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# West Europe Report

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27 August 1984

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## PRINCIPLE OF BILINGUALISM IN WESTERN PROVINCES EXPLORED

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 6 Jun 84 p 9

[Article by Stan C. Roberts: "Bilingualism in the West, or the Art of the Possible", taken from notes for a speech at the symposium entitled "The Linguistic Question and the Canadian West"]

[Text] As one of our large newspapers is demonstrating, the question is far from settled. It even became again the subject of political debate on the occasion of the changes that are taking place or will take place in the leadership of the two major federal parties.

The record we are to explore is a very delicate one, likely to provoke very strong reactions. I have been asked to start the discussion today on "language in the public and private sectors." I promise you I will not prove to be as particular in my choice of words as certain persons who are currently campaigning on the national scene!

I must confess that I have never ceased to defend the cause of bilingualism. "The Canadian identity"--if you will permit me to use that somewhat outmoded term--stems partly from the fact that Canada was founded by two peoples which, for all practical purposes, make up two nations. It will continue to exist only if we can live together, like each other and communicate with each other.

But the word "bilingualism" does not assume the same meaning for all Canadians and in the country's different regions. The dictionary defines it as "the quality possessed by a person who uses two languages fluently."

But in the West, bilingualism--and the programs created to accomplish that objective--encompasses a much broader reality. To the francophones who inhabit that region, it means the right to communicate with the administration in their own language and the means of safeguarding their culture.

Some anglophones, on the other hand, see it only as programs intended to make them swallow French by force. Believe it or not, there are some who are even opposed to having cereal boxes and the signs in the national parks in both languages.

As for the Western Canadians who have come here from other countries, they consider the constitutionalization of the francophones' linguistic rights as the

bestowal of "special status" on that group and they believe it fails to take into account the considerable contribution of other cultural groups to the development of this region.

These divergent and complex attitudes seem to be the result of the very geography of our country--of its immensity--and of its history.

It is clear that the federal linguistic policy is based on a historical fact, namely that Canada was born of the union of two founding peoples, the English and the French.

But the West has not followed the same progression as the center of the country. Our historic roots are not the same. That region was colonized by immigrants from all corners of the world, some of whom arrived in the country via the United States or traveled across Quebec and Ontario directly, to settle in their new homes. Since it became part of the Confederation (with the possible sole exception of Manitoba), the West has been multicultural.

This is why, in the West, the French Canadians are considered merely another group that has contributed to opening up that region. Not to stress this point too much, I should like to cite some data taken from the 1981 census that seem to me extremely eloquent:

Manitoba:

Total population: 1,025,000  
Mother tongue, French: (5 percent) 52,000  
Other languages: (24 percent) 240,000

Saskatchewan:

Total population: 965,000  
Mother tongue, French: (2.6 percent) 25,000  
Other languages: (18 percent) 172,000

Alberta:

Total population: 2,240,000  
Mother tongue, French: (2.5 percent) 62,000  
Other languages: (16 percent) 365,000

British Columbia:

Total population: 2,745,000  
Mother tongue, French: (1.6 percent) 45,000  
Other languages: (16 percent) 450,000

Yukon:

Total population: 23,000  
Mother tongue, French: (2.5 percent) 585  
Other languages: (10 percent) 2,330

Northwest Territories:

Total population: 45,740  
Mother tongue, French: (2.7 percent) 1,240  
Other languages: (43 percent) 19,760

I am not presenting these statistics to justify a breach of our commitment to bilingualism, but rather to emphasize the West's cultural heritage. Many Canadians in that region wonder why bilingual services need to be provided there.

By way of an answer, many logical reasons can be put forward, in particular the fact that Canada was created in 1867 thanks to a collaboration agreement between two founding peoples who spoke English and French. Bilingual services therefore serve to consecrate that historic understanding and to put in concrete form the affirmation that francophones can play a major role everywhere in the country without sacrificing their distinctive linguistic character. (Many Western Canadians, whether they be anglophones or from another ethnic group, quite simply do not understand this fundamental contract).

This leads us to another question, what kind of a Canada we want to have. If we want to have a country that remembers its history, that is based on mutual respect and understanding between its diverse cultural groups, who want to take full advantage of each one's contribution, the bilingualism policy is now more than ever justified. It is also indispensable that this position be explained to each and everyone.

But what kind of bilingual services must be provided over the short and the long terms? How can they be put in place? It is to questions of this nature that Western Canadians want to obtain an answer, in this final quarter of the 20th century. It is thus a matter of how, considering the cultural context of the West, we can implement effective bilingualism programs without causing repercussions likely to damage the national unity we are rightly trying to protect.

I should now like to share with you some of my views on the question. I dare to hope that they will keep the discussion going.

Having studied Canada's history in both languages (that is, with teachers and with different manuals), I am convinced that we must find a means of presenting to all our young people a more uniform and consistent vision of the past. In fact, we can only appreciate our nation's uniqueness if we look at the whole Confederation in the same way.

The teaching of languages also seems to me an essential element of any permanent solution. I believe this question is to be the subject of another meeting, but right now I should like to point out that we will never settle our difficulties by refusing to grant the francophones of the West an education in their own language and to give the anglophones solid courses in French.

In that area we have two reasons for rejoicing. First, I believe we can count on a favorable interpretation, by the school authorities and the courts, of the "sufficient number" condition provided for in the new charter. Secondly, Canadians finally seem to be overcoming their innate resistance to learning two or more languages, primarily because of the growing interest being stirred up by programs for immersion in French at the elementary level. The demand greatly exceeds the supply. Among other places, this is the case in Calgary and Vancouver. This reversal will perhaps incite the provincial and school administrations to set up programs more likely than those of the past to produce bilingual people. This enables us to hope for a true linguistic equality--"equality" if you will--in all of the regions.

Now let us examine what is being done in the public and private sectors and what can be done in the immediate future and the remote future.

The federal bilingualism programs in force since 1969 have placed the accent on the linguistic rights of persons inhabiting the "bilingual center" of the country, and, up to a certain point, on the support to be granted to the linguistic minorities of the other regions. In 15 years the federal ministries have achieved real progress with respect to administering the most common public services in both languages.

At the provincial level, however, one does not find the same desire to furnish bilingual services. The ministries and corporations of the Crown in Alberta and British Columbia, those that have been investigated, stated for the most part that they had no bilingualism policy for providing or promoting services in French.

The same situation is found as far as the private sector in the West is concerned: quite simply, no policy on the subject exists. Last week, I communicated with four large employers from that region and saw that none of their personnel departments had established or tried to establish a program dealing with the use of French in the workplace or in customer relations.

Any sensible civil servant or businessman knows that to succeed he must communicate with the public in the public's own language. But, as demonstrated by the statistics I cited earlier, in the West there is no pressing economic need to serve the public in French. We point out that in that region "bilingual" service does not necessarily mean service in French and English!

Having said that, it is now a matter of determining what measures are to be taken in the 1980s to effectively raise the level of bilingualism in the West's public and private sectors. We have posed the problem; now how are we going to solve it?

First, we must encourage--and not oblige or force--Western Canadians to learn a second or even a third language. This means stressing regional strategies and motivational techniques rather than strictly legal measures. One of the challenges we will have to meet between now and the end of the present decade will be to make all Western Canadians aware of our national heritage, so they will be proud of it. Of course, we can congratulate ourselves that Canada is not a monocultural melting pot and that we are able to use our two official languages and others besides. But, to get these ideas across we must not hesitate to resort to the techniques of marketing or commercialization.

If tomorrow all employees of provincial administrations or corporations of the Crown were required to be functionally bilingual, there is no doubt that many Western Canadians, competent as they might be in all other respects, would be removed from some positions.

The effect of a policy of that kind would be to provoke a new and vigorous opposition to bilingualism, in such a way that instead of making progress in reciprocal understanding, we would be taking a step backwards.

Perhaps we should consider a different perspective. Potential managers, for example, might be informed of the possibility that bilingualism might become one of the criteria for advancement, in the same way that specialized skills in marketing, publicity or human relations are criteria.

In conclusion, I would say that bilingualism in the West, far from being dead, is in abeyance. Despite the absence of a uniform policy in the administrations and the large companies of the three most Western provinces (as I was able to establish by experience and with the help of an uncertain poll), I believe it is possible to consider effectively providing permanent bilingual services in a more positive and less accusatory manner. However, we must avoid, in our haste to accomplish progress, selecting a strict and legalistic point of view which, its objective being to "correct" the situation, might bring negative results.

Pragmatic idealists having made a point of making Canada a home for all Canadians, we must not, if we are to accomplish our fundamental objectives, impose certain measures, but we must make use of instruction and judicious marketing techniques and show a little patience. As far as instruction is concerned, it means giving our young people an accurate and consistent view of Canada's history, honoring our commitment to the francophones and providing instruction in French to the francophones as much as to the anglophones.

To sell bilingualism, we have to convince the young and the less young of the fact that learning French can be both amusing and enriching. Provided we use the appropriate techniques, we will see our patience rewarded: most Western Canadians will want to think, speak and work effectively in both of the official languages.

8946

CSO: 3619/78

## TURNER SEEN AS LACKING DECISIVE PROGRAM

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 16 Jul 84 p 6

[Article by Marc Laurendeau]

[Text] A week after the opening of the federal election campaign, it is apparent John Napier Turner is not benefitting fully from the advantageous position of authority that his post of incumbent and outgoing prime minister ("incumbency") gives him. His blunders put him constantly in a defensive position. In contrast, Brian Mulroney is taking advantage of his role as head of the opposition; the vagueness of his promises hardly attracts any attention. He remains, with certain exceptions, generally on the offensive. In 7 weeks from now, the 2 and 1/2-point lead the Liberals now enjoy could prove to be fragile.

After undertaking, during his contest for the leadership, to reduce the \$30 billion deficit within 7 years, John Turner now raises the possibility of increasing the deficit a little more "if there are good reasons for it." No doubt, the prime minister-designate is worried about the rise in interest rates. Repayment of the Canadian government debt will cost more and thus increase the deficit.

Turner is perceived also as wanting to cut the ground out from under his Conservative opponent, Brian Mulroney, who has already begun to make alluring electoral promises (involving a certain cost). But, in trying to hit back at the head of the Conservatives, John Turner is forgetting to keep his own position consistent.

Seeing his opponent maneuver, John Turner may hope to give himself room for maneuver in advance in the hope of encouraging investment. But John Turner seems to be improvising on these fundamental questions. A wave of hope brought the new Bay Street leader to his high position. Thanks to his connections and his support, he was thought to be capable of devising a vast economic strategy, one that, in particular, would reduce unemployment.

In this regard, John Turner is not seen as having any real government program nor of having done any ingenious planning. In 1968, Pierre Trudeau promised, upon taking power, to establish "the just society." He already hinted at a bill of rights. More recently, Ronald Reagan also announced a specific program



of government, in particular a reduction in taxes that would enable the private sector to spark economic recovery. John Turner tries more pragmatically to adapt to events.

The resignation of Mrs Monique Begin does not necessarily indicate a difference of opinion with the prime minister-designate. But it is certainly revealing that her departure took Turner himself by surprise. This indicates, at the very least, that the consultations preceding the formation of the new cabinet were superficial.

Turner seems not to have ascertained that Mrs Monique Begin could work together with her colleagues. How could she have agreed to be flanked by Messrs Chretien and Ouellet in Quebec? She had already said that Chretien "lacked class" and Ouellet had pitilessly commented on Mrs Begin's departure by saying that she had "done her time." She seems not to have had very warm relations with them. Above all, with Mrs Judy Erola in charge as minister of state, could the minister of health have hoped to have challenging duties? Turner seems not to have inquired sufficiently into the impressions of the principal person involved, Monique Begin.

With regard to the hypothetical departure of his finance minister, Marc Lalonde, John Turner rendered him a very special tribute. "Mr Lalonde is the man most capable of insuring the stability of our economy," Turner declared, recalling that the minister is "still young, still dynamic" and has "unlimited possibilities before him." Expressions suited to the occasion. These are the words used in businesses in connection with a firing or an involuntary departure. In forming his cabinet, John Turner got no assurances that the ministers appointed would remain part of the team for the next election.

From all this, the impression emerges of a ship whose officers are leaving it one after the other. Or that at least they are hesitant about staying with it to the next port. In strategic terms, it would have been better for John Turner had he taken the initiative himself and reorganized the cabinet more radically.

Embarrassed by the collapse of the dollar and the small surge in interest rates, the Turner government finds itself obliged to defend certain appointments that have been announced in an unacceptable diplomatic form that, moreover, is highly questionable on ethical grounds. To extricate himself from such a legacy, John Turner will have to put forward a brilliant program of government. Even if, thanks to summer's charms and the holidays, this election will be decided largely on the basis of images, opinions on substantive issues will also count in the end.

12336

CSO: 3619/79

## MANEUVERINGS TO INHERIT JORGENSEN'S POSITION CONTINUE IN SDP

Jorgensen Determined, Somewhat Disillusioned

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 20-26 Jul 84 pp 1, 8

[Commentary by John Wagner]

[Text] It is a thoughtful Anker Jorgensen who is walking around in the Norwegian mountains at this time. But he is not thinking about resigning. Anker Jorgensen is somewhat disillusioned about his party's defeat in the EC election and inwardly irritated by the "war of succession" that has followed in the wake of the battle over who would be his new female vice chairman. But that will not lead to his resignation. On the contrary. Anker Jorgensen takes his party's crisis as a challenge and longs for the Social Democratic upturn that could restore him to the post where he felt at home, namely the prime ministership.

This weekend--on Saturday, 21 July--it is 113 years since Lieutenant Louis Pio and his cousin, Harald Brix, published the first issue of the weekly paper, SOCIALISTEN. That created a socialist movement in Denmark and the Social Democrats regard that day in July 1871 as the party's founding date. In April 1924 the SDP became Denmark's biggest party and in March 1943 the party received no less than 44.5 percent of the votes. As recently as the election in September 1979 the Social Democrats received 38.3 percent of the votes. But things have gone downhill since then and in the EC election on 14 June the party got only 19.5 percent of the votes, less than the votes cast for the Conservative Party or for the People's Movement Against EC.

Now Anker Jorgensen--the Social Democratic Party leader since 2 October 1972--is wandering around the Norwegian mountainsides and pulling himself together after the election defeat and the soul-searching process it led to. So far the soul-searching has mainly concerned who will succeed former Gladsaxe mayor Tove Smidth as female vice chairman of the SDP and who will

succeed newly-elected EC Parliament member Ejner Hovgaard Christiansen as party secretary. As reported in BERLINGSKE AFTEN last week the lines are drawn for an exciting contested election at the congress on 15-20 September.

It has caused quite a stir that the debate on the vacant top posts turned so quickly into a regular war of succession. Although Anker Jorgensen, who turned 62 last Friday, has insisted that he has no current plans to step down as party chairman and thus as the SDP candidate for the prime minister post, the daily press and many of his party colleagues are acting as if Anker Jorgensen has had plans for early retirement for quite a while now. One day POLITIKEN wrote (4 days after EKSTRA BLADET) that Aarhus Social Democrats want former Labor Minister Svend Auken as the new male vice chairman instead of former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen because Auken, not Heinesen, should stand out as Anker Jorgensen's successor. The next day the same paper wrote that Folketing Speaker Svend Jakobsen is Anker Jorgensen's favorite to succeed him as party chairman.

#### Knud Heinesen Ready to Jump In

Our impression is that the only thing definite about the succession question is that Knud Heinesen will succeed Anker Jorgensen if he has to resign this year or next. In that case Anker Jorgensen would give the nod to Heinesen and Heinesen would accept the offer unless there was a contested election. And that is regarded as unthinkable.

If Anker Jorgensen "serves out his time," as they say, which is what he himself wants to do, time will be on the side of younger candidates for chairman than Knud Heinesen who is only 10 years younger than Anker Jorgensen. Four people are being mentioned and they are, in alphabetical order, Svend Auken, Ritt Bjerregaard, Svend Jakobsen and possibly Birte Weiss.

BERLINGSKE AFTEN has talked to prominent Social Democrats who feel it is "highly likely" that Anker Jorgensen will remain in office for at least 5 and perhaps as many as 6 or 7 years. At least it is widely believed that he will not resign before he has once more seen his party make gains in a Folketing election and insured the party a stronger position in Folketing efforts. Several people have stressed that a victory in the municipal elections in the spring would not be enough for Anker Jorgensen, who is always ready for a good fight.

"He will not be satisfied before he has toppled Schluter," said one party colleague, "not because Anker has anything against Schluter--he doesn't--but because he does not want to have the reputation of being the party chairman who cost the party the most votes in addition to surrendering government power to the nonsocialists without getting it back."

If at some point Anker Jorgensen manages to make a comeback as prime minister, it is considered certain that he will relatively quickly prepare for a change in leadership so his successor can gain experience as prime

minister before the next election campaign. Now we are operating with a time frame of 3-4-5 years and by then it is thought Knud Heinesen would be on his way out of the picture as a possible successor. But who would be in line then?

Experienced political observers point out that Anker Jorgensen became Jens Otto Krag's successor because Krag had a clear feeling that the party base needed a striking shift in leadership. After a pompous academician the exact opposite type, as represented by Anker Jorgensen, was needed--the typical LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] worker. In the same way Anker Jorgensen is expected to take a look at the situation that exists when he names his successor. Is the time ripe for a woman to become party chairman (and possibly prime minister)? Should there be a large or a small generation shift? How much influence should the union movement have on the selection? Are there other people besides academic types in the running? Which candidates have the best relations with the parties they will have to work with in Folketing? These are only a small portion of the many questions Anker Jorgensen must take into consideration.

#### Time on Svend Auken's Side

If time is running out for economist Knud Heinesen, Svend Auken is thought to have the best chance of becoming Anker Jorgensen's successor. Auken, who is 41 years old, has a degree in political science and has been a member of Folketing since 1971. He is one of that body's most talented, tactically shrewd and audacious politicians. Auken's strongest point is his political flair which has been well-developed by the party's so-called national tactician, former Transportation Minister Jens Risgaard Knudsen. Thus in his party's opposition period Svend Auken has gone out of his way to demonstrate willingness to cooperate (even in the area of security policy with which he is usually not concerned) and to stay on good terms with the Radical Liberal politicians (read Niels Helveg Petersen) he would have to work with if he gets the job of regaining for the Social Democrats the influence they used to have.

Svend Jakobsen, who is 48 years old and was trained as a store clerk, runs the same risk as Knud Heinesen of being too old to replace Anker Jorgensen. These two--Svend Jakobsen and Knud Heinesen--also have in common the fact that their level of ambition is relatively low and that the only reason they would take on the job of party leader is that they have feelings of obligation to the labor movement. Svend Jakobsen is a likely compromise candidate if there were signs of a showdown between Svend Auken and Ritt Bjerregaard, for example, or if the party needed a chairman who can recreate broad cooperation in Folketing. It could turn out to be Svend Jakobsen's enormous strength, but also his weakness, that at times he has been better liked by the nonsocialist parties than by his own.

In addition to the three men, two of the strongest Social Democratic women are ready and waiting to jump in. Former Social Affairs Minister Ritt Bjerregaard, 43 years old and former teacher's college instructor, has been

mentioned innumerable times as a possible successor and there is no question that she has the leadership abilities that might be lacking in others. But Ritt Bjerregaard's problem to an increasing extent is that many people have begun to fear her well-known ability and strong desire to gain influence.

The other woman candidate being mentioned in Social Democratic circles--at least by AKTUELT's editor in chief, Harry Rasmussen--is the chairman of the Radio Council, journalist Birte Weiss, 43, who is currently the favorite to replace Tove Smidth as female vice chairman. But it has been stressed to this newspaper that neither Knud Heinesen, who suggested Birte Weiss, nor Anker Jorgensen, who so warmly supported her, has considered Birte Weiss in the role of party chairman. And this is certainly also true of the top union leaders who only supported Birte Weiss instead of Folketing member Helle Degn because Ritt Bjerregaard supports Helle Degn and because the union movement was unable to talk the chairman of the Domestic Workers' Union, Bodil Mogensen, into running for the vacant vice chairmanship post.

So the selection of a new party chairman, when this finally occurs, could also be a question of who should not have more power. But it is still too early to rule out Ritt Bjerregaard who has demonstrated before her formidable ability to come back after painful defeats. As she put it so forcefully:

"What stands to the credit or the discredit of a Social Democratic representative are the concrete results that are achieved for unimportant and underprivileged people. It is not the words that are spoken or the slogans that are displayed. It is not the way one lives, the friends one has, the drinks one consumes, the hotels where one lives or the clothes one wears."

But even so.

#### Fight for Vice Chairmanship

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] It is now definite that there will be at least two women candidates for the Social Democratic vice chairmanship at the congress in September. One with broad support from the women, the other backed by the party leadership and influential voter associations.

"The profile both Birte Weiss and I present in the Social Democratic Party is that there must be a more striking opposition policy. So there is no real difference in the line we represent. But I will not give up my candidacy for the vice chairmanship even so."

So said Helle Degn who is a little "tired" of the fact that the debate on the SDP prior to the congress in September has involved personalities to such a large extent. "But there is nothing strange or threatening about the fact that two women are running for the same position," she said.

Since she came home to a "party in crisis" after a 2-week camping vacation in Greece--deliberately cut off from all information about Denmark--Helle Degn has read the newspapers and been in contact with the people who encouraged her to run for the office.

"It is not just the SDP Equal Rights Committee but a great many women in executive committees, steering committees, the Folketing group and my own election district who have now asked me to stay with my candidacy," Helle Degn told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

Helle Degn does not conceal the fact that there is something to talk about when it comes to the party's opposition line. When she says that there is a need for a more striking line in the SDP, it means--translated from political language--that things have not been done well so far and that the party must "show its teeth" to the nonsocialist government to a much larger extent.

At the same time Helle Degn says that the debate on a new structure for the entire party apparatus will be an "especially exciting element" at the congress. Thus she indirectly supports the critical "regular party soldiers" who feel the apparatus is not functioning well enough.

One thing is now definite. There will be a contested election for the post of woman vice chairman in the SDP in September. Helle Degn is the candidate of a large number of active women Social Democrats--while Birte Weiss has support among party leaders who gave her 9 out of 13 votes. But she also has the support of a number of influential voter associations which were consulted before she was nominated.

#### Former SDP Minister Joins Fight

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Thomas Uhrskov]

[Text] The internal SDP conflict over the vice chairmanship became even more bitter yesterday. Former Housing Minister Erling Olsen accused the candidate of the women's wing, Helle Degn, of wanting to continue the "deficit policy" and hand out free tickets to the grass roots. Erling Olsen is making the SDP superfluous, Helle Degn replied.

Yesterday former Housing Minister Erling Olsen made a violent attack on the SDP women's wing's candidate for the party vice chairmanship, Helle Degn.

Erling Olsen said to TV News:

"If one follows Helle Degn's political line, one will continue the deficit policy. That means an attempt to provide more work in order to save on support payments--and that is economically indefensible. It also means that leaders of grass-roots movements would get a free ticket to leading party positions.

"Denmark should produce its way out of the crisis. We must look out that we do not just speak out for the weakest groups who are now in the minority.

"If the Social Democratic Party becomes narrow, the party's century is over."

Helle Degn said that Erling Olsen's position makes the SDP superfluous. She said:

"It is obvious that we must produce our way out of the crisis. But Erling Olsen's line leads to nonsocialist politics.

"And what is the point of the SDP unless we are the strongest spokesmen for the weakest people in society? If the weakest groups are not our most important area, the party's century is really over and done with.

"I do not think the country's economy can be saved by cutting the public sector to shreds," said Helle Degn.

The two vice chairmanship positions in the SDP are the background for the conflict.

A total of three candidates have been nominated to the two vice chairmanship posts. They are Knud Heinesen, Birte Weiss and Helle Degn.

6578

CSO: 3613/204

## KURDS ESTABLISH INSTITUTE, ASSERT DEMANDS AT CONGRESS

West Berlin TAGESZEITUNG in German 19 Jun 84 p 8

[Article by Juergen Gottschlich: "International Kurdish Congress in Dortmund. 'We Are A Separate People'"]

[Excerpts] Dortmund (TAZ)--The demand for recognition as a separate people was the central issue of the final resolution passed by an inter-Kurdish congress which concluded last weekend in Dortmund. At the invitation of the University of Dortmund the first scholarly congress on German soil to deal with the situation in Kurdistan and in particular with the problems of Kurdish emigrants in Western Europe was held here over a three day period. Since the Kurds, the fourth largest ethnic group in the Near East, have been divided among the countries of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria since the end of the First World War, they are classified primarily as emigrants from these countries. One of the main concerns of this congress was to make clear to the Kurds living in the FRG the consequences of such an attitude.

The just under 400,000 Kurds living in the FRG, most of whom have Turkish citizenship, receive no instruction in their native language here, nor does the scope of assistance to foreigners include any other services in the Kurdish language. The refusal up to now of the television and radio networks to include Kurdish language broadcasts in their programming was also strongly criticized. According to the official concluding statement of the congress, the FRG, in contrast to France and the Scandinavian countries, has up to now acted as an aide to the Turkish government which is brutally suppressing the Kurds.

"We, that is the Kurds within the FRG, must first find a forum from which we can make ourselves heard. Making ourselves noticed is the first step toward identity." Dr Yekta of the Kurdish Institute in Bonn, which has been in existence since the end of last year, was intimately involved in the preparations for this congress. He makes no secret of how happy he was that the University of Dortmund made itself available as a forum. This could be a signal, he hoped, that in the future the Kurds would also receive the attention due them in the FRG, at least from a scholarly point of view.

Such hopes were encouraged by the vice president of the University of Dortmund. In his welcoming speech, he pointed out that scholarship, considered so open to



new ideas, could play an important role by taking an interest in the Kurds, a largely ignored minority in the FRG up to now.

It was a historic moment for the Kurdish emigrants in the FRG to finally hear a "qualified" source grant them their identity as a people rather than labeling them according to their mostly involuntary citizenship as Turks, Iraqis, Syrians or Iranians.

It has taken long enough. Ever since the victorious allies redrew the map of the Near East in accordance with their own interests following the First World War, the Kurdish settlements have been divided among four different nations, three of which in their currently existing form were first created at that time--Syria and Iraq as French and English mandated territories, and Turkey as a truncated version of the former Ottoman empire. It was emphasized repeatedly during the congress that in view of the 3000-year history of the Kurdish people these arbitrary borders forced upon them from without were unacceptable and had no significance as far as the identity of the Kurds was concerned. However, any recourse to history even by one of the most well-known Kurdish intellectuals, Dr Ismet Serif Vanly, who gave a detailed account of Kurdish history from its origins in the Median Empire long before the birth of Christ, is overridden by the fact that the Kurds today, in the age of national states, have missed the boat.

#### Long-Term Emigration

Discussions at the congress on the political situation in the "homeland" turned more and more frequently into discussions of the questions of exile and emigration, the reason being ever increasing awareness that what was originally viewed as a brief exile in Western Europe--be it as an invited guest worker or as a political refugee--has evidently turned into long-term emigration. The above-mentioned Kurdish Institute in Bonn, founded just 1 year after the establishment of a Kurdish Institute in Paris, is a reflection of this recognition. The purpose of these institutes is above all to serve the cultural and social interests of the Kurds living in Europe, a first attempt at providing that which other nations also provide for their people living abroad. Dr Kendal Nezan, a physicist and president of the institute, enumerated for the audience just how many Kurds already make up this European minority. Beginning with the nearly 400,000 Kurds in the FRG, and including the ever decreasing numbers in France, Holland, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and Scandinavia, respectively, more than half a million Kurds from the Kurdish part of Turkey alone live in these countries.

#### "Differentiations Discouraged"

In all frankness President von Arnberg of the regional administration in North Rhine-Westphalia pointed out to the organizers of the Bochum Kemnade (the largest annual German-foreign cultural festival) in 1979 already that a "differentiation of Turkish citizenship according to Kurdish and non-Kurdish roots" was undesirable. Particularly "in the case of NATO-member Turkey," such support of separatist movements would "run counter to West German security interests." This view put forth by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and

the Foreign Ministry, aroused to action by complaints from the Turkish ambassador, has certainly not changed up to now. As a representative of the Kurdish exile organization "Komkar" reported, the WDR and ZDF radio and TV networks just last year turned down Kurdish broadcasts with virtually identical arguments even after "Komkar" had presented them with such a request signed by 20,000 Kurds. Unless the Kurds receive more support from the West German public, their situation is not likely to change.

12552

CSO: 3620/389

## SPARTAN WELFARE BENEFITS FOR 4 MILLION 'NEW POOR'

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 26/27 May 84 p 8

[Article by Christian Schneider: "The New Poverty: The Last Safety Net Threatens to Snap"]

[Text] Department stores and many retail stores have reason to rejoice. For some time they have been observing a pronounced trend toward the exquisite among a segment of their customers. While junk and cheap products are moving only sluggishly, numerous customers deliberately choose everything that is beautiful and of good quality. In most cases they don't even ask for the price first. It appears, nothing is too expensive for the Germans. The reflection of a rich community? Probably more of a caricature.

The message from the sales emporiums threatens to distort the view of the public of the social reality in the FRG. For parallel to the yearning for luxury grows especially the number of those who have hardly enough money for the barest necessities.

The signs of widening poverty are increasing. For example, lately more and more people are coming to the clothing stores and furniture depots of the Caritas charity, who want to clothe or provide themselves with cast-off clothes or discarded items. And in the advisory offices of the Catholic welfare association, people are "crying more" than in the past, according to the recent alarming statement by Christian Schmierer, department head for the open social services with the Caritas association of the Munich and Freising arch dioceses.

The officially acknowledged poverty, for years apparently a sociopolitical residual item, has grown alarmingly, similar to unemployment. While the number of welfare recipients remained almost constant between 1965 and 1970 at about 1.4 million, in 1982 (later figures are not yet available) there were 2.31 million--with further growing tendency.

But actually the number of needy is likely to be almost twice that provided by the official statistics. Thus the Cologne "Institute for Social Research and Social Policy" (at the behest of the federal family ministry) has found out that for each 52 registered welfare recipients there are 48 more persons entitled to submit claims. They shy away from going to the social welfare

office either out of ignorance or--more frequently--out of pride, shame or fear of what acquaintances, neighbors, and relatives would say.

As Antje Huber, the former federal family minister once put it, welfare is "the last safety net of social security." It has been created for cases in which other forms of social security, such as health insurance, retirement benefits, and unemployment insurance are no longer effective. Until a few years ago, women were still heading the list of welfare recipients. In the meantime the share of mothers bringing up children by themselves predominate. Added to that are a constantly increasing number of jobless, but also handicapped, persons in need of care, and finally also political asylum-seeking persons. And, according to observations by social welfare offices, the persons entitled to file claims are getting younger all the time: school leavers without a position as an apprentice or without a job, university graduates who are unable to find positions after completion of their studies.

Even now the lowest safety net of social security is "irresponsibly overtaxed," as a resolution of the Deutsche Landkreistag (rural district conference) states. This can hardly be attributed to abuse or raised expectations of those seeking help, as it is often heard at the corner pub. Overtaxing of the safety net is caused by the fact that the anyway short financial possibilities of those entitled to make claims have been drastically reduced by public economy measures.

In its book "Der Sozialstaat in der Krise" (The Social Welfare State in Crisis) the German Caritas Association recalls the budget structural law of the social-liberal coalition and the subsequent budget-associated law of the present government. Examples are restrictions on unemployment benefits, reductions in housing allowance, children's allowances, as well as in promoting the training of students, the new rent laws, and the reductions in the maternity allowance. The consequence: more and more FRG citizens have to go to the social welfare office. Particularly the family, which, according to family minister Heiner Gessler, is "in the center of our policy," is "on account of the cuts in the social welfare laws, on a tightly packed down-escalator."

The bill for the Bonn economy-mindedness by which the Federal Government relieves the load on itself must be paid by the municipalities, i.e. the cities and the rural districts as responsible bodies for welfare. While in 1965, DM 2.1 billion was spent for welfare payments, in 1982 these payments already amounted to DM 16.24 billion. What that means specifically is made clear by a comparison of statistics by the Augsburg rural district head Franz Xaver Frey, chairman of the Bavarian rural district association: In 1970, the Bavarian municipalities by themselves had to pay DM 54 expressed in terms of the number of inhabitants; now it has become DM 250 per year.

But: roughly two-thirds of these welfare payments come under "aid in special situations" according to the definition of the federal welfare law (BSHG). Thus these are financial payments for old age and cases requiring nursing who are placed in homes for the aged and nursing homes for the aged. Noticeable easing of the burden could be achieved here by the introduction of the nursing cost insurance which is not yet being considered by the Federal Government. But that is another matter.

But also the "subsistence aid," the classical case of welfare, cost a good deal. Whoever cannot meet his basic needs is entitled to this aid. In this connection it makes no difference what the causes for this inability may be. According to the Federation of German Towns, overall the expenditures of the municipalities for current "subsistence aid" of needy increased by just under DM 1 billion to a total of roughly DM 5.4 billion. An impressive sum, it might be said.

What is too much for the communities as paymasters has an entirely different effect on the needy recipients. In the opinion of Caritas, the aid for the individual is "too little to live and too much to die." It is the purpose of welfare, according to article 1 of the BSHG to "enable the recipient... to lead a life fitting for the dignity of man." Taking into account all possibilities for support, an adult welfare recipient in Bavaria at this time must be able to make ends meet with a so-called standard rate (the amount varies from federal province to federal province) of DM 335 a month. Caritas social affairs specialist Christian Schmierer, Munich, thinks that it is "nearly cynical" to speak in this connection of "leading a life of human dignity."

#### 15 Grams of Soap

Basis of the regular payment rate is a so-called quantity pattern of essential commodities, in general parlance referred to as "market basket." It includes all goods and services required by an adult to be able to eke out a scanty living at the subsistence level.

#### "Decreed Nutritional Deficiency"

According to the "market basket" now in effect, which is supposed to be emptied even further, an adult single person under 65 years of age is entitled to the following food per month from welfare:

2,400 grams of bread

960 grams of baked goods

640 grams of flour

40 grams of semolina

160 grams of rolled oats

6,100 grams of potatoes

160 grams of beans

80 grams of veal

440 grams of pork

400 grams of beef

100 grams of candy

6 liters of milk

1-1/2 bars of chocolate.

According to the same pattern, a welfare recipient must make do with one roll of toilet paper a month, must use only three razorblades and 15 grams of soap. Furthermore, he is granted four cans of beer and a small package of tobacco. Furthermore, he is permitted to travel 34 kilometers by federal railroad, to go to the movies once every half a year and use up 24 sheets of writing paper.

If the welfare recipient were to strictly adhere to the planned need for "cooking heat and lighting, he would be able to listen to radio for about half an hour a day, see TV for 11.3 minutes, switch on a lamp for 20 minutes, and iron for 30 minutes. He could operate the refrigerator for only one hour a day and the washing machine only once a month.

In connection with this quantity pattern of essential commodities, experts have been talking of "decreed nutritional deficiency" for a long time. It is true, the standards were repeatedly slightly increased over the years. But the welfare recipients had to accept even further income losses.

The market basket, last compiled in 1970, is in urgent need of being brought up to date and adapted to the changed living and consumption habits. An updating promised for 1975 was not done. In 1981, the "German Association for Public and Private Welfare" (representatives from municipalities, provinces, and various federal authorities belong to it) presented a new market basket which was nearly one third more expensive than the old one. It was not accepted by the cities and rural districts. An interministerial working group consisting of the Federal Government and the provinces has been pondering over a new market basket for over two years. According to the latest information, the proposal is to be submitted to the Bundestag after the summer recess. Insiders are starting from the assumption that the new market basket could be even emptier.

Even now the specialists in the town halls are trying to economize on the burdens that have been placed on cities and municipalities as a result of business stagnation and the Bonn economy-mindedness. According to Caritas observations, the scope of discretion is being interpreted more and more restrictively, those seeking assistance are referred to the free welfare associations "with intolerable harshness." "The poor have become fair game" whom no parliamentary lobby supports, according to Christian Schmierer of the Caritas.

More and more frequently, welfare recipients who can no longer make ends meet with the officially decreed rates must ask Caritas and other welfare associations for additional emergency money. However, such additional aid can be provided only temporarily and in extreme emergency situations. The number of these emergency cases has become so great that the Caritas association of the Munich and Freising archdiocese feels obliged to establish a special support fund for the jobless. The intended purpose is aid to avoid a threatened stopping of training, avoiding homelessness, or bridging of waiting periods until public assistance is paid. It can be no more than a drop in the bucket.

## 'POVERTY' PROBLEM SURFACES WITH CONTINUED HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 12 Jul 84 p 13

[Article by Birgit Morgenrath: "'New Poverty' in the Federal Republic"]

[Text] The Bonn economy-mindedness and the growing chronic unemployment push more and more unemployed into financial isolation. This is the result of a study entitled "The New Poverty," which, as already reported, was drawn up by scientists by the Rhenish Journalists Bureau, Cologne, on behalf of the Hans Boeckler Foundation of the German Labor Union Federation. Unemployment pay was drastically reduced at the beginning of 1984 not only for unemployed training graduates but also for jobless without children. The childless now receive a 5-percent lower support rate--on the average DM 70 less per month. Two-thirds of all those receiving unemployment pay were affected by this reduction. The average unemployment pay paid out, DM 941 per month, dropped below the level of 3 years ago (1981: DM 948).

Fewer and fewer jobless are, however, entitled to unemployment pay. Not even every second registered jobless (47 percent) receives this insurance benefit. Especially jobless who remain without work for over one year and thus lose their claim to unemployment pay are dependent upon the reduced scale of unemployment relief. But the unemployment relief rate, too, was reduced for the childless by DM 27 per month on the average. Only DM 694 of unemployment relief per month is paid to the jobless on the average.

The so-called means test for unemployment relief also causes many jobless to come away empty-handed from the labor offices. In September 1983, a total of 637,000 registered jobless received neither unemployment pay nor unemployment relief. That is about as many as the number of inhabitants of the city of Frankfurt and over 130,000 more than in 1982.

These excluded jobless--as they are called in the DGB study--for one thing include many longer-term jobless. For the labor offices they are not needy because they have an earning spouse. The income of the spouse is counted in full against the unemployment relief except for minimal personal allowances (DM 75 per week plus DM 35 for each dependent child). These personal allowances have not been changed for 15 years. As a consequence, even jobless whose spouses earn only about DM 1,200 per month today as a rule are no longer regarded as needy and are excluded from unemployment relief.

Further excluded are those jobless who do not succeed in entering or reentering working life or who can only prove short periods of employment covered by social insurance (qualifying times) prior to their unemployment. In 1982, the qualifying times were doubled, for unemployment pay from 6 to 12 months, and for unemployment relief from 70 to 150 days. It is especially these (extended) qualifying periods over which many youths, foreigners, and women fail to qualify.

Economizing and increasing poverty are not the only effects of the Bonn exclusion policy. For increasing numbers of jobless who lost their claim to unemployment compensation as a result of the recent years' stiffening of the law gave up. They no longer reported to the labor offices and disappeared into the so-called hidden reserves of the labor market. Roughly one million jobless who could not expect either job or money from the labor office retired into the hidden reserves and no longer turn up in any official unemployment statistics. Thus Bonn's economy-mindedness indirectly also leads to an erroneous reduction of the already high unemployment figures.

In the meantime, the Bonn economy-mindedness had the effect desired by the budget politicians: the deficit of the Federal Institute for Labor declined--in spite of increased unemployment figures--from DM 8.3 billion in 1981 to 1.6 billion in 1983. For the first time in a long time, surpluses in unemployment insurance are expected for 1984. All that with at least 1.7 million registered and unregistered jobless who probably will be out of work this year without aid from the labor office.

12356

CSO: 3620/391



## MANY WORKERS FACE WELFARE AFTER JOBLESS BENEFITS EXPIRE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 16 Jul 84 pp 21-22

[Text] Only every third jobless receives unemployment pay even though the Nuremberg Federal Institute has accumulated surpluses amounting to billions.

Hidden call buttons have been attached to desks of the social welfare office in the West Berlin Wedding workers district. Thus the desk officers can trigger an alarm if assistance-seeking Berliners threaten to beat them up.

The security precautions in the Wedding district are not an isolated case, the behavior at the social welfare agencies has become rougher all over the FRG. The officials are no longer dealing exclusively with shamefaced and woebegone welfare recipients from the edges of society. The social welfare assistants frequently are hit with the files.

For more and more frequently, self-assured, formerly relatively well-off heads of families who lost first their job, then their unemployment pay, and finally frequently their dwelling appear at the offices, and in addition young people who never had a job and never received a penny of unemployment pay (called "Alu" in the vernacular).

The "new poor" as the DGB calls them, after being ignored by Bonn politicians for a long time, appear to accidentally develop into the No. 1 social policy issue. The new poverty did not enter the consciousness of the nation until the DGB had reported amazing facts at a press conference last Tuesday: With the help of a study based on figures of the Federal Institute for Labor (Werner Balsen, Hans Nakielski, Karl Roessel, Rolf Winkel: "The New Poverty--Exclusion of Jobless From the Unemployment Compensation" Bund-Verlag, Cologne, 176 pages, DM 12.80), the labor unionists calculated that

--of the 2.1 million jobless registered with the Federal Institute for Labor only 35 percent still receive unemployment pay;

--1.6 million jobless in the FRG must get along without any entitlement to unemployment pay or unemployment relief;

--nearly half of the jobless youths and even 78 percent of the foreign youths without jobs do not get any unemployment benefits.

The result, according to DGB deputy chairman Gerd Muhr: "After 1948 the share of persons getting unemployment pay in the total jobless has never been as low as it is now." And: "Without political countermeasures this trend is likely to continue in the coming years."

While the absolute figure of the excluded jobless has increased almost eight-fold in the past nine years, more and more jobless go to the social welfare offices to apply for over DM 350 a month for "subsistence aid." There is "nothing missing except for work" for every third welfare client, according to Walter Schellhorn, manager of the German Club for Public and Private Welfare.

That far more than one million jobless must live from welfare is, as DGB's Muhr maintains, the "result of a social economizing measures," with which the changed Bonn coalition wanted to restore the impoverished Federal Institute for Labor to financial soundness. Piece by piece, with several changes in the law, the unemployment benefits were reduced.

But an important restriction comes from the social-liberal coalition: Since 1982, unemployment pay can only be demanded by those who during recent years prior to unemployment had paid in contributions for at least 12 months to the Nuremberg insurance—a barrier to those who are just starting in a career and itinerant workers.

But even those who have paid their contributions for three years will get unemployment benefits for only one year, between 59 and 68 percent of the last net wages. Thereafter there is only unemployment relief, between 50 and 58 percent of the last net wages. Only those are getting the support who cannot be supported by other family members.

More jobless are stopped by the one-year limit the longer mass unemployment continues: in 1975, 10 percent of the jobless were without a job for more than a year, in 1983 28.5 percent. Even going to the social welfare office cannot keep these jobless from the crash into social catastrophe. For since 1981 the relief standard according to which the "subsistence aid" is calculated has been nearly frozen by law.

The "capping" of the relief standard adjustment has brought about that meanwhile welfare recipients must live of amounts which are about 20 percent below the poverty line if they do not get special benefits beyond the relief standards, e.g., grants for the purchase of winter clothing or briquettes.

But the social welfare officials of the municipalities are miserly with such special aid since the city treasuries have come under pressure from the jobless needy. Welfare expert Schellhorn already sees "the welfare system overburdened" as a result of the onslaught of the new poor.

According to labor unionists such as Muhr, a remedy is possible only if Bonn extends "the duration for getting unemployment pay, so that the people are kept away from welfare," a proposal for which the DGB can advance a good argument: With its economy measures at the expense of the jobless, the Federal Institute has gone too far.

An interim balance sheet of the unemployment center has revealed that this year several billions will probably remain unspent. Of the DM 17 billion earmarked in the 1984 budget for unemployment pay, at halftime, at the end of June, not even half had been spent: DM 7.8 billion.

Economic and social welfare politicians of all parties are fighting over the balance of the money. CDU Bundestag Deputy Adolf Mueller (Remscheid) publicly calculated that the surplus to be expected suffices to pay in the future unemployment benefits for 18 months instead of the present only 12 months. Mueller: "The person who has paid unemployment insurance for 30 years will not understand why he does not get anything anymore after one year."

Mueller's party friends from the industry wing of the CDU and also the Free Democrats demand that the surplus be used not in favor of the new poor but, among others, of the old rich: to reduce the contributions to the Nuremberg insurance which is paid in equal parts by employers and employees.

Mueller and Mueller's opponents have not taken the finance minister into account. Muhr is afraid that Gerhard Stoltenberg would like to get a hold of the Nuremberg surplus for himself to restore his budget, strained especially by assistance to farmers and Bundeswehr investments, to financial soundness.

Labor Minister Bluem last week restrained himself: "We have not yet gotten the billions," according to a Bluem spokesman.

Bluem assistants calculate that Stoltenberg will ask for at least DM 1.7 billion of the surplus from the Nuremberg institute. The finance minister had provided this amount to the Federal Institute last year as emergency assistance for its 1984 budget.

12356

CSO: 3620/391

## GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYERS, UNIONS RESPOND TO 'POVERTY' THREAT

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 17 Jul 84 p 5

[Text] Duesseldorf, 16 July 1984--Additional proposals have been submitted to solve the problem of the pauperization of the long-term jobless, also in connection with the billion DM surplus of receipts of the Federal Institute for Labor expected this year.

Heinrich Franke, the president of the Federal Institute, told the Hannover NEUE PRESSE that, in his opinion, jobless older workers should receive unemployment pay over a longer period of time. He considers it as socially unjustified that those who have been employed for 30 years or longer and made high insurance contributions should be treated exactly the same way as those who have made contributions only for a few years. Franke intends to submit a recommendation to this effect soon to the decision-making bodies of the Federal Institute.

The initiator of the discussion concerning "new poverty," Deputy DGB chairman Gerd Muhr, emphasized on Monday, in view of the reactions by FDP chairman Genscher and parts of the CDU/CSU to his demands in favor of the long-term unemployed that "with growing hardening of long-term unemployment, the solidarity of all groups of society is required more than ever."

The DGB firmly rejects an accumulation or inappropriate use of the expected surpluses of the Federal Institute when at the same time the number of registered unemployed ranges between 2 and 2.5 million, of which only 35 percent are still receiving unemployment pay, the share of unemployment relief recipients already amounts to 28 percent and over one third of the registered jobless do not receive any unemployment compensation at all.

A similar statement was made by the managing committee of the working group of Christian-Democratic DGB labor unionists. Pointing to a corresponding declaration by the CDU social affairs politician Mueller of the week before, the labor union Christians raise the priority demand for better social security of the long-term jobless in the unemployment insurance and the increase in the personal exemptions for unemployment support, which has been unchanged since 1969. In case of income of the spouse, these personal exemptions amount to DM 75 a week and in addition DM 35 a week for every dependent person.

On the other hand, the Federal Association of the German Employer Organizations warns against "eagerness to distribute." No one can reliably predict how big the Nuremberg surpluses will actually be at the end of the 1984 fiscal year. At this time it is not yet possible to decide on the use of possible surpluses for benefit increases or reductions of contributions with long-term effect.

But the Federal Association also considers it necessary to defuse the problem of chronic unemployment. According to the Federal Association, the most reliable strategy for this goal is and will be an employment-effective growth policy as it has been developed by the employers.

Moreover, the Federal Association challenges the figures mentioned by the DGB of "the chronic jobless" excluded from unemployment benefits. Of the roughly 600,000 long-term jobless with more than 12 months of unemployment, 55 percent received benefits according to the labor development law. Fifteen percent were not entitled because they had not worked prior to reporting their unemployment.

For the core of the unemployment, the more than a quarter that stopped drawing benefits, unemployment "must be attacked by a forward strategy supported by all responsible forces. For interim aid in emergency situations, this group of people has public welfare available to it in our structured social benefits system."

The Federal Association, moreover, does not consider all-inclusive regulations possible on account of the differentiated facts. The connection between term of insurance and time limit for benefits must always be taken into account. "By appropriate staggering of amount and duration of the unemployment benefits it would be attainable to adapt the contribution-financed unemployment insurance system better to the problems of unemployment."

12356

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## BRIEFS

ALIEN DEPENDENTS INFLUX CRITICIZED--Wildbach Kreuth (AP)--In the view of Parliamentary State Secretary Spranger of the Federal Ministry of the Interior the alien problem in the FRG is becoming more acute due to the "constant influx of alien dependents," particularly Turks. At a meeting held by the CSU-leaning Hanns-Seidel Foundation in Wildbad Kreuth [as published], in Upper Bavaria yesterday, Spranger explained that this influx of dependents was coming "primarily out of rural areas of Anatolia" and thus "the prerequisites for their integration into a highly industrialized society could hardly be met." Alluding to the planned amendment of the Aliens Law, Spranger spoke out in favor of strict limitations on the entry of alien dependents into the FRG even after the association between the EC and Turkey, and reiterated Federal Interior Minister Zimmermann's demand to set the age limit for dependent alien children entering the FRG at 6 years [as published]. The new Aliens Law, in Spranger's words, should require "greater personal efforts toward achieving integration" on the part of aliens who want to remain permanently in the FRG. [Text] [West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 15 Jul 84 p 3] 12552

ALIEN RIGHTS STRENGTHENED--(PTN) Wiesbaden, 23 Jul--Hesse has strengthened the legal position of alien workers and their families. This new ruling, based on agreements between the SPD and the Greens, in effect lifts the legal limits which had been recommended to the Laender by the West German Federal Government in December 1981 and accepted by Hesse in August 1982. The new interior minister in Hesse, former SPD Chairman Winterstein, gave assurances Monday in Wiesbaden that his order of July 13 concerning residence permits for alien dependents caused no infringement of federal laws. According to this order, the age limit for dependent alien children entering the FRG, after having been lowered from 18 to 16 years of age as recommended by the Bonn government, has again been raised to 18 years. It is also again possible for children to join only one parent living in the FRG; for the past two years this has been illegal in Hesse. The new ruling also permits a spouse to join a second-generation alien if the latter has lived in the FRG at least five years and they are able to support themselves on foreign income. The recommendations of the West German government, on the other hand, stipulate that a second-generation alien may be joined by a spouse only if the former has reached the age of 18, has lived continuously in the FRG for at least eight years, possesses a permanent residence permit or right of residency, has sufficient personal income and adequate living quarters, and has been married for at least one year. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Jul 84 p 5] 12552

HOSTILITY TOWARD FOREIGNERS DEBATED--(WTR) Frankfurt/Main, 17 Jul--Two Cologne sociologists, Professor Erwin K. Scheuch and Manfred Guellner, find "no proof" of a sharp increase in hostility toward foreigners "in the FRG and in Cologne." On Tuesday they contradicted their fellow Cologne sociologist, Harald Rohlinger, who in a recently published study had asserted that about 50 percent of the population of Cologne was "latently hostile toward foreigners." Scheuch and Guellner went on to explain that this study provided no proof of any kind of assertions of grave hostility toward foreigners. Rather than measuring hostility toward foreigners, they said, the study only showed the distance between them and the German population. Rohlinger's assertion of hostility toward foreigners in Cologne, they went on, was therefore a case of "mislabeling." [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 18 Jul 84 p 4] 12552

IMPRISONMENT IN HOMELAND PREFERRED--Berlin, 15 Jul (DPA)--When questioned by authorities, 54 Turkish inmates of Berlin's Tegel Prison declared their willingness to serve their sentences in their homeland. Since the beginning of July a total of 75 Turkish prisoners have been questioned, said Volker Kaehne, press spokesman for the judicial authorities. The "Law On International Legal Aid In Criminal Cases," enacted in July of 1983, makes it possible for aliens to serve sentences passed by German courts in their native countries. Kaehne pointed out that it was only possible for an alien prisoner to serve the sentence in his homeland if the prisoner also consented. The final decision regarding the permissibility of such an arrangement, he said, rests with the courts. Berlin prisons currently hold nearly 800 foreign prisoners from 42 countries, corresponding to approximately 20 percent of this city's total prison population. Approximately 220 Turkish prisoners represent the largest group of foreigners. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 16 Jul 84 p 4] 12552

MOST ASYLUM PETITIONS REJECTED--(TSP) Berlin--Yesterday Senator of the Interior Lummer dismissed as incorrect allegations by Mr Thomae-Venske, the representative for aliens of the Protestant Church of Berlin, that excessive figures are being used to document abuses of the laws concerning asylum. Lummer labeled it deceitful to use as proof of this the fact that the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees has granted about 20 percent of the petitions for asylum since 1953. It is an undeniable fact, he said, that the federal office in Zirndorf last year accepted only 5.3 percent of the aliens entering West Berlin to seek asylum: of the 5289 petitions, 277 were accepted, 3152 rejected and 1860 withdrawn or not pursued. Of the petitions for asylum processed in the first half of this year 312 were accepted (including 229 Iraqis and Iranians), 821 were rejected and 907 were withdrawn or not pursued, corresponding to an acceptance figure of 15 percent. Even including the total number of acceptances since 1953, he said, the fact cannot be refuted that about 90 percent of the petitioners for asylum, particularly from countries in the Near East, East Asia and Africa, enter West Berlin for reasons unrelated to political asylum. [Text] [West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 14 Jul 84 p 6] 12552

CSO: 3620/388

## PCF ON DISARMAMENT, PACIFIST PLANS, NEW ECONOMIC ORDER

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French May 84 pp 40-45

[Article by Jacques Denis, member of the Central Committee of the PCF [French Communist Party] and deputy to the European Assembly]

[Text] Along with the primary questions about what our country will become and the other issues under discussion, the problems of peace and development will not be excluded from the vast debate launched with a view to the European elections in June.

It has quite rightly been emphasized that the rise of the popular movement for disarmament is a key development in the present period. The struggle for peace has today taken on a new quality on the five continents. Under extremely varied conditions and in the widest range of forms, it involves hundreds of millions of men, women and young people of all origins and convictions.

Thirty-five years after those days in April 1949 which saw the birth of a world movement for peace in the Salle Pleyel, with Frederic Joliot-Curie presiding, how much ground has been covered! Exceeding all bounds, the demand for peace has truly become universal. And far from being a flash in the pan, far from resignation to existing facts, it has become an enduring factor the strength and influence of which must be taken into account by all political forces, all governments. No one can be rid of it through recourse to anathema or hasty judgments.

This is particularly true for Europe. Our continent was chosen by the Pentagon strategists as the epicenter of their plans for "limited" and "winnable" nuclear war. The double motivation of the commitment to peace today--the horror and fear of what a nuclear conflict would be like and the feeling of being treated like hostages in a policy decided upon behind their backs--is felt particularly by the European peoples.

Rejecting any reasonable alternative, Reagan has begun the installation of the new Pershing II and Cruise missiles. This has led to what was predicted and foreseeable: the suspension of the Geneva talks and countermeasures on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries. A new escalating spiral has begun in the heart of Europe.



## New Mass Actions Everywhere

But the peoples involved will not resign themselves. This spring of 1984 has been characterized by new and important actions initiated on themes determined on the basis of the varying national conditions. In these themes, we find converging ideas, such as an immediate freeze on the installation of new nuclear missiles in order to create conditions favorable to the initiation of new negotiations, support at the European Disarmament Conference in Stockholm for measures of military confidence, the establishment of denuclearized zones, and a reduction in military expenditures to the benefit of social progress and development.

It is not therefore a time for any discouragement, but for new mass actions.

The scandalous silence maintained in this regard by the leading press organs, excluding L'HUMANITE, naturally, which again emphasizes its irreplaceable role, does not prevent mass actions evidencing this popular intervention every week in the widest variety of countries, from the USSR to the United States, from Japan to Czechoslovakia, from India to Portugal and from Sweden to Australia.

This will continue, for example, with the World Congress of Physicians Against Nuclear War, scheduled to be held in Finland in June, and the international concerts organized by the Association of Performers for Peace (PAND) headed by Harry Belafonte, planned for this summer in Leningrad in the USSR and Atlanta in the United States.

In recent months there have been the powerful Easter marches in the FRG, while at Florennes, in Belgium, the planned installation site for Cruise missiles, pacifists have formed a chain around the NATO base. In Great Britain, where the courageous women of Greenham Common are continuing their peace watch, there was the rally in Dover. Militant French citizens participated in all these demonstrations. In Italy, the popular referendum against the installation of the missiles has already vastly exceeded 3,000,000 signatures (it is known that in the FRG, where the law allows this, temporary polling places were established on 17 June near the government offices for a similar referendum).

In France, the international meeting of intellectuals for peace and disarmament which was held in Paris at the end of March rallied several hundred cultural and scientific leaders from more than 30 countries on all continents. The Appeal of the 100, the organizer of this rally, has announced that another mass peace rally, as a continuation of the demonstrations in June 1982 and 1983, will be held in the capital. It is scheduled for 28 October, that is to say at the end of the traditional UN World Disarmament Week which will be planned as it is each year and will involve multiple undertakings by various peace organizations in all countries. Following the States General for Peace held at the end of last year, the French Movement for Peace is making preparations, over a month of activity, for the Argenteuil National Peace and Disarmament Sessions on 12 and 13 May, which will be attended by several hundred delegates appointed for the purpose by the numerous departmental sessions, or sent by the some 400 peace committees in existence.

An interesting and significant fact involves the impact made by the showing of films, either fictional, like "The Day After," or documentary, in ever greater numbers, dealing with the problems raised by the threat of a nuclear war. One can imagine what television and other mass media concerned about sponsoring responsible and serious debate on these vital issues could achieve.

The supporters of the RPR [Rally for the Republic]-UDF [French Democratic Union] slate warn of the "pacifist danger." This, along with "European defense" (see the article by Louis Baillot elsewhere in this issue), is one of their favorite themes. Seeing the continued existence of the popular movement for peace, they have reason for concern.

To speak the truth, this burgeoning activity serves to emphasize the fact that the pacifists are everywhere, in the West, the East, the North and the South. And where this part of the world is concerned, it has the virtue of demonstrating that the Europe of the people, the Europe of the peace to which we aspire, is not a dream. This Europe is being created in the realm of popular struggle.

#### A Europe of Independence and Peace

The echo of these aspirations has even penetrated the thick walls of the European Assembly. It is dominated by an ultrareactionary majority which includes the supranational European Popular Party (in a group in which Mr Lecanuet seemingly is not bothered by associating with a former general once condemned as a Nazi war criminal), Mrs Thatcher's British conservatives, Mrs. Veil's liberals and the Chirac supporters, once elected on a "slate for the defense of the interests of France," which is at the very least a misnomer, if one is to judge on the basis of actual conduct. All of this fine group is entirely Reaganistic. Everything which will aggravate tensions, everything leading to the division of our continent into blocks is favored by these firebrands.

But the new thing is that the voice of reason and negotiation has been heard ever more frequently in the course of the years which have elapsed. And if where France is concerned, the elected officials of a communist or related persuasion have, unfortunately, been the only ones to hear it, the same is not the case for the other countries represented in Strasbourg. It was possible to establish a group for disarmament in Europe which garnered the signatures of several dozen communist, socialist, social democratic, independent and other parliamentarians. Twenty-seven women deputies of various political persuasions signed a joint appeal for disarmament sponsored by Danielle De March.

#### An Unprecedented Alternative

From that rostrum as everywhere else where they can act or intervene, the French communists begin with a simple and powerful idea: the policy involving an armaments race, nuclear escalation, and aggravation of the bloc policy leads to catastrophe. We propose an alternative no one has ever yet tried to implement, that is to say the negotiated and gradual reduction of armaments within balance and safety for all parties. We have always linked the goal of disarmament with the inalienable right of our country to its security and freedom of decision.

One can imagine what a constructive role France could play, within the framework of European political cooperation included, in progress toward the reduction of all weaponry to the lowest level, in the East as in the West, and toward the settlement of conflicts. Such European cooperation, responding to the movement of the people, would be a precious factor in peace!

#### A Basic Challenge of Our Time

Georges Marchais was able to say to the enterprise militants meeting in Ivry to prepare for the 17 June elections: "...Today as yesterday, when the monstrous escalation of the armaments race threatens world peace, when the peoples are shaking off the yoke which oppresses them, who can be seen at the side of the workers and the democrats, in the front ranks of the struggles for peace and disarmament, for solidarity and for a new international economic order? The communists."

In fact, all of these issues, which are intimately interlinked, have been raised in the course of these past 5 years by the French communist or communist-affiliated elected delegates to the European Assembly.

The question of development is one of the basic challenges mankind must face at this end of the 20th century. And when it is put seriously, it immediately leads to the question of the means for combatting underdevelopment and hunger, political means indeed, but also the material means today being wasted in so many ways, and being swallowed up in the armaments race, in particular.

Our ideal leads us to denounce and combat the scandal represented by the situation imposed on billions of inhabitants of our world. The growing awareness of the intolerable nature of the situation and the refusal to regard it as inevitable are leading an increasing number of people in our country to join together. Men, women and young people in large numbers, sometimes far removed from our analyses, feel that something is wrong when the crisis being experienced by the capitalist countries is invoked to claim that there is surplus production capacity to be reduced, and goods of first necessity to be destroyed, in a world in which the majority of individuals still cannot exercise and meet their most basic rights and needs: having enough to eat, a roof for the family, enough to survive and to acquire education.

Our group in Strasbourg has never failed to act on the basis of its conviction that aiding the Third World and cooperating with it means aiding oneself to emerge from crisis.

#### New Forms of Cooperation

Within the framework of the Lome Convention, in which the 10 Common Market countries and 64 African, Caribbean and Pacific nations (called the ACP countries) are participants, there are parliamentary institutions in which we have been present and active in defense of the concept of new cooperation relations for the 600 million human beings who populate our countries.

It was necessary there to deal with the neocolonial concepts of the right wing, its constant desire to interfere in the affairs of these peoples, its profound inhumanity, and its racism, which leads it to protect the apartheid regime of South Africa.

In the course of these years, we have had the satisfaction of seeing our explanations better understood by the representatives of these countries with such varied situations and political and social options. For example, where the sterility of a North-South contrast is concerned, whereas what is needed is a common effort to be pursued for a new international economic order, that is to say basically the right which should be recognized for each people to have the regime of its choice, to choose its own path of development and to utilize its national assets to establish new relations among all countries, large and small, based on justice, equality, democracy and cooperation. Or again, on the common interests of the workers in the European countries and the peoples in this region in the struggle against a system based on profit in which the large multinational firms, American in particular, dominate production and markets as a function of their egotistical interests, or on the monstrous nature of the European policy which refuses to give the ACP countries the products said to be surplus at preferential prices, just as these countries, as we know, have been demanding in vain for 7 years--and this in the name of maintaining the world prices controlled by the United States!

We were more widely heard to the extent that we acted on the basis of the intention not to separate the basic reforms required from the immediate steps which can be taken within the framework of the EEC and its institutions, and in particular in connection with the present renegotiation of the Lome Convention.

The Europe of the Ten has a special responsibility to assume so that this renegotiation will succeed, in particular by no longer granting priority to the interests of the all-powerful Atlantic sponsor, giving priority to those of the respective peoples instead. And also by ceasing to seek to introduce political conditions which the ACP quite rightly reject into what is in fact a cooperation agreement for development. It would be unforgivable to fail to move forward toward veritable cooperation, and there is an opportunity here to be seized, while the various forms of North-South renegotiation which exist are experiencing a worrisome blockage because of American stubbornness.

The French Communist Party has devoted special attention for a long time now to the dramatic problem of hunger. It is even the only political organization in this country which has set forth its analyses and propositions concerning this problem in a basic document.<sup>1</sup> This concern has constantly been present in the activity of the communist and communist-affiliated deputies elected to the European Assembly. Matters have steadily deteriorated. The disaster extending from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, the vast Sahel with its millions of inhabitants suffering from famine, and the very serious situation in Mozambique are the current evidences of this in Africa. Despite the opposition of the right wing, our group succeeded in getting approval for a request for special intervention, using the financial resources of the EEC, for the Sahel.

But in fact these emergency measures, indispensable though they may be, can only serve as a palliative, and more basic measures which fall within the campaign for new international order are needed. A double goal must be sought: in the short run, secure food supplies for various countries, and more basically, aid to enable them to proceed toward self-sufficiency.

#### Disarmament and Development Are Linked

In the final analysis, we always come back to the question posed in terms of a very noble approach on the part of the Movement of Nonaligned Nations during its summit meeting in New Delhi: "Peace and peaceful coexistence, independence, disarmament and development are the basic issues of our era."<sup>2</sup>

The Movement of Nonaligned Nations (of which almost all of the ACP countries are members) has shown a great spirit of responsibility in making it clear that the threat of nuclear war concerns all peoples, without exception. "The most serious peril currently menacing the world," it said, "is the threat which a nuclear war would pose for the survival of mankind."

In the situation of confrontation and effort to achieve supremacy which represents the strategy of the Reagan administration, the countries in the process of development are viewed as strategic bases, transit points for communications lines and sources of raw materials to be exploited. Any liberation struggle, any move toward progress is ascribed by the imperialists and their propaganda to "interference by the East," and every low blow is justified by this basic line.

The Third World countries are increasingly drawn into the armaments race. As a result the cost of their military expenditures has increased, in constant prices, from \$33 billion in 1972 to \$81 billion in 1981. In other words it has multiplied 2.5 times.

Imports of weapons, sometimes justified by the threats hanging over these young nations (we need only think of the situation of the southern African countries, under constant attack by the racist South African regime), represent a half of the crushing debt burden of these countries.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, the total amount of military expenditures, which now exceeds \$750 billion, has catastrophic effects on the world economy as a whole. It is a weighty factor aggravating the crisis, and the recent public debates on the administrative level in Washington have revealed their effects on the United States itself. The same is the case everywhere, including Europe.

On the other hand, other data eloquently reveal what could be done with these resources being swallowed up to prepare for the destruction of humanity.

With the price of a nuclear submarine (Trident-type), 16 million children could be sent to school for a year in the underdeveloped countries, or 400,000 housing units accommodating 2 million individuals could be built.

With what a modern tank costs, 1,000 classrooms accommodating 30,000 students could be built in the Third World countries.

This is what has led the nonaligned nations to raise the question of putting an end to this race for the precipice and bankruptcy, for reasons for survival and to release the resources for development. Following the proposal formulated in their name by Fidel Castro, calling for a 10 percent reduction, the meeting in New Delhi at which Indira Gandhi presided renewed this demand just one year ago.

Last December, the United Nations General Assembly, during its approval of the French proposal for "a conference on the various implications of the links between disarmament and development, and a proposal on the establishment of an international disarmament for development fund," expressed the view that "the scope of the expenditures on weaponry is such today that the various implications can no longer be ignored in the efforts being pursued within the international community to achieve a relaunching of the world economy and the establishment of a new international economic order," and that "a reduction in weapons expenditures, in particular by the nations equipped with nuclear weapons and other militarily strong nations, on a mutually agreed basis, would be a measure likely to slow the accumulation of weapons and to make it possible to release additional resources which could be used for economic and social development, in particular to the benefit of the developing countries."

At the recent EEC-ACP parliamentary meeting in Brazzaville, a proposal in this same spirit was presented by the elected communist deputies and was supported by all of the representatives of the ACP countries, but was rejected by the other European parliamentarians.

Nothing will prevent the advance of this idea: dedicating to life what is being wasted for death. This is an idea of as much concern to the starving in the Third World as it is to the unemployed among us. It arouses great emotion in the young and awakens the demand for justice on the part of men of good will. It offers a field for struggle and unity. Let us not fail, on this occasion, to offer it to all French citizens as yet another reason for voting for the slate proposed by the French Communist Party.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See "Hunger in the World--What Contribution From France?" in CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, July-August 1983, pp 122-126. The reader will also profit from the recent book by J. Suret-Canale and Marie-Francoise Durant (with the collaboration of Germain Trugnan) entitled "Hunger in the World," Messidor-Editions Sociales (Social Publications).
2. Concerning this summit meeting, see the article by Martin Verlet in the May 1983 issue of CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME.
3. However, the total indebtedness of the Third World is equivalent to less than one year of military expenditures.

## INTERNAL POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL DILEMMA OF PSF ANALYZED

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 84 pp 21-28

[Article by Eric Dupin: "The Socialists in Parentheses"]

[Text] It is an understatement to say that the Socialists are uncomfortable. Three facts of political life are combining to plunge the PS into the greatest trouble. First, discomfort is the inevitable fate of the president's entire party under the monocratic regime of the Fifth Republic. So many decisions depend on a single person that his band of followers is perforce condemned to a humiliating submission to authority. But this inconvenience weighs especially heavily when it is working on a party of the left. Unlike its counterparts of the right, a leftist party cannot, without major problems of conscience, be content with an electoral agent role, admit that its deputies are being transformed into push-buttons and find its only reward in distributing the positions made available by the government. More or less conscious of its historic mission, a leftist party's ambition is to transform its arrival at the command of the government into putting into concrete form a political plan with a strongly ideologic content. And that is where the PS today is enduring real suffering. Not only is it throwing absolutely no light on the road of the governing left, but it has been caught wrong-footed by the changing course of its actions. Tagging along behind the executive power, the Socialists are taking refuge in the unwarranted affirmation of their ideologic constancy.

#### When the PS Prefers Essence to Existence

No doubt certain Socialists are nostalgic for the first phase of the seven-year term. The PS was then invaded by the feeling, somewhat saddening but by no means painful, of its own uselessness. Largely drained of its substance by the government apparatus having attracted its leadership stratum, it had already lost any real influence. But at least the president's party found some comfortable satisfaction in letting itself be borne along on the wave of change. At the congress in Valence (October 1981), the PS was already feeling a little left out of the game, but it was not displeased to be forming a clique for a government that was boldly engaged in launching promises of "structural reforms."

The shock of austerity, marked by the Delors plans of June 1982 and especially March 1983, put an end to that feeling of communion. A "concession to the



imposed reality", the austerity policy "bears no relation to what we wanted to do," Lionel Jospin frankly admitted on 27 March of last year. That concept of a government change of policy has never been denied since then. The official argument of the PS is still that of the parenthesis. Austerity is only a bad time that must be lived through. A difficult but inevitable period of adjustment of the broad economic balances. Also, the Socialist leaders make no secret of their haste to emerge from the zero-growth tunnel. Jean Poperen is already predicting a relaunching of the machine that is judiciously preparing for the 1986 legislative deadline. Lionel Jospin rejects with all the more virulence any "theorization" of the present policy because he analyzes it, softly, as a phase of "going backwards" and "withdrawal." The implacable economic laws may have thus forced the leftist government to make a purely tactical withdrawal preparatory to a new offensive. In that spirit, what matters to the Socialists is simply that they not lose their social base in the maneuver. They also explain that the government's present misfortunes, however inevitable they may be, will not last. And that the therapy set up by the French left is gentler than what is imposed on the peoples of the other Western countries.

Essentially defensive, this explanatory model has two weak spots. By thus justifying the austerity policy, the Socialists are first of all favoring a cyclical conception of the economic crisis, which is contradictory to the interpretation of the crisis offered simultaneously in terms of change. Next, and above all, their thinking leaves out the spectacular change in the economic concepts that guide government action. The praise for the entrepreneurial function, the grand design of the industrial modernization, the desire to reduce the burden of public levies--would these be merely occasional themes? One is of course permitted to doubt that this new language is a sign, in Francois Mitterrand, of an irreversible and radical cultural change. Undeniably, it owes much to the imperatives of the moment and takes in too much air for its ideologic significance to be over-estimated. But the fact is that the PS is hiding its eyes before this singular reversal in the government's economic thinking.

This ostrich policy ignores and accentuates the growing contrast between the party's thinking and that of the government. A divorce performed completely peacefully by resorting to the famous distinction between practice (fluctuating) and principles (intangible). In the government the management and its compromising subterfuges. In the party, ideology and its reassuring certainties. Such a division of labor, which for all that is extremely classic, seemingly shows the PS in the best light: there it is, the depository of the eternal values of the left, firmly planted on its ideologic identity, the tenacious advocate of its social base. As for those who govern, their thankless task is to build a series of compromises according to the power struggle building up in the society.

From a politicking point of view, this outline presents undeniable advantages. It authorizes the president of the Republic to assume even more positive freedom of movement. It enables the government to assume without incident the responsibility for the national interest and to conceal from others how the ideology is being preserved. It shelters the PS from upheavals that would not fail to cause doctrine to be updated within the party. The final, but not the least advantage is that the Socialists' peremptory affirmation of their theoretical continuity obscures the Communist demonstration on their new shift to the right. The test



of strength that is pitting the two leftist parties against each other is greatly influencing the linguistic dialectic of the PS. Confessing that change has changed it, the PS is afraid that the PC will take from that a solid argument with which to fight it.

Conversely, the cost of this division of PS-government roles cannot be considered negligible. It is really difficult to convince people of the benefits of a policy that is reluctantly adhered to, for lack of a better one and according to a purely contingent analysis. It takes an extraordinary pedagogic talent to praise the merits of a parenthesis that one is impatient to see closed. But, above all, the PS refrains from throwing light on government policy, from breathing a word about a management that is strict but terribly devoid of imagination. By refusing to really make the shift from austerity, the Socialists deprive themselves of contributing to it what it is so lacking in: social creativity and marriage with a new dynamism for reforms. While they are reveling in their loyalty to socialism's fundamental principles, a dangerous technocratic drift lies in wait for the government. It was on the subject of the school question that the combined pragmatism of the party's power/orthodoxy came to light. A fierce defender of "the secular", the PS logically protects a central element of its ideologic identity at the same time that it protects a not inconsiderable portion of its social base. The demand for a "secular and unified public department of national education" had so shaken the congress in Bourg-en-Bresse (November 1983) on this point that Pierre Mauroy thought it right to divert the attention of those attending by announcing his bill concerning the press. But, on the school problem, which is considered a decisive one by many Socialists, the government gives no satisfaction. Only a small minority of PS deputies is supporting Alain Savary's approach. The party's first secretary, who certainly does not lack opportunities to make himself heard at the Elysee, is taking to the streets to change the direction of the government text. Without much of a chance of knocking over a carefully designed equilibrium. What does it matter, the party testifies and leaves to the government the burden of synthesizing it.

### Ideology in Pieces

Not everyone in the PS is satisfied with this state of affairs. Warnings mount from various sides and Lionel Jospin, the connection between presidential thinking and the reactions of the underlying part of the party, has difficulty in controlling the seething of the malcontents. He first has to face two frontal and opposite charges. The CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research and Education] accuses the government of somehow betraying the PS by not respecting either the Socialist bill or even the final motion of the Bourg-en-Bresse congress. For this faction, the clear verdict comes down: the austerity policy has "failed" and it is urgent that it be changed. The "Neo-Rocardians" accuse their party of the opposite: dragging their feet and not daring to demand whole-heartedly the new course of government action. It is comical to observe that this fervent progovernmentalism is the deed of a little faction, representing 5 percent of the party membership, whose daring earned it the right to be called the "modernist right" by Lionel Jospin.

But the most interesting attack is due to Jean Poperen. It is of course no surprise to anyone that this old enemy of "Rocardian modernism" regularly goes on a crusade against the "second left." Nor even that he gives it a singularly scaled-down definition: that it is composed of "Christians--mostly Catholics--

who came into the left in such organized strength and endowed with a political cohesion"! But what holds the attention is that to Poperon "it is the ideas of the second left that are governing." Consequently, the "ideologic clarification in the left" that he calls from its prayers for the purpose of fighting with the second left over its "cultural hegemony" is almost like a basic challenge to the evolution of the governing left.

To Poperen, if the government is justified in conducting a "policy of compromise," the left is sick from having embraced an "ideology of conciliation." Concern for safety turns to courage when he waves high the standard of his distinctive credo. Slipped into his logic may be found a theme that is much credited among the Socialists. What would be urgent would be to reoccupy the terrain of the "ideologic battle," which has been too long deserted, while arming oneself with "leftist values."

The meaning of these appeals leaves one perplexed. Louis Mermaz is assuredly right when he reminds his comrades that no one wins an election on good economic indicators alone. But is there not, in this impatience to promote the debate, the somewhat naive hope of overshadowing the ups and downs of government practice by a frenzied reactivation of the old right-left cleavage? Jean Poperon was not wrong in denouncing a right "that has never been so far to the right." For all that, would it be judicious to pass oneself as a challenger, to wager less on his own successes than on the harmfulness of the adversary's ideas?

For the main thing is whether the Socialist left still has ammunition with which to go on the offensive. Immortal though they may be, the "leftist values", defined "aminima," in a way that is timeless and rarefied, would not be adequate for waging the battle against the opposition. It is not in the heaven of pure ideas, which have faded according to the tautological traditionalism at which Louis Mermaz excels, that the PS will win a battle that will first take place over very earth-bound realities. Effectiveness requires giving a new strategic content to the old leftist values. However much the PS averts its face, its ideological house of cards has collapsed. Who talks any more about the "break with capitalism" that was part of the congresses' palmy days? Whatever happened to the famous tryptic "nationalizations--planning--self-management" that was to provide the key to hexagonal socialism?

The Socialists' attitude toward businesses is symptomatic of a loss of markers that cruelly contradicts the male affirmation of an ideological continuity. Employers, who yesterday were exploiters, have become entrepreneurs. An abrupt reversal that is not without slippage. Thus one heard nice things about it in the course of the recent symposium organized by the PS on "the risk of doing business." One of the speakers did not hesitate to advocate a revision of the social thresholds "in certain cases" as well as "the possibility of labor contracts with their duration limited to 1 year and twice renewable, which will not burden businesses with the risks connected with the delays caused by an economic unemployment." Lionel Jospin has recognized, moreover, that the economic thinking of the PS lacked consistency, because he has voiced the hope that his party would hold to "the same kind of talk before the workers and before the heads of business firms." Another example of a question that cannot be evaded for long. What form should be given today to the social justice requirement? For whom and according to what method of intervention? This reflection is all

the more urgent because the government has committed itself to reducing the share of public levies in the national income. This choice, which for all that has an extremely ideologic content, cannot continue without consequences for the social transfers system. Is it not indispensable for the PS to be worrying about it?

It is undoubtedly by looking into this type of problems that the PS would be best able to build a Socialist plan that, this time, would not be pigeon-holed. For it would be a mistake to try to beat the "sacred cows" that make up the traditional dogma of the left, without constructing in a similar movement a plan that goes beyond the limited horizon of day-to-day management. For the time being, the attempts to put things in perspective are rather disappointing. The ideologic false front of "modernism" will not fool anyone for long. The "individualism of the left" praised by Max Gallo hardly looks like a concept rich in potential. Still, one must give credit to the government's spokesman for his laudable care in not seeking to put an ideologic false mask on his head. "Long live social democracy," he dares to cry. An act of faith that has yet to find an echo. But can the PS, even though it would like to, lay claim to social democratic party status?

#### The Feet as Fragile as the Head

Coming into command of the country has not served as a springboard for the Socialists. Despite control by the Elysee, an absolute majority in the National Assembly and the confidence, in June 1981, of more than a third of the French people, the PS has not been turned into the dominant party of French political life. There are multiple causes, but we could not forget the way in which the socialist renaissance has been conducted since the Epinay congress in 1971. Today's PS is really the product of a Mitterrand plan. The objective of the present head of state was to build a catch-all party with high electoral effectiveness. This was how he successfully fought two other conceptions of the destiny of the PS. First, the neo-Guesdist plan of the CERES: a party built around a solid ideologic body and implanted in business firms. Then the labor plan of the Rocardians: a "party of the socialists" which would be only slightly restrictive but would be closely linked to the associative and trade union movement. This was the dream, with no results, of the Socialism meetings of 1974.

Francois Mitterrand, as hostile to one as to the other of these plans, busied himself with giving body to a marvelous electoral machine for times when there would be opposition. The theme of the "class front" served as a handy excuse for the proven technique of adding up social discontent. The delightful cacophony in the Socialist leaders' phrasing made it possible to search a little more carefully, for the voter to hear which bell-ringing was seducing him the most. The radicalness of the talk, opportunely in phase with the ideology that was then dominant in the left, was appropriate for making sure of indispensable militant relays. Better still, without major difficulty it combined with a respectable moderation in the approach to the decisive electoral dates (the presidential elections of 1974 and 1981).

All of this, and many other things besides, did not lack skill. But although electoral success was its reward, it left the PS in a state of extreme fragility. It remained first of all a party without solid roots in society.

One hundred thousand members, a rank-and-file fabric that was rather loosely-woven and not at all representative of the country's social reality, or even of the left. What is more, the PS was maintaining and still maintains relations of a very mediocre quality with everything that makes up the backbone of civil society. The most resounding failure was that of the relations with the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]. The Rocardians and the CERES, which corresponded to the different sensibilities of the Confederation, were unable to take advantage of it to give life to the PS. As for Francois Mitterrand, he remained steadfastly insensitive to the Confederation's progress.

A poor man's party, the PS is also a confused party. Its energy has been wasted in the internal debates whose terribly artificial character is revealed by today's reality. Michel Rocard was therefore not listened to because he had had the effrontery to maintain that the saving "break with capitalism" could not be anything but "slow"! These confrontations with thematic ideology, moreover, were largely diverted from their stated objective by tactical considerations and power games. Thus, Francois Mitterrand was seen allying himself one after the other with the CERES, with Michel Rocard and then again with the CERES, etc. Pierre Mauroy was still in the "right-wing" minority when he became prime minister in 1981! Definitely, the internal debates in the PS at that time scarcely prepared it to run the government.

Mission accomplished: the PS was cut out for carrying its directing group to the summit of the state. After that, what was left to hope for? It had been childish to call the government to order in the name of a ramshackle ideological structure. The PS also found itself facing the practical impossibility of speaking out to the government on behalf of its constituents. The desires of 100,000 members do not count for much in comparison with the responsibilities related to the national interest.

It was inevitable that the PS should become the prisoner of governmental feats. And that it would try to save face by trumpeting an ethereal orthodoxy. As might have been expected, it does not at all prevent the Socialists from suffering the full effects of the government's unpopularity. Their electorate dwindled even faster than it had swelled. For its consolation, the PS remains the party closest to the center of gravity of public opinion, as attested to by the polls. But it constitutes its soft underbelly.

The structural weakness of the PS is not unrelated to the embarrassment it feels in its relations with the Communist Party. The threat brandished against it of governing all alone is worth no more than its credibility. But the Socialists know that even the appearance forces them to confront a dual opposition: that of the right and that of the Communists. Have they broad enough shoulders to be successful at that?

#### A Space to be Occupied

In any case, the hour has struck for socialist solitude. The survival of the institutional forms of the union of the left is attributable solely to the constraints on the process of rupture between the two partners. In reality, the PS from now on assumes the governmental responsibilities all alone.

It is a perilous exercise. It appears to be doomed to failure if the analysis continues to be a prisoner of the present configuration of the political forces. For in the field of the possibles, the PS is preserving the asset of an enviable space for development. It is the party that best begins to resonate with the values of cultural liberalism that are profoundly marking the evolution of the French society. The combination of a prudent social progressivism and an industrial modernization effort, although it has no immediate electoral advantage, may meet with a broad approval over the middle term.

The Socialists' potential audience is still justifiable on the basis of an optimistic vision in view of the state of the economic cycle. The Communist Party is bogged down in too deep a crisis not to leave the field to a PS that has once more become attractive. The opposition's good health should not make us forget the persistent weaknesses of the right. It is revealed as incapable of cementing its unity around a plan that is more than the juxtaposition of opportunistic protesting solidarities and superficial ideologic modes.

In these times of crisis, the Socialists are not the only ones losing their footing. Their room to maneuver is extensive. It is not totally ridiculous to hope that the electroshock of the exercise of power will cause them to find a new equilibrium again. The schizophrenic relationship that the PS maintains with the real, that is to say with the governing function that its own people are exercising, will not be capable of being lived with for long. Adaptation to the new political deal, to the contours increasingly defined by Mitterrand, seems inevitable. Converted to "real-socialism", will the PS be content to fulfill a lobbying function and offer its propaganda services to the government? Or will it really be able to prolong the iconoclastic governmental revisionism by exploring a new Utopia? The dreary management of socio-economic balances, ruled by the established power struggle, could not take the place of ambition for the left. The return to the Socialists' reality would be suicidal if it did not give birth to an operating reformist tension. Government involvement and the crisis, which renders conservative theories very paradoxical, may furnish the opportunity for that to happen.

The Socialists would then have no choice but to get rid of their linguistic strait jacket and take the risk of reinventing social change. A long-term task. Unfortunately, the politico-electoral calendar is a short-term affair.

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CSO: 3519/446

POLITICAL

GREECE

NO POLITICAL DOSSIERS WILL BE KEPT

Athens TA NEA in Greek 11 Jul 84 p 20

/Text/ All data unrelated to a civil servant's official capacity will be removed from his personal service files and replaced by the personal records of the employee. The data to be removed--and destroyed--are those related to the employee's political views.

Minister to the Premier Apostolos Lazaris said yesterday that "these data are irrelevant and dangerous. They will be removed from the files under Law 1400/83 on the modification and completion of civil service regulations."

In implementing the law, this procedure has already started and will be completed in the next few days. The irrelevant data will be given to three-member committees and then destroyed.

As a result in the new personal records of the 250,000 civil servants (permanent, temporary, Legal Entities of Public Law, Organization of Local Self-Governments, etc.) who are subject to the regulations of the civil service code, only data strictly related to their professional identity will be retained.

The provisions of Law 1400/83 do not apply to the employees of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Public Enterprises (DEI, OTE, OEA, etc.).

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CSO: 3521/300

## PASOK IS REPORTEDLY PLANNING CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT

## Reduced Number of Ministers

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 11 Jul 84 pp 1-2

/Article by Akh. Khatzopoulos/

/Text/ The principal target of a possible reshuffling of the cabinet (when the premier deems the moment right) will be to "regulate" the governmental machine in such a way as to enable the cabinet to successfully carry out the PASOK program until the next parliamentary election.

Our information from reliable sources centers on thoughts and views expressed lately by Andreas Papandreou to associates.

Any questions the premier may have come from the fact that when PASOK appears before the people to seek their vote for another 4-year term he must be prepared to give a positive accounting of its accomplishments.

Andreas considers the moment he will implement his decision for any tactical move which is expected to take place in the next 2 months--in spite of a denial by the government spokesman.

In this context he also places his reasoning for a drastic reduction in the number of cabinet members, which now exceed 50.

This number of ministers and deputy ministers causes problems of flexibility in the government machinery and even of supervision by the premier himself. A spectacular reduction is one of the premier's intentions. The time for the final decision remains unknown.

In any event, the premier himself had alluded to disfunctions when he talked to the political editors at the opening of the new Press Room. The thinking, therefore, is not new. Simply what remains is the phase of implementation.

A reduction from 50 to 20 will be a revolutionary change of methods and will signal a new mode of action for the governmental machinery. The premier believes that the reduction will spectacularly raise the government's productivity. His intention, which he discussed with his close associates, is to

be able to meet with his ministers every morning, if he goes ahead with this move.

#### Not Ruled Out

On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that in the end Andreas will not go ahead and instead will select the second alternative. In this case, it is not possible for new ministers to assume ministries and to spend a long time on orientation. This would mean that they will be less productive since they will have less time in their posts than the present ministers. Already, while Andreas meets with the Government Council /KYSIM/ every week, the more numerous ministerial council meets only once a month.

The cabinet, of course, which will come out of the reshuffling (we repeat, when its implementation is decided) will be the last before the next election. Prior to this election the major decisive political event is the election of the new president of the Republic in May 1985.

It is too early to guess about the candidate although Dimitris Maroudas, the government spokesman, reaffirmed an earlier statement that the government "supports" K. Karamanlis.

Two questions are relevant in this regard: Whom will Andreas propose for the presidency? Will K. Karamanlis again seek the presidency?

Under political conditions and provided we have no early elections, the new president will be elected by the present Chamber of Deputies. This means that no candidate can be elected without the support of PASOK.

In spite of all this, if the Chamber is unable to elect a new president, we will go to the parliamentary election so the president will be elected by the new Chamber. In any event, until next May the speculation around the name of K. Karamanlis will continue. Discussions on the election of the president are also taking place in the parties.

#### PASOK Restructuring

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 12 Jul 84 pp 1-2

/Article by Kh. Mourtzis/

/Text/ In view of the future electoral contest the PASOK party machinery is moving towards an organizational restructuring.

Up until tomorrow all leading committees of the Movement will have their meetings aiming at an evaluation of the electoral result and proposals for a more dynamic restructuring and reactivation of the party machinery (all-Greek structure of party organs, branch organizations, etc.).



This weekend there will be regional conferences under the chairmanship of members from the central leadership. In the meantime, we are told, beginning in September, the leading party echelons will embark on informative visits to the provinces, especially in the major cities, to present the government's accomplishments.

The proposals of the 18 central leadership committees will be written down, codified, and will come up for discussion at the meeting of the PASOK Central Committee scheduled for 28-29 July.

According to our information, the restructuring and qualitative improvement of the party's organizations will have the following aims:

#### Rearrangements

The rearrangement and shrinking of the PASOK branch organizations, in the assessment of the central leadership, handicapped the organization's political effectiveness. These organizations are said to act as a mechanism for distributing power and staffed with individuals lacking in ideological purity. The journalists' branch organization, which is also charged with corrupt tendencies and attempts at autonomy from the central leadership organs, will be radically restructured. We are told its entire coordinating committee has resigned for "reasons of self respect" following charges from the leadership that it did not actively participate, like all PASOK members, in the electoral campaign. Those in charge of this branch organization countered that they are only to reproduce ideology and not carry out routine party duties.

According to the same sources, there will be restructuring in all 18 central leadership committees of the Movement in order to improve their political functioning.

The membership of these committees will be reduced from 40 to 20 so they can be more flexible and effective.

The three-member secretariat of these leadership committees will not include government officials--ministers, secretary generals of ministries, presidents of agencies--to be more productive in the basic post entrusted to them by the party.

There will be appointed a member of the Central Committee to take charge of the three-member secretariat of each leadership committee and there will also be a parliamentary deputy to assure a connection with the parliamentary group.

The restructuring of the 18 central leadership committees was also deemed necessary following the discovery of symptoms of feuding among them.

Several members of the branch committees will be moved to the local committees and in the future they will have a cell composed of no more than 50 persons selected under strict criteria of ideological purity and socialist ethos.

## Flexibility

Also, there is going to be a flexible coordinating organ between the Central Committee and the Executive Bureau, composed of the secretaries of the leadership committees. This organ will be under the supervision of members of the Executive Bureau.

We are told that at the meeting of the PASOK Central Committee there will be a documentation committee selected to deal with supplying the party organizations with special printed material relating to the governmental accomplishments.

There will also be a proposal to create a regional committee to deal with the guidance of the regions. This organ will be between the nome committees and the Central Committee. It is also likely to propose the creation of a committee for consumer cooperatives.

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CSO: 3521/300

## SPECTRUM OF RELATIONS WITH WEST AT CRITICAL JUNCTURE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15-16 Jul 84 p 1

/Article by Rikhardos Someritis/

/Text/ Paris--The crisis in the Greek-American relations--which refers to the relations with Europe as well--may quiet down with or without the settlement of specific issues. But it will not be put on the shelf without first solving a series of significant problems and without first restoring even a limited climate of confidence in the relations between Greece and the West.

The Westerners, and not only the hawks of the Pentagon, charge Greece under PASOK above all with the following:

1. The direct or indirect pro-Soviet tone (and content) of its reactions and international initiatives, the intense and systematic anti-Americanism (and anti-Westernism) of many official statements and also of the guided newspapers (as it is believed for some) and even more so the specific initiatives of Greek diplomacy in the EEC and NATO, which either prevented or weakened a joint European or Western policy.

Specifically, most Europeans consider the Greek veto to a joint European reaction following the downing of the Korean airliner as the worst moment in European cooperation following the similar experience in Poland.

2. The political and practical confusion over Greece's participation in NATO and the EEC where very often it acts not like an equal, free ally but as a prisoner who has not been able to escape as yet.

3. The doubt about the future of the bases and of the Greek participation in the military structure of NATO, a doubt sustained by the government.

4. The systematic use of matters relating to the Alliance and Europe in the most negative fashion to deal with domestic political developments.

5. The "weaknesses" (and one or two burning provocations) on the prosecution of terrorists. For a long period of time many Westerners believed the basic motive of the strange Greek diplomacy was the Turkish threat which was seen and considered real. What is very often questioned is the present extent of this threat.

## Mistrust in the West

A very negative suspicion about Greece is solidifying that the Papandreou government uses this threat in order to promote its pro-Soviet position or at least its neutrality. These reactions--some of them unjustified and some of them "with ulterior motives"--nevertheless constitute a climate which tends to turn this suspicion to the isolation of our country within the Western organizations when secret and significant initiatives are being discussed. If this practice continues and is expanded, the cost will be heavy for Greece in many sectors, starting with that of defense.

How long can this "equilibrium" last? Many believe it is in the country's interest to clear up the situation and restore a different, healthy climate in its relations with the West. This does not mean it must align itself, but the current contradictions and uncertainties may lead to greater crises and difficulties. For a long time most Westerners believed that Moscow was happy to see problems among the Western powers but it respected the European status quo and did not encourage truly separatist trends. This is less certain today when the Soviet leadership has toughened its stand across the board. Many now suspect that Moscow shows a new and more practical interest in Greek developments and their "peculiarities". For this reason the need for a candid and pragmatic discussion with the West may soon prove great and urgent.

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CSO: 3521/300

## POLLS MEASURE SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES, GOVERNMENT

## Poll Sees Left Advancing

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 21 Jul 84 p 6

[Article: "Stable Advance Increases Optimism"]

[Excerpt] The monthly opinion poll taken by Norges Markedsdata indicates advances for the two largest parties on the left. The Labor Party (AP) registered over 40 percent for the first time in 6 months and the Socialist Left Party (SV) has crept over the 6-percent mark. If elections were held today, the socialist parties would receive 84 seats. AP alone is just two representatives short of an absolute majority in parliament.

## Heartwarming

"This opinion poll is as heartwarming as it can be 1 year before the election: it does not give us any victory in advance," Einar Forde told ARBEIDERBLADET. He said that the long-term trend confirmed that the Labor Party could win the election next year.

Forde emphasized the high degree of stability in recent polls. This, and recent advances among young voters, make him most optimistic.

"Young people have been our greatest problem in recent years. Our advances within this group has been the best news we have had in many years," Einar Forde said.

## Burden

The Center Party (SP) and the Progressive Party (FRP) suffered the greatest losses this month. The 5.3-percent level is the poorest showing ever for SP.

"The lack of support for the Center Party probably is due to the difficult economic situation and the unemployment level," Center Party chairman Johan J. Jakobsen told ARBEIDERBLADET. He pointed out that the other two ruling parties had lost support since the 1981 elections.

But the Center Party chairman is taking today's figures with a grain of salt. He pointed to the party's steady advances in Norges Markedsdata polls since

November of last year.

"I do not know if this 1-percent decline means that we are back at square one," said Johan J. Jakobsen, who pointed out that there was unity within the party on the party's policies.

Former Prime Minister Per Borten told A-PRESSEN [Labor Party press service] that the decline was due to the party's position as junior partner in a government that is dominated by another party.

#### Minor Changes

Conservative Party chairman Jo Benkow told ARBEIDERBLADET that the opinion polls could indicate minor changes. He is confident that the Labor Party will show its "true socialist face" before the elections.

"In the light of today's situation, it is clear that it will be a major challenge for the nonsocialist parties to win the elections next year. It will be easier, however, when the Labor Party is forced to reveal its true socialist face," said Jo Benkow.

#### Political Barometer

Question: Would you vote if elections were held tomorrow?  
If so, which party would you vote for?

#### Distribution of answers:

	Year	AP %	H %	KRF %	SP %	SV %	V %	FRP %	DLF %	NKP %	RV %	Others %
Election	81	37.1	31.8	9.3	6.6	5.0	3.9	4.5	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.2
Election	83	38.9	26.4	8.8	7.2	5.3	4.4	6.3	0.7	0.4	1.2	0.3
OCT	83	39.2	26.8	8.1	6.2	5.8	4.0	8.3	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.2
DEC	83	39.9	27.6	7.8	5.5	5.5	4.2	7.9	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.1
FEB/MAR	84	38.4	28.9	8.3	5.7	6.5	4.0	7.1	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.2
MAY	84	39.0	28.6	7.6	6.3	5.8	3.8	7.5	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.3
JUN	84	40.1	28.9	7.7	5.3	6.2	4.0	6.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4

AP Labor Party  
H Conservative Party  
KRF Christian People's Party  
SP Center Party  
SV Socialist Left Party  
V Liberal Party

FRP Progressive Party  
DLF Liberal People's Party  
NKP Norwegian Communist Party  
RV Red Election Alliance

The interviews were conducted between 18 June and 6 July 1984. The number of respondents was 1,245. Of this number, 1,039 indicated a party preference.

NORGES MARKEDSDATA A/S

## Labor Down in Voter Loyalty Poll

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Odd Inge Skjaevesland]

[Text] The Labor Party still has the most loyal voters, but voter loyalty has dropped somewhat since May. This was indicated by an NOI (Norwegian Opinion Institute)/AFTENPOSTEN poll on voter stability in June. The three coalition parties (Conservative Party, Christian People's Party, and the Center Party) also have loyal voters. The picture is bleakest for the Progressive Party and the Socialist Left Party. The loyalty of Liberal Party voters has varied.

The Norwegian Opinion Institute asked the following question of people who voted in the previous parliamentary elections: "If elections were held tomorrow are you absolutely sure you would vote for the same party as in the last elections, would you consider voting for another party, would you perhaps not vote, or are you uncertain as to what you would do?"

In June, 84 percent of those who voted for the Labor Party in 1981 said they would do the same if elections were held tomorrow. This represents a 7-percent decline from the previous month for the country's largest party. It indicates that some Labor Party voters have become uncertain over a short period of time and could perhaps vote for another party. In the past, however, the party has regained the support of doubtful voters. From November to December of last year, Gro Harlem Brundtland's party suffered a decline similar to that of June this year, only to recapture the lost voters during the spring of this year.

### Stable Among Conservatives

Since April, more and more of those who voted for the Conservative Party in the last parliamentary elections have answered that they are "absolutely sure" they would vote again for the largest coalition party. In June the figure reached 77 percent. Eleven percent of the party's 1981 voters said they would perhaps vote for another party, while 8 percent of them had already decided to change parties. Two percent decided not to vote if elections were held tomorrow.

### KRF Decline

The Christian People's Party has experienced shifting voter loyalty in recent months. After a strong showing in May, voter loyalty dropped by 9 percent to 75 percent in June. In March the party scored as high as 92 percent loyalty, only to drop 20 points the following month. These large variations are the result of wide margins of error that are inevitable in connection with small parties. Nevertheless, the greatest party loyalty among the nonsocialist parties is in the Christian People's Party.

## SP Advances

With 79-percent voter loyalty, the Center Party should be the coalition partner that is most satisfied with the June results. The latest poll also shows that Johan J. Jakobsen's party has strengthened its position considerably among its own voters since the first 3 months of the year. After struggling to top the 70-percent mark, the party now has stabilized its position, receiving the support of about 80 percent of its 1981 voters.

## Unstable

The Socialist Left Party and the Progressive Party had the poorest showing in the June polls with 67-percent and 63-percent support, respectively, among their own voters in the 1981 parliamentary elections. SV dropped 10 percentage points from May, while Carl I. Hagen and his fellow party members lost 8 percent, compared to the previous month.

The Liberal Party showed a major advance of 15 percent from May to June. Since 78 percent of the party's 1981 voters still chose the party in June, the Liberal Party was in third place among all parties in its ability to retain the support of its voters from 3 years ago. If we examine the figures for several successive months, however, we see that the Liberal Party's 1981 voters have shown varying degrees of support for the party. An examination of all the monthly loyalty polls reveals that the Liberal Party is in a worse position than most other parties.

## Stay-At-Home Voters

SV and the Conservative Party are the only parties that are recruiting "stay-at-home voters, according to the poll. Six percent of SV's 1981 voters decided not to vote if elections were held tomorrow. The corresponding figure for the Conservatives is 2 percent. Among those who have decided not to vote for the same party as before, the highest percentages last voted for the Conservative Party (8 percent), the Progressive Party (7 percent), and the Liberal Party (7 percent).

Those with family incomes below 100,000 kroner are more loyal to the party for which they voted in 1981 than those who earn more. Only 1 percent of those earning under 100,000 kroner decided to vote for a different party. Voters with 9 years of schooling or less are more loyal to their party than those with higher education--63 percent and 59 percent, respectively. At the same time, however, there is greater uncertainty within the former group as to whether or not to vote for the same party.



Percentages of voters in the 1981 parliamentary elections who would vote for the same party if elections were held tomorrow:

	1983		1984					
	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Labor Party	91	84	87	87	85	82	91	84
Progressive Party	78	66	66	58	58	78	71	63
Conservative Party	70	70	67	80	73	70	74	77
Christian People's Party	87	76	78	87	92	72	84	75
Center Party	66	76	72	72	71	78	80	79
Socialist Left Party	69	75	84	72	74	70	77	67
Liberal Party	58	77	61	57	87	66	62	78

The number of respondents in the individual monthly surveys is between 30 and 60 for all parties other than the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. For this reason, the margins of error for the smaller parties are considerable. For these parties, figures for several months should be examined.

Party loyalty in the Labor Party has dropped somewhat since May, while in the Conservative Party it has risen.

#### Support for Willoch Stable

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] The popularity of the government is stable: 42 percent indicate that they are satisfied with the work of the government. This is 2 percent fewer than the number of satisfied voters in February of this year. Only 61 percent of the Christian People's Party's sympathizers are satisfied with their own government. No SV supporters were satisfied with the Willoch government, which clearly has its greatest support in the Conservative Party--81 percent. The government has its greatest support among organized employees who are not LO (Federation of Trade Unions) members. Among this group, 54 percent are satisfied with the performance of the government.

This was indicated by the NOI/AFTENPOSTEN opinion poll taken in June. The question asked in the survey was short and to the point: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's performance so far?

Thus, 42 percent answered that they were satisfied, while 45 percent stated that they were dissatisfied. This is 2 percent below the February figure. On the other hand, 4 percent more are uncertain about the government's work. Thirteen percent did not know what they thought about the performance of Prime Minister Kåre Willoch's government.

Although the government's popularity may be described as extremely stable this

year, it has dropped considerably since the summer of last year. In June 1983, for example, 10 percent more (52 percent) said they were satisfied with the government.

The number of satisfied voters, by party affiliation, this summer was as follows: AP 19 percent, FRP 42 percent, Conservatives 81 percent, KRF 61 percent, SP 71 percent, no positive responses from SV supporters this summer, and 39 percent in the Liberal Party answered that they were satisfied. The greatest doubt is found among FRP voters--21 percent.

#### Men Positive

One clear trend in the survey is that the government enjoys its strongest support in cities and in towns, with Oslo and Akershus clearly at the top of the list. Here, over half the respondents (51 percent) supported the government. In addition, the figures show that many more men are satisfied (46 percent) than women (38 percent). Doubt is most widespread (16). Among men, 10 percent answered that they did not know.

#### Many Do Not Know

The government's popularity is highest among voters in the 30 to 59 year age group: 44 percent of this group are satisfied. The Willoch government is also strong among young people under 30: 42 percent. Among respondents over 60, however, only 38 percent are satisfied with the performance of the three-party government. A relatively large number in the youngest and oldest age groups are uncertain: 16 percent under 30 and a similar number over 60 do not know what they think about the performance of the government. Ten percent of the voters in the middle group, 30 to 59 years old, expressed similar uncertainty.

#### Income Groups

The efforts of the government received the greatest approval among people with incomes of 160,000 kroner or more: 49 percent of this income group were satisfied. Among voters with an income of 100,000 to 159,999 kroner, 39 percent expressed this same opinion. This opinion was shared by 3 percent fewer of the respondents who earned under 100,000 kroner.

#### Highest Figure

Perhaps the most encouraging figure in the survey, from the government's standpoint, is the support it enjoys among organized employees who do not belong to LO: 54 percent of these voters approve of the coalition government. However, Prime Minister Willoch and his cabinet cannot be pleased with the response of LO members: only 24 percent are satisfied with the government's performance. More unorganized employees are satisfied, however: 43 percent.

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CSO: 3639/142

## PCP-PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ISSUE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 26 Jul 84 p 6

[Text] The PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] has always voiced active solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people against Zionism and imperialism and for the national rights to which they are entitled, including the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Throughout the years, the PCP has always recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and has maintained relations of fraternal friendship and mutual solidarity with the PLO.

Delegations representing the PLO participated in the 9th and 10th congresses of our party. On various occasions, here and in the Near East, talks have been held between the two organizations.

With the development of the situation in the Near East, the relations between the PCP and the struggle of the Palestinian people are now entering into a new stage.

The PCP not only continues to be profoundly interested in strengthening the bonds of friendship and solidarity with the PLO, the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but is also seeking to develop bilateral relations with the organizations affiliated with the PLO.

It is within the framework of this policy that the PCP maintains relations with the PLO through its executive committee, as noted by Yasser Arafat in his message, important portions of which we are publishing in this issue of AVANTE!

It is also within the framework of this policy that a delegation representing the Palestinian Communist Party has just visited Portugal at the invitation of the Central Committee of the PCP. Talks between the delegations representing the two parties were held, as the joint communique, which we are also publishing in this issue of AVANTE!, notes.

Simultaneously, the PCP has written letters of friendship and solidarity to the other leading organizations affiliated with the PLO, specifically the FATAH, FDLP and FPLP.

In thus voicing its active solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Palestinian people and its revolutionary organizations, the PCP is certain it is contributing to the unity of all the anti-imperialist forces.

#### Joint Communiqué

At the invitation of the Portuguese Communist Party, a delegation representing the Palestinian Communist Party visited Portugal from 23 to 25 July. It included Naim Ashab, a member of the Political Bureau, and Maher Charif, a member of the Central Committee.

The Palestinian Communist Party delegation held talks with a delegation from the Portuguese Communist Party made up of Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general, Sergio Vilarigues, a member of the Political Commission and Secretariat, and Domingos Lopes, an alternate member of the Central Committee.

During the talks and meetings held, a broad exchange of information and views concerning the activities of the two parties and the international situation took place. Special attention was devoted to the Middle East and the situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel.

The Portuguese delegation confirmed its active solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Palestinian people against imperialist-Zionist aggression and for their inalienable national rights, including the creation of their own independent and sovereign state on Palestinian territory.

The party voiced its solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimated representative of the Palestinian people, and the organizations of which it is composed.

The Palestinian Communist Party delegation reported on the Algiers and Aden agreements and other efforts made to reestablish Palestinian unity. The Portuguese Communist Party delegation noted the high value it places on the efforts pursued with a view to overcoming the differences and difficulties within the PLO and strengthening the unity and the struggle of the Palestinian people for the achievement of their just goals. Specifically, it informed the Palestinian Communist Party delegation of the value it places on its struggle.

The Palestinian Communist Party delegation, for its part, voiced its solidarity with the struggle of the Portuguese Communist Party in defense of the gains of the 25 April Revolution and the democratic regime which is consolidating them, as well as the high value it places on its international policy, and the solidarity expressed with the just struggle of the Palestinian people and the other Arab peoples.

The two delegations stressed the victories achieved in recent decades in the liberation struggle of the workers and the peoples. They agreed that the aggravation of international tensions and the increasing threats of war are the result of the aggressive militaristic policy with which the imperialists, led by the U.S. imperialists and the most reactionary NATO circles, are seeking to reverse the development of the revolutionary process and impose their

mastery on the world. They condemned the installation of the new U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe, stressing the need to intensify the struggle for disarmament and detente on the European continent, as well as on the international level. In this connection, they stressed the importance of the peace proposals and initiatives of the USSR and the countries in the socialist community and the broad popular movement for peace. They stressed the fact that in order to face up to the aggressive actions of the imperialists and to defend peace, the unity of the international communist movement and the strengthening of friendship, cooperation and mutual solidarity among the socialist countries, the workers class in the capitalist countries, the national liberation movement and the progressive countries, are of basic importance. The two delegations condemned the crimes, and in particular the policy of aggression and confiscation of Arab land, as well as the expulsion of the Arab populations from their land. They denounced the plans of the U.S. imperialists and the Zionist leaders of Israel with a view to stifling the national and social emancipation movement of the Arab peoples, liquidating the Palestinian cause, imposing hegemony over the entire region, plundering its assets and converting it into a forward military launching area against the USSR and the socialist camp.

The two delegations voiced their active solidarity with the patriotic and progressive forces of Lebanon in their struggle in defense of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. They voiced their solidarity with the Syrian people, stressing the important role played by Syria in confronting imperialism and Zionism. They stressed the decisive importance of cooperation among all of the progressive and patriotic forces in the Arab world, the Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian forces in particular, in the struggle to defeat the plans of the imperialists, the Zionists and the reactionaries. They stressed the importance of the victories won with the withdrawal of the military forces of the United States and the NATO countries from Lebanese territories, and the cancellation of the May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese agreement.

The two delegations emphasized that a just and enduring peace in the Middle East requires the firm rejection of the Camp David agreements, the so-called Reagan plan, and other projects designed to liquidate Palestinian resistance and to divide the Arab world. This is only possible with the total withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem, and the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

With a view to the establishment of a just and enduring peace, both parties stressed the importance of the initiative launched calling for the holding of an international conference, with all of the interested parties, necessarily including the PLO, participating.

The two delegations voiced their firm solidarity with the just struggle of the Arab countries of the Gulf against the military intervention attempts of the United States in the area, and they expressed the view that the interests of the peoples of the Gulf require an immediate end to the destructive war between Iraq and Iran on a just and democratic basis.

With regard to the policy of interference and aggression and the threats of large-scale and direct military intervention by the United States in Central America and the Caribbean, the two delegations made a special point of their solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua and the people of El Salvador, as well as the people of Grenada, who are the victims of criminal invasion and occupation by U.S. troops.

Concerning the situation in southern Africa, they voiced their solidarity with the People's Republic of Angola and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] Party and the struggle of the Namibian people and the SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization), and with the national independence and the struggle of the people of South Africa and the ANC [African National Congress] against the hateful apartheid regime.

The two delegations voiced their solidarity with all of the peoples struggling against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, fascism, Zionism and racism.

The two delegations stressed the usefulness of this fraternal visit in terms of better mutual understanding, as well as the development of friendship and solidarity between the two parties and between the Portuguese people and the Palestinian people.

Lisbon, 24 July 1984

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CSO: 3542/96

## ARAFAT SENDS MESSAGE TO PCP LEADER

Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 26 Jul 84 p 6

[Text] The following are extracts from a message signed by Yasser Arafat and dated 10 July 1984.

"To Comrade Alvaro Cunhal:

Revolutionary greetings. I greatly value your message of comradeship and solidarity with the just struggle being pursued by our Palestinian Arab people for their liberation and independence. May I express to you my gratitude and great appreciation for your position of principle in support of the struggle of our people for the liberation of their fatherland and the recovery of their inalienable rights, including the right to return, to self-determination and to establish their independent Palestinian state (...).

The Zionest enemy and the American imperialists, with the invasion of Lebanon, launched a ferocious war of extermination against the Palestinian people and the people of Lebanon. They used the most sophisticated weapons of death and destruction in the American arsenal. But they failed in their purpose of annihilating our just cause and destroying the PLO. For this reason they are currently intensifying their aggression against our people, using new methods (...).

But our people (...) will continue their revolutionary advance, with the indomitable will and determination not to abandon the revolutionary conquests achieved through their constant struggle and numerous sacrifices (...).

I reiterate to you, dear comrade, my gratitude and appreciation for the positions of your fraternal and militant party, and for your solidarity with our just cause and our legitimate struggle.

I send you most fraternal greetings of comradeship, and best wishes for your progress and success.

Yasser Arafat  
President  
PLO Executive Committee

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CSO: 3542/96

## FORMER PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Jul 84 pp 34-37

[Interview with Francisco Pinto Balsemao by Helena Sanches Osorio; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Francisco Pinto Balsemao, who was prime minister in the coalition formerly in power, assessed the last political year for DIARIO DE NOTICIAS. He is the man perhaps among those in public service who, as a result of his stubbornness and shrewdness, has made the best use of his political potential. He has never ceased his activity and, going almost unnoticed, is continuing vigorous party activity, never neglecting any of the vectors which might aid him in the task he has set himself. Once a year he "opens the window" and argues his case, thereby sending messages to his party colleagues, his adversaries and the public in general. The future will show how excellent his strategy was.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: A year after the last interview you gave me, I would like you to give me a brief summary of your views about the actions of the present government.

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: Within the rule of silence I have adopted, except on matters of state and the actions of my party in this sector, I do not want, of course, to comment on the actions of the present government, although I regard as abusive the way in which some of its members have criticized my two governments, forgetting that the PSD [Social Democratic Party] participated in them, while having recourse 13 months later to charging my executives with responsibility in order to excuse their errors or incompetence.

Therefore, I can only respond in the affirmative. I emerge head high and with my conscience clear. The constitutional revision was completed and the Defense Law approved, and, putting an end to military sponsorship, full democracy was returned to Portugal. On the other hand, the natural wear and tear on the government, above all in a period characterized by the most profound world recession since 1929-32, did not prevent the PSD from remaining, in the elections for the self-governing bodies, the leading Portuguese party, or from gaining in the legislative elections, while I was still prime minister. Apart from this, the main macroeconomic problem, the balance, was in the process of being resolved (the results in the first half of 1983, which obviously were produced by my government, and the consequences in the second



half, bear witness to this). Unemployment had been stabilized, and inflation, although still high, was under control. The budget deficit was again dropping as a percentage of the gross domestic product, while the competitive capacity of our exports did not force a further devaluation of the escudo. Also, negotiations with the Common Market had progressed in such a way that the fact that they were not concluded was due exclusively to the inability of the EEC to establish the conditions for the signing of the final agreement.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: That is your opinion as a former prime minister. What is the view of Pinto Balsemao, the citizen?

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: I am concerned, as any conscientious Portuguese citizen is, about the economic situation and its social and political repercussions.

I have returned to my status as a small businessman, and as such I am following the daily development of economic and financial life. I see that the indications and the charges of corruption are increasing steadily, although there continue to be difficulties in proving that such corruption exists. I see that, almost with every passing day, purchasing power is declining, people are living worse, and dissatisfaction is increasing. That no one should pay anyone seems to be the general rule, and the most blatant example of this is the unique total of back wages owed.

It is evident that one can discuss the balance of current transactions, the foreign debt and the agreement with the IMF, and even the negotiations with the EEC, which seem to me to have been proceeding too hastily in recent times, thus not protecting Portuguese interests cautiously enough, because 30 September appears to be a date more important than that we wanted and to which we committed ourselves. But these goals, which are valid but more or less abstract, do not resolve the problems, do not convince the people that they are living better, or at least that they are maintaining their standard of living.

Above and beyond all this, confidence is lacking. And here we get into the basic issue: there is no confidence because there is no political stability. There is no political stability because the system of government is impracticable. The system of government is not being changed because the existing political class is conservative, in the sense that it does not want to surrender the positions won, and therefore it rejects any change. I do not want to be an accomplice in all that is happening and which can destroy democracy. This is the reason for the struggle I have undertaken for a new approach to the basic questions on the national level.

#### A New Government in the Coming Months

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Why is the priority you clearly specify on the national level, and not for example on the party level?

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: The study I have made or followed in connection with the celebrations of the 50th birthday of Francisco Sa Carneiro, in which

the IPSD took the initiative last October, and also, the time available for contemplation after leaving the government, as well as the encouragement provided in the conception and execution of the activities plan of the IPSD, and, further, the experience gained in government and after 16 years of political activity--all of these things lead me to believe that it is first of all on the national level that it is essential to find enduring solutions.

I have used as a leitmotiv the phrase "changing the system to save the regime." Changing the system under which we live, in terms of organization of the political power, the economy, education, and health, in order to save and consolidate the democratic regime.

This is in my view the basic national goal. We are all aware that the lack of confidence on the part of economic and social agents has been the main obstacle to the harmonious and human development of our country. This lack of confidence is evidenced in the widest variety of ways, from the investment of money abroad (from what I am told, it is no longer just a matter of Switzerland or the United States, but also the regular export of small and medium-level savings to Spanish banks) to an anguished apathy with regard to political life. This is seen, for example, in our young people, but it is also evident in an increasing number of individuals who, in one way or another, devoted themselves to public affairs after 25 April, but are now deliberately, if not bitterly, avoiding such involvement.

In a democracy--and this is the system under which I want to live--political stability is the primary condition for a return of confidence.

However there has not been political stability in Portugal. There has not been a single government which has completed the four years of its term of office, and this prevents continuous and properly planned work and has demonstrated the precarious nature of the functioning of our executives. Even the present government, despite its very broad parliamentary majority, has felt the effects of this precarious condition, which has even led to the impossibility of undertaking a cabinet reorganization, for lack of individuals willing to accept posts in the executive branch. And no one is unaware that the present government, whether or not it maintains the majority supporting it, must yield to another in the coming months, because of the very probable candidacy of Dr Mario Soares for the presidency of the republic.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: You have indicated your preference for the presidential system of government. Why?

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: Where the system of government, in the most limited sense of the term, is concerned, and since we see that the semipresidential system does not serve the purpose, the options remaining within the democracy we have and which we want to strengthen are the parliamentary system and the presidential system.

I do not want to go into much detail on the parliamentary option. Up to a certain point, the shortcomings I have just described result from the parliamentary components in the present system. To insist on the parliamentary

system, as the four main parties which have been consolidated since 25 April have done, or even with a fifth party which might in the meantime emerge, would be to maintain the institutionalization of the provisional.

The presidential system is the formula which could best resolve the problem of the system of government. What is wanted with this insistence on presidentialism? Above all, stability for the executive branch within the democratic system.

What is wanted is that a man elected by direct, universal and secret balloting can, with his team, take up the government of Portugal for the 4, 5 or more years his term will last, with the future possibility of running for office again, judged on the basis of what he has done, with the knowledge both on the part of those who govern and on the part of those who are governed that, during the period established for this term of office, the executive branch cannot fall, because it cannot be ousted by the parliament, and in the knowledge also that the parliament cannot be dissolved by the president of the republic.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: In our present situation, we already have the beginnings of participation in democracy. It should not be forgotten that the forms of democratic participation by the citizen in key sectors, as is the case in all the Western countries, have not yet been established. Here and now this proposal would be the same as choosing dictators for a given period.

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: The presidential system has nothing to do with dictatorship for a given period. It has to do with political stability within democracy. Dictatorship, whether limited in time or not, can indeed threaten, if the organization of the political regime is not consistent--look at what happened with the First Republic. Apart from this, it is possible, through a referendum, through regionalization, through the possible participation of independent candidates in certain elections, as well as a closer supervision of the actions of the government by the parliament, etc., to create systems of functional balance to keep the greed for personal power in check and to encourage new forms of citizen participation in the key decision-making areas.

#### The Administration Does What It Wants

It is not a question of a simple adaptation of the American system of government, because the differences between us and the United States are multiple, ranging from history to geographic dimensions, including economic development, and mainly involving cultural concepts and basic traditional values.

The effort is to establish, through the choice of the people, a point of reference, particularly on the level of the public administration, which is accustomed to doing what it wants, because ministers are changed as often as shirts, to take the place of the continuing doubts and hesitations we see nowadays. Cabinet changes, presidential actions, and intersecting elections, whether they be municipal, regional, legislative or presidential, flawed reorganizations and alleged legislative initiatives which lead to no progress

--all of these things result in the postponement of basic solutions, such that in the end they are never studied, discussed, concretely implemented and tested and finally judged, by means of a new popular vote, within a period the length of which all of us--those elected and the voters--know in advance.

There are those who urge the strengthening of the semipresidential system or a return to it, but I do not understand very clearly what that is.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: To the best of my knowledge, you are not alone in your party in your advocacy of presidentialism.

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: Within and outside the PSD, I have found that my theses, designed essentially to achieve political stability are very well received.

Note, moreover, that achieving political stability was one of the consistent goals in the thinking and actions of Francisco Sa Carneiro, who would have turned 50 this week.

#### Disagreements Within the Coalition

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Let us move then to the specific party level for 1984.

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: On the party level, there is first of all one statement to make: a shift of the present parliamentary majority toward the right can be seen. I am not about to concern myself here with the classic concepts of right wing and left wing, but I think that the style of government pursued has opened up a very broad space between that which the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party itself occupied and that which the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) has traditionally occupied. The result has been a certain "smothering" of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]. And this was perhaps the reason for the attempts to create a party based on the old commission for the support of the reelection of General Eanes. This may also be the reason for the ideological vacuum, which has contributed nothing to nurturing the hopes of the citizens.

It is probable that all of this had to do with the so-called situation, i.e., the need to turn to a certain number of problems with little ideological import. The IMF has no color, and in practice it uses the same formula for Chile or Romania, Mexico or Spain, Brazil or Portugal.

But on the other hand, the difficulties inherent in introducing so-called structural reforms are obvious. A large part of these difficulties can be laid to the system of government, as I have already stressed. The balance, however, is due to the ideological schisms which, at least in part, are to be found within the coalition. However much the government action may be shifting to the right (note, for example, that in connection with the Internal Security Law, there were very few voices representing the Socialist Party to protest the version put forth, and none representing the active leaders within the PSD, with the recent and very strange exception of engineer Angelo Correia), there are on the program level clear differences, which will make

it difficult to adopt decisions, on the issues, for example, of agrarian reform, the National Health Service, access to higher education, the fate to be determined for the EDP or Petrogal, the PGP or the CNP [National Petrochemical Company], the CTT [General Administration of Post Offices, Telegraphs and Telephones] or the TLP [Telephone Workers of Lisbon and Oporto], etc. These differences are evidenced each time efforts are made to adopt specific positions on specific issues. The income law may prove to be an exception, despite the fact that it has not yet been taken up in this legislative session, but the labor laws have not been nor will they be, however much weakened the Assembly of the Republic may be.

The time it has taken to produce a financial and economic recovery plan and the vague content of the majority of its chapters are proof of the difficulty of finding a common denominator.

Under these circumstances, the PSD will be forced to an ever greater extent to occupy its own space, which is a center-leftist space, pragmatic and non-Marxist, with clear ideas concerning the national plan, and a declared concern with social justice, which is a part of social democracy and which is the legacy of Sa Carneiro, and with the proposal of concrete measures making it possible to achieve the national goals toward which we must move. These include a change in the system, reduction of the obvious power of that anemic giant which is the state, and the focusing of efforts on the social aspect, along with the maintenance of control by the political regime over the economic regime.

To our way of thinking, as you certainly must be aware, equality is as important as liberty.

In other words, the PSD should know why it exists, and it exists because it represents the sociological majority of the Portuguese people and their aspirations in terms of personal and collective life. It should know what it wants, and what is wanted is rapid growth in the Portuguese economy, within a context of equal opportunities. It should know how to act, and although I would like to go into this in greater detail subsequently, I say now that this action should be pursued without partisanship, without subordination, without the maintenance of power for its own sake, being therefore consistent with the party's own motives, and obedient to specific and affirmative goals. And the party must know when it will act, which involves a basic decision concerning the potential of the present coalition and concerning the role of the social democrats within it.

No Power for Its Own Sake

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Should the PSD remain in the coalition or withdraw from it?

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: I do not believe that what I have just said means that the PSD should automatically withdraw from the so-called Central Bloc.

What seems obvious to me is that there are two ways of remaining within the Central Bloc. One involves the affirmation of its own space within the

center-left, with very clear national goals consistent with the party program, and achievement of these goals. Given that hypothesis, I am absolutely in agreement that the party should continue within the Central Bloc, since this coalition has a large parliamentary majority for support, and since it is in coalition with the other major Portuguese party that it will be possible to move toward the national agreement of which I spoke earlier and create new rules of the game which it will be more possible to observe and which will guarantee stability. The other way of remaining within the Central Bloc is the one I have just criticized, in other words, remaining in power just for its own sake, going backward or drifting, which means nothing less than complicity in the dream of our partners in the coalition, or some of them, of remaining eternally in political power. This attitude seems to me to merit criticism, and I thus arrive at the following conclusion: either we remain for certain purposes and, because we believe in them, we will be capable of struggling, ready to depart if this possibility is denied us, or we can reach the conclusion now that this is not possible, so that we must withdraw.

In any case, I believe that the basic goal is to make use of the existing coalition to achieve certain objectives.

But on a purely party level, I do not dismiss or relegate to a secondary position the possibility of an opposition cure. The PSD has been in power for 4.5 years, and it has acquired shortcomings and defects because of this. It has suffered from that universal evil, a lack of time, and has postponed problems and internal difficulties.

It would be desirable to define the positions of various individuals more clearly, and above all to define the party strategy and the national goals we are pursuing, which have many times been allowed to fade, using the excuse of the national interest or the pretext of postponement because we are involved in a coalition.

What is impossible is to be and not to be, and to maintain a facade of seeming harmony when no harmony exists within the party or within the coalition itself.

Should the ostrich policy prevail, the existence of the party itself may be threatened, or at least its existence as a great Portuguese party. For my part, I will never share the belief that the PSD is unnecessary or that it can be "strangled" between the PS and the CDS.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Do you think that what we might call the "wear and tear on the regime" may lead PSD voters, at this time of disillusionment, to support the CNARPE?

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: I do not believe so. Obviously, there are always discontented individuals in each party, and as a result there already are those who are charging that the so-called CNARPE is carrying out the laudable task of collecting the undesirables.

As to the voters, the political analysts are almost unanimous in saying that the party which will be by far the most affected may be the PS.

Where the PSD is concerned, this does not alter the clear concerns to which I have referred.

#### A Candidate Who Can Win

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Could we speak now about the 1985 presidential elections?

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: If, as I maintain, the so-called Central Bloc is instrumental in connection with the most profound national and party goals we should pursue, it is obvious that the presidential issue is not unimportant.

Provided that the party understands that it must content itself with being No 2, forgetting, for example, that it is No 1 in the self-governing bodies and in the autonomous regions and the youth organizations, the logical consequence would be to support Dr Mario Soares in the presidential election, or perhaps, to nominate a candidate of the sort the PCP has supported on the first round, merely to save face.

If, however, the party believes that its duty is to lead in a process of changing the system to save the regime, and that it must do so within the Central Bloc, while being ready to do so outside it if working within it proves impossible, then our obligation is to nominate a candidate who can win, and who, to this end, rallies broad national support, and not merely a candidate based on circumstance or availability.

It is obvious that the triumph of the Mota Pinto motion in Braga, thus postponing this problem, destroyed the possibility the PSD had at that point of asserting itself as a consistent whole which would support its candidate. Postponement is dangerous and vulnerable to various interpretations, but I do not want to go into this.

I will merely say that the possibilities available to Dr Mota Amaral, despite the unfortunate Braga postponement, remain strong, as the public opinion polls show. Therefore I do not at all deny him the support which I voiced publicly prior to the congress.

If Dr Mota Amaral comes to believe that the objective conditions for his candidacy do not exist because, among other reasons, the party continues to hinder it, there may possibly be other social democratic militants for whom possibilities exist, although not so many as is being asserted there, or there may be the possibility of a so-called "equidistant" candidate. Only an equidistant candidate almost immediately suggests a military candidate. I have nothing against a military officer as president of the republic--the officers in Portugal are as much citizens as are the civilians, but I dislike the hypothesis at the outset that the candidate has to be a military officer, and thus cannot be a civilian.



## Balsemao Is Not a Candidate

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Do you then definitively exclude a military officer?

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: I agree that if the PSD does not succeed in finding a candidate with very broad support within it, and I do not know whether the present political leadership is working in that direction, the candidate the PSD nominates or supports will have to be a military officer. Given that hypothesis, which is not one that I support, I would indicate my preference at the proper time, although I think now that among the possible military candidates, it is General Firmino Miguel who would have the best chance. From what I know of him, he would moreover be more likely to run as a candidate supported by the PSD, although the candidacy would be national in scope.

It seems to me, in any case, too soon to put forth certainties with regard to the presidential election, not only because it is still 16 months away, but also because much can happen before then, ranging from possible differences as to the basic options between the political leadership of the PSD and that of the PS to intervention by General Ramalho Eanes. For example, he might resign his post, or early legislative elections might be demanded and approved.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Meanwhile, I would like to hear your views about the possible candidacy of Freitas do Amaral, someone supported by the president of the republic, and the already certain candidacy of Mario Soares.

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: In my view, the possible candidacy of Diogo Freitas do Amaral is a problem for the CDS, a party to which I do not belong, and it is for the CDS to resolve the problem. I have difficulty foreseeing support for such a candidacy by a large majority in the PSD, although I think that, in the Lisbon area above all, there are those who have been active for a long time in developing such support.

A candidate sponsored by General Eanes is a possibility, and if such an individual emerges, he would naturally be a military officer, despite the success of engineer Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo in the polls. However, on the second round, if he gets that far, he would have little chance, whoever his opponent might be, because an anti-PCP majority would be formed.

Just as a little more than a year ago, in the only interview I had granted before leaving the government, I told you that "I will do everything so that we will not have to choose between Eanes and Soares," for even better reasons I now reiterate the same. However, this does not mean that I do not admire the democratic inspiration, the physical courage and the spirit of personal conviction which characterize Dr Mario Soares in everything he undertakes. These are qualities which have characterized him throughout his long career, as has his capacity to find solutions, even when they were in short supply or nonexistent.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: There is a sense, beyond his civilized, and I would say even aristocratic, profile, of strong ambition and great political shrewdness.



The people of Portugal are tired of politicians who claim they are not interested in winning office but who struggle valiantly to win them and then to retain them. Can you tell me frankly, in this launching of a "new style," whether or not you want to be a candidate for the presidency of the republic, and if you do, whether or not you will struggle and persevere to win? Rui Machete, moreover, spoke of this as a viable hypothesis just last week.

Francisco Pinto Balsemao: In fact, Dr Rui Machete was speaking of the possibility of my being nominated by the PSD. He has done so more than once, both publicly and in private talks. I take this as a sign of friendship, because I do not believe that Dr Rui Machete, who is clearly on the rise, and deservedly, within the PSD, would name me as a way of pushing me toward any difficulty.

I am not a candidate for the presidency of the republic.

5157

CSO: 3542/96

## COMMENTS ON LEADERSHIP ISSUE IN PSD

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 28 Jul 84 p 6

[Commentary: "A Question of Hope"]

[Text] The period which Mota Pinto set for his party to adopt structural measures at the national level has not yet expired, yet here is the group led by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, already saying that, in the next national council, it will demand an accounting from the vice prime minister! There is, naturally, an explanation for such haste, and the so-called "Nova Esperanca" ["New Hope"] movement has not hesitated to supply it: the leader of the group intends to become president of the party as soon as circumstances permit.

Rebelo de Sousa has--as he likes to point out--time on his side. Judging by his activity throughout last year, he also has persistence and dynamism, without which time has little value. With these three factors, and also knowing by experience how to attract media attention, he has been able to create the idea around him that the PSD [Social Democratic Party] must inexorably fall into his hands, congress or no congress.

This last point, apparently simply a consequence of the others, is perhaps the most decisive one in his rise within the party--for its originality (it is in fact rare for a politician to be so open about his ultimate goals) and for the conviction which he instills in his followers that they are working on a project much vaster and more perfected than any other one around.

To what extent is this a fact and how much is it a strategically well presented myth? Let us see. It is a reality insofar as it is an affirmative process in a party whose leadership, since Sa Carneiro's death, has existed formally but has not presented itself aggressively enough, leaving continuing room for debate of the leadership and of the critical choices, such as the coalition with the PS [Socialist Party]. It is, however, also a myth, inasmuch as there are no sure indications pointing to the future development of a party in such circumstances. It is noted that we are not witnessing the usual succession process here, but the formation of a unifying pole which will permit effective leadership and, consequently, a reorientation of the PSD. When all is said and done, "Nova Esperanca" is simply another nucleus to add to the others which have emerged and are still there, led by individuals who entered politics almost at the same time and whose ages are not so different as might be thought. Whether or not this nucleus has greater potential than any of the others remains to be seen and, for the time being, is only a gamble.

The important thing to observe right now is how this group has been putting together a strategy aimed at leading the PS back into a Center-Right alliance, breaking with the PS and making the Socialists the real adversaries. Even here, however, the observer will detect some advantages but also some difficulties which are not minor. It is undoubtedly a strategy of resistance to Socialist hegemony, which could, therefore, win support from all those who have not looked favorably on the PSD's possible subservience to the presidential candidacy of Mario Soares. On the other hand, the group does not have an alternative candidate available to offer, and we must admit that the presidential elections constitute a decisive moment for any group with projects like those which "Nova Esperanca" is parading. The fact is that "Nova Esperanca" has already begun to recommend a strategy of staying out of the presidential elections because the elections would place the party "somewhat on the fringes." This is undoubtedly a sound observation, but it is still an acceptance of postponement, if not an admission of a certain powerlessness at short range.

Well, it is precisely here that the time factor is being skillfully utilized by Rebelo de Sousa's group. Any other group in the same circumstances would keep quiet or would admit that it lacks the resources for anything as concrete as the presidential elections. On the contrary, "Nova Esperanca" seeks to minimize the effects, avoiding the battle at the outset so as not to have to answer for the result of the war, fostering the belief that the future is awaiting the movement with victory in its outstretched hands. This being the case, we have to acknowledge that it is still too early to judge. In politics as in religion, there is always a question as to whether or not it is too late for hope.

6362

CSO: 3542/97

## POLL SHOWS PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK ON FUTURE

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 28 Jul 84 p 13

[Text] [In a poll conducted by NORMA exclusively for SEMANARIO] about 75 percent of the Portuguese people feel their living conditions are going (to continue) to worsen throughout this year. In fact, the percentage of those who feel this way is, by far, the highest in all the target cities, and this percentage is --again by far -- the highest both among men and women, young people and elderly and regardless of socioeconomic class.

Oddly enough--or perhaps we should say significantly--most of the minority for whom the Portuguese living standard should "improve greatly" or at least "improve a little bit" appear to base their opinion on a kind of "general principle" (temperament, approach to life) that is obviously subjective; the figures indicate that, for most of the minority who expressed optimism, the respondents were simply "hopeful."

The accompanying tables, which we invite the reader to examine, give a fuller picture of this material.

Universe: Portuguese citizens over the age of 18, residing in the cities of Coimbra, Evora, Lisbon, Porto, Vila Real and Viseu. Sample size: 614 individuals. Sample method: random, stratified by city, ascription nonproportional. Sample selection: random, by the "random route" method to select the households and, within households, the Kish method to select the individual to be interviewed. Technique: direct and personal interview, at the respondent's residence, using a structured questionnaire. Sample points: 6 cities in which 120 starting points were selected. Field work: interviews conducted in the period between 20 and 29 June 1984. Margin of error: the level of error is about plus [or minus] 4 percent in a 95-percent confidence interval for p= 50 percent. The survey was conducted by NORMA, Inc, Portuguese member of Gallup International.

Table 1: Expectations for Living Conditions in 1984 (responses tabulated by sex, age and class, expressed in percentages)

Response	Sex							
	Total	Masc.	Fem.	18-44	Age 45+	A/B	Socioeconomic Class*	
							C	D
Much better	0.1	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.3	-	-
Little better	12.4	11.3	13.4	17.8	7.4	20.9	12.1	0.1
Little worse	35.3	43.6	27.8	38.6	32.4	45.3	34.3	23.5
Much worse	39.6	33.8	44.9	31.1	47.5	20.8	40.9	64.3
Same	2.9	4.5	1.4	3.7	2.2	6.6	2.1	-
No opinion	9.6	6.7	12.3	8.6	10.5	6.1	10.5	12.0

Reasons cited by those who thought living standard would improve

Recovery measures	4.8	4.2	5.2	6.0	2.1	9.5	1.1	-
Could not get worse	2.6	5.6	0.4	2.4	3.0	-	4.7	-
Prospects upward	26.2	11.4	37.3	27.8	22.4	14.6	35.4	-
Hopeful	53.4	64.2	45.3	52.7	55.0	53.9	52.9	100.0
Only if govt. changes hands	0.1	0.3	-	0.2	-	-	0.2	-
Others	0.4	1.0	-	0.6	-	-	0.8	-
None cited	17.3	17.6	17.0	16.2	19.6	31.5	6.0	-

Reasons cited by those who thought living standards would worsen

Price increases	57.0	51.3	62.6	61.5	53.5	52.8	60.7	51.4
Economic crisis	7.6	7.5	7.6	10.9	4.9	13.2	5.4	7.2
Unemployment	5.3	5.5	5.1	6.5	4.3	3.0	6.5	4.2
Lower wages	5.6	5.8	5.4	5.5	5.7	4.8	7.9	-
Poor public administration	6.4	6.7	6.1	4.6	7.9	6.3	6.1	7.4
Lower pensions	6.2	2.9	9.3	-	11.1	2.5	5.1	13.6
Lower quality of life	6.3	6.8	5.9	6.3	6.4	5.1	6.1	8.7

\* A-upper class; B-upper middle class; C-middle class; D-lower class

Table 2: Expectations for Living Conditions in 1984 (responses tabulated by city, expressed in percentages)

<u>Response</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coimbra</u>	<u>Evora</u>	<u>Lisbon</u>	<u>Porto</u>	<u>Vila Real</u>	<u>Viseu</u>
Much better	0.1	2.1	-	-	-	-	-
Little better	12.4	12.6	11.3	13.2	10.2	16.0	11.8
Little worse	35.3	40.9	25.9	28.2	53.1	37.7	44.4
Much worse	39.6	26.2	33.1	46.4	27.0	28.2	30.2
Same	2.9	12.2	17.9	2.5	-	0.7	3.4
No opinion	9.6	6.0	11.7	9.7	9.7	17.3	10.2

Reasons cited by those who thought living conditions would improve

Recovery measures	4.8	6.6	-	-	19.4	10.7	22.3
Could not get worse	2.6	12.2	-	-	7.4	15.1	8.2
Prospects good	26.2	39.5	9.2	34.2	-	4.6	6.6
Hopeful	53.4	37.1	43.5	58.7	42.6	59.7	45.9
Only if govt. changes hands	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	8.5
Others	0.4	-	11.0	-	-	-	8.5
None cited	17.3	11.3	36.4	7.1	50.0	20.6	22.3

Reasons cited by those who thought living conditions would worsen

Price increases	57.0	72.6	51.7	56.0	57.1	61.6	52.3
Economic crisis	7.6	7.1	9.6	8.4	5.5	7.7	4.6
Unemployment	5.3	1.6	7.5	5.8	4.0	2.6	15.4
Lower wages	5.6	16.0	8.2	5.2	3.8	6.8	11.3
Poor public administration	6.4	-	6.2	4.9	10.9	-	16.2
Lower pensions	6.2	5.7	4.1	7.8	3.0	1.6	3.1
Lower quality of life	6.3	-	11.3	7.3	5.0	2.9	7.1

## QUALIFIED DENIAL OF EANES RESIGNATION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 29 Jul 84 p 5

[Text] Herminio Martinho, member of the former CNARPE [National Committee of Support for the Reelection of President Eanes], ruled out the possibility that "at least under normal circumstances," the president of the republic would resign his office to lead the so-called "Eanist party."

Appearing on the Radio Renascensa program "Cards on the Table," Martinho admitted, speaking for himself, that unusual circumstances could arise that might move Ramalho Eanes to take this step; such a circumstance might be the passage of an internal security law which contained provisions contrary to the spirit of the constitution.

Expressing the hope that Eanes would come to lead the movement in due time, the official added that, at this time, it is expected only that he will continue to serve the office of president of the republic with "the same impartiality which he has always shown."

Referring to the approaching presidential elections, Martinho denied that this movement, of which he is a member, had already decided on the candidate it would support, noting that it had not even been decided yet whether it should be a military officer or a civilian, although the former CNARPE feels that the presenting a presidential candidate is essential to the implementation of its program.

Although Herminio Martinho feels it is still too early to announce the date of the constitution of the new party, he envisions "an essentially Portuguese project, one which corresponds to the country's historical and cultural reality."

It is a project which is not against anyone, although, according to Martinho, it could take voters away from all the parties, including the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], which, in his view, has more voters than actual members.

In conclusion he stressed: "The great majority of the Portuguese--and I myself--have cast negative votes, because we did not support either the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] or the PCP programs. It is high time we voted for something positive."

## FRG MINISTER PROPOSES TRILATERAL COOPERATION

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 31 Jul 84 p 5

[Text] Jorgen Warnke, FRG minister for economic cooperation, stated in Lisbon that one of the objectives of his visit is the "probable trilateral cooperation between the FRG, Portugal and the Lusophone countries."

The visit, which lasted barely 24 hours, included meetings with Soares, Lucas Pires, the ministers of finance, social equipment and industry, Gaspar da Silva, state secretary for cooperation (Minister Gama was attending the defense council) and with German entrepreneurs.

The FRG minister stressed to newsmen "Portugal's paramount importance" in Southern Africa, where, he said, "it would be impossible, in its absence, to reach a military detente in the region."

He also stated that the cultural ties between Portugal and the Lusophone African countries are "extremely important for increased efficiency in the cooperation with them." In reference to Portuguese-German cooperation, Jorgen Warnke said that various issues were analyzed during the course of the meetings, including especially the supply of German telecommunications equipment to Portugal.

Moreover, he said that his country is especially interested in cooperation projects that "will assist in creating employment in the FRG, which is presently affected by a high rate of unemployment."

He finally added that cooperation between Portugal and the FRG is not restricted only to economic issues, but also includes external security. He noted that "countries such as Portugal, the FRG and France have more cause to progress in this field." He stressed, however, that "these are only prospects for the future."

CSO: 3542/104



## EUROPEAN DÉPENDENCE COUNTERBALANCED BY LUSOPHONE AFRICAN SUPPORT

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 31 Jul 84 p 21

[Article by Gil Daupias: "Lusophone Africa Forgotten by Government"]

[Text] It is in vain that I looked for some reference to Lusophone Africa in the excerpts appearing in the press of the government's Program for Financial and Economic Recovery whose focus is the opening up to the EEC and to foreign capital.

For those of us who fought in the Luso-African Movement for the strengthening of economic, cultural and social relations with the new Portuguese-speaking countries, this EEC mirage and the rejection of all we created in Africa constitute crass and tragic errors.

In order to escape the centralizing tendencies in the Iberian peninsula, Portugal looked, early on, for overseas areas of expansion that would ensure its political and economic independence.

Turning its back on Spain, it was able to project itself, up until the present era, in vast African regions, where it created interdependent structures that constituted a vast economic area, an area that might have survived beyond the natural and inevitable independence of the colonized territories.

However, instead of the kind of solidly structured independence that would have preserved the mutual interests created through the centuries, the 25 April revolutionaries simply abandoned the African territories to their fate. Furthermore, they provoked the disorderly and precipitous departure of the population that had created everything, thus dealing a heavy blow to those territories' economy.

Today, deprived of its natural environment, Portugal is pursuing the mirage of EEC membership and of the internationalization of its economy as a means of solving the crisis in which the apprentice revolutionaries plunged it, instead of attempting to return to this environment on the basis of agreements that would restore the lost balance.

But such solutions will lead not only to the limitation of the sovereignty specified in the Treaty of Rome and to European integration, but also to the peninsular federation that Portugal has been avoiding for 9 centuries.

Having ensured the support of the Lusophone African countries, Portugal could even agree to a common market in the peninsula, without running the risk of losing its own sovereignty.

However, if it turns its back on them, Portugal will be unable to resist the Spanish attraction for long. With its decades of advance over us, Spain will be the immediate and largest beneficiary of our two countries' entrance into the EEC, since the opening of the borders will allow it to expand the volume of its supplies to third countries--something that is already happening today--without our being able to restore the equilibrium because of our lack of marketing ability.

Under present circumstances, our entrance into the Common Market would make us dependent not only on Europe, but also and especially on Spain, an economic dependence that would soon be transformed into a political one as well.

At first glance, Europe is being charitable with us: it is allowing us, as an alm, to sit at its table, since its interest in doing so is difficult to ascertain.

Blind and naive, our government is not paying attention to this, preoccupied as it is with the rapid solution of the problems affecting the country. Our leaders do not care about our appearing to be the poor relative, just as long as they can affirm that they saved the homeland from bankruptcy and they are considered heroes.

Popular wisdom says that when alms are large, the poor man becomes suspicious. The haste with which Mitterrand came to expressly announce to us that we shall finally enter the concert of rich nations was meant to make our mouth water.

If one stops to reflect for a moment, it becomes obvious that the Common Market countries must see some advantage in our membership. If we really have nothing else to offer except some textiles that no one needs, what interest does our entrance have, especially for France, which, having previously fought against our admission, is now showing its resolve in fostering it?

Obviously, France is attempting to jockey itself into a favorable position against the attraction that will be exercised by Spain, and to turn to its advantage those ties with the Lusophone countries that we have allowed to fall into disrepair; through our intermediary, France will thus extend its agreements with the Franco-phone African countries to the Lusophone nations, a fact that will strengthen its position within the EEC, where Germany's economic might is becoming stronger every day.

It is well known that France has not been very successful, despite its efforts, in penetrating the Lusophone countries. With us as an interpreter, it could possibly achieve its ends. French cultural influence is quite significant in Portugal, and Paris, in the future, could well use our emigrants--whose return it is inciting--to achieve in Lusophone Africa what we ourselves have disdained.

Thus it is paramount that Portugal, upon entering the EEC, be tied to the Lusophone countries by solid economic and social relations achieved through a strong presence, as the Luso-African Movement has been advocating.

Otherwise, we shall not only lose the benefit of all we have created, but also our own independence, economic as well as political.

## APPROVAL OF INTERNAL SECURITY LAW CREATES WAVES

## Party Discipline

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Aug 84 p 6

[Editorial: "The Seven Infractors"]

[Text] The repercussions from the controversial vote on the Internal security Law are already beginning to be felt inside the Socialist Party. This may not mark the beginning of a serious crisis--as some predict--but, without a shadow of a doubt, it is a delicate situation for the party leadership.

The system of party discipline permitted the approval of the bill; without that discipline, the vote could have presented some surprises. The problem naturally arises when this system is not respected by every party member and when, on the contrary, there are some who are determined to flout it and thus challenge the party organization. To attempt to overlook this breach would be to destroy any credibility is voting discipline and would be an invitation to all the deputies to cast their next votes according to the dictates of their respective consciences. On the other hand, to be forceful and make an example of the culprits would be to risk further internal disturbance, since those affected would certainly not bow in silence to the decision of an authority which they have already begun to contest in the parliament. This is the dilemma facing the Socialist leadership.

In the first place, its maneuvering room in this case is seriously limited by the reservations with which the bill was greeted in all the opposition benches; moreover, it is limited by the character of those who broke with party discipline. Actually, the position taken by a party like the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] during the entire process has been such as to inhibit any less well founded accusation against the Socialists who dared to vote against the bill. But even if this were not the case, it would always be risky to launch any such action against deputies like Sottomayor Cardia, Manuel Alegre and Eurico de Figueiredo, names against whom it would be difficult to make any serious allegation of collusion with forces outside the party. Thus, unlike what has occurred in previous cases of opposition to the party leadership, which almost always resulted in expulsion or ostracism, based on the claim that the perpetrators were serving ideologies or forces that were alien, if not hostile, to the PS [Socialist Party], this time the leadership will have to make a judgment solely on the refusal of the seven deputies to vote on a bill according to party instructions.

The matter does not end here, however, although formally it would seem to be settled. In a communique released in this regard, the Permanent Committee of the Socialist Party agreed to confine the issue to the seven deputies who carried their rebellion to the utmost degree and voted against the internal security law. This being the case, in effect, said infractors are to be condemned for not taking the more conciliatory--thus easier--course of those who arranged not to be present when the vote was taken. In ethical terms, the solution is not the most convincing and, in political terms, it can be predicted that the seven culprits will not be ostracized.

Does this have something to do with the movement inside the party to redistribute the leadership posts, as some would like to have it believed? It is difficult to demonstrate such a connection, and even if it could be verified, the matter at issue is sensitive enough to call for discussion on its own merit, independent of any other real or supposed implications.

#### Effect on Eanist Party

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 31 Jul 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Agapito Pinto]

[Text] Conclusion of the parliamentary debate on the Internal Security Law and the vote on it demonstrate that what many call the "Eanist" strategy is in a more advanced stage of planning and execution than anyone would have thought, and that Eanes has benefited or will benefit from the divisions, the schisms and the crises within the major democratic parties, particularly the PS, because of the mistrust and criticism that were apparent in that parliamentary debate.

Statements by General Eanes while he was abroad and later in Ovar, about his future political activity, taken together with the signs of division within the "majority" (above all in the PS), observed during the debate on the internal security law, are strongly indicative of a crisis that could erupt in late summer and could come to a sudden climax in the winter of 1984/1985 or in the spring of 1985.

#### Internal Security Law Divides PS

The fact that some "ancients" of the parliamentary group, hand picked by Mario Soares in 1983 to include only those most loyal to him, have openly defied the leader is the first troubling sign of this growing crisis in the PS.

#### How Will Soares Defend Himself?

In his favor--in addition to his incumbency, which gives him considerable weight--Mario Soares has the charismatic prestige of the leader of the party and also great skill at maneuvering, which on other occasions has enabled him to win out over a series of competitors. It has been said that, since he was able to put down his greatest friend--Salgado Zenha--it will not be difficult for him to subdue the "ancients," beginning with Sottomayor Cardia.

In fact, if Mario Soares looks ahead and manages to win over the rank and file and the Socialist electorate (which is pretty distressed and discouraged, indifferently) to his point of view, at least at the level of the active members, Soares could win out again.

But it will not be enough to be able to say he has been victorious, because there are victories and victories--Phyrric victories, for example. Mario Soares must think out his strategy very well as leader of the PS and the government, so as not to fall into one of these Phyrric victories, so as not to pile up "victories" that will later turn into defeats. Isn't it certain that each of these "victories" diminish his base of support and add to the number of his enemies? It could happen that, at the moment when Soares wants to launch his presidential campaign and give up the leadership of the party, his strength within the party will be very limited, and the rules that govern the action of the present secretary general will be dictated precisely by the sectors which have drawn away from him.

The tactic of "divide and rule" may be important, but successive and systematic division, offending everyone at one time or another, piling up enemies upon enemies, is a dangerous tactic, with unpredictable consequences for the future.

But it is even worse not to act. It would be worse still if Mario Soares did not understand that his position within the party is still strong, but that it could become shaky. And the issue of the Internal Security Law was the most expressive sign of this crisis.

#### Eanes Continues To Advance

This is not, by the way, an isolated crisis--it has to do with other situations that are occurring in other parties. It will affect the future orientation of the other democratic parties regarding the presidential elections and, right now, certainly, it has something to do with the progress of the Eanist party. It also has something to do with the recent public statements by General Eanes, announcing that he is going to engage in party politics after he leaves the presidency of the republic, a fact that many good people have interpreted as meaning that he is going to operate precisely in the area most affected by the crisis in the PS.

This Internal Security Law, with more episodes still to come (there is still the discussion of the particulars and then the final vote and the promulgation or veto by the PR [president of the republic]), served as a first signal that all this is not happening at the same time by coincidence. It is not by chance that General Eanes came forward with his statements at a time when this crisis could be deepening within the PS. Eanes has some clear objectives regarding the presidential elections in 1985 and partisan activities in the future, and these objectives are coming to the surface.

#### Elected a Man of Confidence

For 1985, the idea is simple: to see to the election--on the Left or the Right--of a reliable man; that is, a military candidate who, in the future, will go along with Eanes' game. The idea of a civilian candidate appears to be ruled out. The Eanist sectors are no longer relying on Pintasilgo and it is even quite probable that they are not relying on just one "face," but that they want to [choose among] several--several military candidates. And the more this

candidate, this trusted individual, is a disguised candidate, capable of being "swallowed," as Eanes was in 1976, the better it will be for their strategy.

The PR will probably not appear to support anyone, leaving this responsibility to his supporters. Then it is only a matter of giving a free rein to the divisions and infiltrations within the democratic parties, permitting the introduction and the successful election of someone who can open the way for the formation, growth and, above all, political affirmation of his party.

#### Political alignment

Once this path is open, General Eanes can align himself politically between the remains of the parties or the existing divisions within them, taking advantage of them and giving some support to his movement, to his party, which was born so badly crippled and which can only come to stand erect at the cost of the other parties and with the support of the PR himself.

This is crystal clear and represents the end of a long process about which much has been said. When, for example, during the 1980 presidential campaign, Francisco Sa Carneiro pointed to the dangers of reelecting Eanes, he was clearly talking about this strategy of power and about the possibility that it would be pursued if Eanes were reelected. In fact, his second term has served or is to be used to launch the presidential party, when the current president leaves office, but also when the new president turns out to be a man in Eanes' trust, who will provide the necessary protection for his political and party activity.

The crisis within the PS, the confusion which the PR is causing in the other parties, the increasing appeal of solutions that would favor Eanes and his apparent wish to throw himself into politics again in the future; there are too many factors to have come together simply by coincidence, to use an expression which Alvaro Cunhal used on 25 November and which became famous. Hence this convergence must be taken to mean that the Eanist strategy is going forward in the face of the divisions and the troubles of the democratic party leaders--as it happened in the past when, at Constantinople, the political leaders were debating the sex of angels while the Turks were scaling the walls of Byzantium.

#### Mobilization of Opposition

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 31 Jul 84 p 6

[Text] Early yesterday afternoon, at Belem Palace, the president of the republic met with a delegation of the opinion movement against the Internal Security Law. During the meeting, which lasted for over an hour, Gen Ramalho Eanes was informed about the nature and objectives of the movement.

Coming out of the meeting, the spokesman for the national movement in opposition to the Internal Security Law told reporters that the president of the republic has said there were "issues on which one could be tolerant, but there are others where this is not permissible, because they collide with the rights, freedoms and guarantees of the citizens.

Rui Gracio stressed that the movement "is concerned and perplexed, and views the possible implementation of the Internal Security Law with great distress." He invited the Portuguese people to inform themselves on this issue and announced that the movement will be taking some initiatives, starting in October.

The delegation which met with the president included Agostinha Almeida, Alcina Bastos, Baptista-Bastos, Carlos Marques, David Mourao-Ferreira, Emidio Guerreiro, Francisco Fanhais, Jacinto Baptista, Luis Moita, Luisa Irene Dias Amado and Rui Gracio.

#### Another Appeal

Meanwhile, a group of citizens from Santarem District has addressed an appeal to the president of the republic not to promulgate the Internal Security Law. The signers of the petition--over a thousand names, according to a communique released yesterday--"note that we recently celebrated 10 years of freedom and the end of the dictatorship supported by the frightful political police, the PIDE/DGS [International and State Defense Police/ Security Directorate General]."

They also see on the "horizon the possible creation of an intelligence service " whose powers "would jeopardize the rights, freedoms and guarantees of the citizens" as consecrated in the constitution.

The signers of the petition also note the repudiation of the law by "numerous public figures, including deputies of the government majority."

6362

CSO: 3542/101



## POLLS INDICATE SOCIALIST VOTERS, YOUTH RALLYING TO CONSERVATIVES

## SDP Supporters Shifting to Moderates

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] There has been a strong shift by Social Democratic voters to the Conservative Party and also, to a lesser extent, to the Liberal Party since the election in the fall of 1982. This is evident from the flow analysis of voter shifts that was carried out by DAGENS NYHETER and the IMU [Institute for Market Research].

The analysis of voter support for the parties is based on polls taken between 30 January and 31 May 1984, when 2,260 interviews were conducted.

The analysis shows the shifts among political parties between the election in the fall of 1982 and the spring of 1984--that is, it covers the first half of this election period.

The Social Democratic Party [SDP] suffered some degree of decline in the voter barometer almost immediately after the election but has picked up support since then.

Since the 1982 election, the Social Democrats have had a net loss of about 3 percent in voter sympathies. Most of that loss benefited the Conservative Party (1.5 percent), while 1 percent benefited the small parties outside Parliament and 0.6 percent benefited the Liberal Party. Support picked up by the Social Democrats includes 0.7 percent from the VPK [Left Party-Communists].

## From SDP to Conservatives

The flow analysis confirms that voters have moved directly from the SDP to the Conservative Party. That type of voter shift was previously thought to occur by way of the Liberal Party or the Center Party.

There are signs in recent polls that movement from the SDP to the Conservatives is coming to an end. The debate on security policy between the two biggest parties may be one explanation.



The net gain for the Conservatives totals 1.5 percent. On the plus side, the influx is chiefly from the SDP (1.5 percent) and the Center Party (0.6 percent). On the minus side, there is a loss to the Liberal Party totaling 0.3 percent.

The Center Party shows a drop of 1.9 percent in comparison with its election results, with 0.8 percent having gone over to small parties outside Parliament and 0.6 percent to the Conservatives.

#### VPK Down

The Liberal Party is up by 1.2 percent. It picked up its largest net gains from the Social Democrats (0.6 percent) and the Conservatives (0.3 percent).

The VPK shows a drop of 1.3 percent from its results in the 1982 election. It has lost 0.7 percent to the SDP and 0.3 percent to the small parties.

According to the poll, the number of sympathizers with the small parties is up by 3.5 percent. One explanation for this high figure is that the voters interviewed in the poll were asked which party they felt was best--not how they intended to vote in an election.

The increase for the small parties, which include the Environment Party and the KDS [Christian Democratic Party], comes mainly from people who did not vote in the last election (1.3 percent), while 0.8 percent came from the Center Party and 0.3 percent came from the VPK.

#### Less Loyalty

The IMU also investigated party loyalty on the part of voters. The poll shows a drop in party loyalty among the SDP's sympathizers and increased loyalty among voters for the Center and Liberal Parties.

The SDP long enjoyed the greatest degree of party loyalty, but a change has occurred since the 1982 election. The Conservative Party's voters are now more loyal to their party than Social Democratic voters are to theirs.

In the spring of 1983, 94 percent of the Conservative Party's sympathizers said they still supported the Conservatives, compared to 92 percent in the case of the Social Democrats. One year later--in the spring of 1984--91 percent of the Conservatives were loyal to their party, compared to 88 percent of the Social Democrats. For the Social Democrats, this spring's figure is the lowest ever. The highest score for the Social Democrats was in the winter of 1981, when 97 percent of their voters were loyal to the party.

The Liberal Party reached its lowest point in the spring of 1982, when 52 percent of its voters were loyal to the party. One year later, the figure was up to 57 percent, and in the spring of 1984, 71 percent of the Liberal Party's voters said they thought the Liberal Party was the best party.

The Center Party presents a similar picture. Its lowest score came in the spring of 1982, when 58 percent of its voters were loyal to the party. In the

spring of 1981, the figure was up to 81 percent, but by the spring of 1984 it had dropped somewhat, with 79 percent being loyal to the party [dates in this paragraph as published].

The number of VPK voters loyal to their party fell from 84 percent in the spring of 1983 to 67 percent in the spring of 1984.

#### Leading Daily Views Poll

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Jul 84 p 2

[Editorial: "The Psychology of Shifts Between Parties"]

[Text] Since the 1982 election, the Social Democrats have lost between 2 and 3 percent of their voters. During the same period, the Conservatives have picked up nearly 2 percent.

This is shown by three different public opinion polls, all published within a period of just over 1 week: one by SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls], one by the Central Bureau of Statistics, and one by the IMU--the last-named poll being presented in today's edition of DAGENS NYHETER. The trend is clear, and it is also confirmed by a number of earlier polls.

The thing that is more surprising--and it is also clearly apparent from all three polls--is that many of those changing parties are going directly from the SDP to the Conservative Party.

The political debate often includes talk about polarization and intensified ideological antagonisms. The Conservatives are accusing the Social Democrats of pursuing a disastrous policy of socialization. The Social Democrats are claiming that the Conservatives want to demolish the Swedish welfare and security apparatus that has been built up over decades.

Against that background, it seems remarkable that so many voters can cross over from one to the other of those two enemy parties. How is it possible to change one's political views so radically in such a short time?

The very probable explanation is that the voters in general--and especially floating voters, who lack a natural "home" in a particular party--give little credence to the partisan debate's description of reality. The differences in viewpoint in Swedish politics probably strike them as relatively small--so small, in fact, that they find it hard to discern a political profile in the two middle parties, squeezed in as they are between considerably bigger and more sharply defined political neighbors.

As a result, switching from the SDP to the Conservatives does not necessarily indicate a giant political step. It is very possible that a good many of those changing parties will do so once or twice again before the next election. And if they do, the switch will presumably be due not to any deep ideological reflections, but to more solid realities: developments in the Swedish economy, inflation, and unemployment.

Here there is an obvious credibility gap between voters and politicians. The voters simply do not believe the Conservatives when the latter say that the Social Democrats have adopted a new and tougher socialization policy. Nor do they believe that the Conservatives stand for the brutal rightwing policy that the Social Democrats like to depict.

The voters are countering those vociferous party polemics with what they know from long years of experience: that Swedish politics always tends toward the middle--toward compromise and agreement. Not in words, to be sure. But in practice.

And the voters seem to be assuming--and hoping--that things will continue that way.

#### Conservatives Attracting Youth Vote

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Jul 84 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The Conservative Party is in a relatively strong position among young voters between the ages of 15 and 24. The Liberal Party is experiencing a slight recovery from its earlier position. And many pensioners feel that the Center Party is the best party. This is shown by the DAGENS NYHETER-IMU poll of voter sympathies in certain groups of voters.

The summary below shows party sympathies during the spring of 1984 and is based on a total of 2,851 interviews.

The group polled included 233 first-time voters between 15 and 24 [as published, presumably 15 and 19 intended] years of age who did not participate in the 1982 parliamentary election and 451 young people between 15 and 24 years of age, about half of whom did participate in the 1982 election. The poll also included 445 pensioners between 65 and 74 years of age--that is, not the very oldest of them.

#### Conservatives and Liberals up

The results for those groups of voters can be compared to the results of the voter barometers for the spring of 1984, which covered the entire electorate.

The final result shows a relatively strong position for the Conservatives among the young groups and for the Center Party among pensioners. Another result is that the figures for the Conservatives and the Liberal Party are rising in comparison with the corresponding poll last winter, which had reference to voter attitudes during calendar year 1983.

This may be explainable if one considers that both of those parties showed increases in voter support during the period.

The Social Democrats are getting less support from younger voters and pensioners. Nor does the VPK hold a dominant position any longer among young voters. On the

Voting Intentions of Young and Old  
(in percentages)

Party preference	Total (2,851)	First-time voters (15-19 years old) (233)	Young voters (451)	Pensioners (445)
Conservatives	27.5	34.5	32.5	24.5
Liberal Party	8.0	6.5	7.5	9.0
Center Party	12.5	8.0	9.5	17.0
KDS	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0
SDP	41.5	41.0	37.5	41.5
VPK	3.5	2.0	4.0	2.0
Environment Party	3.0	4.0	5.0	2.0
Other party	2.0	3.0	3.0	1.0

The table shows that a total of 2,851 interviews were conducted during the spring of 1984 and shows the distribution in percentages among three groups of voters.

It is clear from the table that support for the Conservative Party averages 27.5 percent among voters as a whole, but that the figure is higher both among first-time voters between 15 and 19 years of age and among young people between 15 and 24 years of age, but lower among pensioners. This means that the Conservatives have relatively strong voter support in the young age groups but weaker support in the older portion of the electorate.

The picture for the Center Party is the opposite. The average figure is 12.5 percent for voters as a whole, but 8 and 9.5 percent in the two groups of young voters and 17 percent among pensioners.

other hand, those voters are quite curious about the parties outside Parliament, including the Environment Party.

#### Pensioners

The Conservative Party has an average of 27.5 percent in the voter barometers. Among first-time voters, 34.5 percent name the Conservatives as the best party, compared to 31.5 percent in the previous poll. In the larger group of young voters between 15 and 24 years of age, the figures are 32.5 and 30.5 percent respectively. The corresponding figures for pensioners are 24.5 and 20.5 percent.

The Conservatives have therefore gained ground in all three voter categories.

The Liberal Party, which has long had a rough time of it among young voters, has an average of 8 percent. The Liberal Party was named as the best party by

6.5 percent of the first-time voters, 7.5 percent of those up to 24 years of age, and 9 percent of the pensioners.

In the previous poll, the figures were 3.5 percent for both groups of young voters and 8 percent for the pensioners. Even though the poll is narrowly based, the upward trend seems clear.

#### Some Decline Noted

For the Center Party, the average is 12.5 percent. It was named as the best party by 8.0 and 9.5 percent of the two young groups respectively, but by a full 17 percent of the pensioners.

The average figure in the voter barometer for the SDP is 41.5 percent. The SDP is called the best party by 41 percent of the first-time voters, 37.5 percent of those up to 24 years of age, and 41.5 percent of the pensioners.

The results indicate that to some extent, there is a tendency for voter support among the older young people to decline. Their support totaled 42 percent in the previous poll.

The average figure for the VPK is 3.5 percent (2.0 percent among first-time voters and 4.0 percent in the larger group of young people). Of the pensioners, 2.0 percent named the VPK as the best party.

#### Conservative Party Stands Examined

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Jul 84 p 2

[Editorial: "A Revolutionary Party?"]

[Text] In their statements, the Conservatives sometimes inflate their radicalism to slightly ridiculous proportions. The other day SVENSKA DAGBLADET presented the direction of its own ideas as a "progressive" and even "revolutionary" force in West Europe. The revolutionary aspect supposedly consists of formulating a market-economy alternative to "the socialist welfare state," which is said to "have been for many years an almost self-evident starting point for practically every West European government."

Among Conservative participants in the debate of ideas, there has developed a sort of political subculture in which words change their meaning to such an extent that the borderline with socialism winds up immediately to the right of Konrad Adenauer and Harold Macmillan.

But how far have the Conservatives really removed themselves from the West European understanding of welfare policy that is now being condemned in such sweeping phrases? During the prelude to the new action program, that question seems to have been asked within the party as well. The program was therefore given the slightly more conservative look in social matters that was needed to preserve the "coalition" in the Moderate Coalition Party [another name for the Conservative Party].

In any case, the expectations that may exist that the Conservatives will help Sweden out of its economic blind alley are rarely based on the somewhat high-strung chatter about sweeping changes in the entire model for society. Comments about the allegedly fundamental differences between a socialist welfare state and a welfare state based on a market economy strike most people as overideologized hocus-pocus.

Conservatives in general are not inspired by any revolutionary designs on the welfare state. Rather, what they appreciate is the party's will to represent their own groups in the tug of war for the subsidies and advantageous tax rules that characterize the welfare state.

Moreover, even some of those outside the party believe, or hope, that the Conservatives will be able to take responsibility for the somewhat more daring policy that will preserve the welfare state by reforming it.

Does this mean that the differences between the new Conservative line and traditional Swedish policy are small? No, the differences are considerable, but they cannot be described with confusing statements about what constitutes "revolutionary forces."

Some--but by no means all--Conservative proposals indicate the direction of travel which is necessary and which is slowly gaining more and more advocates even in groups where such ideas were recently unimaginable: hefty decreases in marginal taxes, the financing of payments, a thinning out of public expenditures, and solutions to insurance problems. These will become realistic policy if opinions and viewpoints making such actions possible can be consolidated.

But the systematic appeal by Conservatives to special economic interests threatens to cement the group selfishness and ruthlessness in matters of income distribution that grew strong during the years of stagnation. The attempts to score points by stirring up discontent with aid to developing countries exploit narrow-mindedness at the expense of the will to exercise joint responsibility. All too often, the Conservative strategy aims at strengthening attitudes that are serious obstacles to the change of course they say they believe in.

The predilection for confrontation also means that they do not even try to lay the foundations for broad support. The government must be as "clearly nonsocialist" as possible, and that is where the analysis ends. Such self-sufficiency will lead straight to a situation in which the emergency policy will be smashed to bits by social conflicts.

In an open society, economic policy must have some measure of legitimacy in most situations--control of the government is not enough in itself to ensure that results will be achieved. Despite that, the idea that employment in general is the business of no one but the parties in the labor market has been made a main point in the economic section of the new action program.

To the extent that the Conservatives really do stand for a change in the model for society, this does not involve primarily their view of the public sector. Rather, it involves the view that a minimum of agreement is not necessary for economic balance and the preservation of a welfare society.

## OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS OF RECENT VENTURE CAPITAL DEVELOPMENTS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Jul 84 p 9

[Commentary by Fred Zeyer: "More Courage for Venture-Capital Financing"]

[Text] Venture capital definitely exists in the FRG. This is shown by the approximately 3 to 4 billion DM which flow annually into the most varied depreciation projects--indeed attracted for the most part by the supposed tax advantages. Another demonstration of this is the billions now flowing into the stock market. Nevertheless, there is a lack of so-called venture capital, which could also be called opportunity capital, i.e., money invested in technical innovations.

In the past 1½ years, therefore, a number of venture financing companies have been founded in Germany which wish to share in such innovative enterprises. Their object is to provide enterprises with venture capital for financing growth. The venture financiers are interested in as many as possible of their investment enterprises doing business as stock companies or wishing to convert to such companies. This is because the legal form of the stock company places certain requirements on the company management, requirements based on disclosure and the rights of the board of directors, for instance. The venture financiers look forward to a day when they can profitably separate themselves from their investments in the simplest way possible. This can occur best when the stocks of the share company are handled on the stock exchange. For this reason they endeavor to smooth the way to the stock exchange for their share enterprises.

The stock list of the German stock exchange had been growing shorter for many years, but since early 1983 another enterprise has been taking the path to the stock exchange at a rate of almost one every month. But there were hardly any enterprises among these which were led there by venture financing companies. This is due first to the fact that in Germany the market for venture financing is still very young and small. Even in America, it was more than a decade before the market developed. And this was true although there stricter financing principles favor the market for venture capital. A second reason is that we have a shortage of young innovative enterprises active in growth markets in which good profit expectations exist, such as in electronics.



Thus, but for one exception, no venture financing company possesses a very large share portfolio in Germany. The German Venture Financing Company in Frankfurt, founded in 1975 by 29 German credit institutions, has 39 investments. It has invested approximately 40 million DM in these. Otherwise, there are a few, mostly regionally active companies that have been founded by savings banks and banks, such as in Berlin, Munich and Seigen. Industry, too, has become active in this field. Siemens together with two partners, for instance, founded the Technol-Venture-Management Company. And only a few weeks ago, a strong foreign bidder, City Bank, arrived on the German market with great expectations. Others wish to follow.

The growing number of venture financing companies should not, however, hide the fact that the German market for venture capital is just getting underway. There is a decisive role here for the banks to play. They should, however, invest not exclusively their own capital in this particularly risky business. For these reasons, the savings of the average person are to be considered less than are the risk-ready institutional investors and the economy itself. The banks would function as middlemen between the markets and the businesses seeking equity capital.

The credit institutions, as the most important financial advisors of the economy and as quasi monopolists in introducing enterprises to the stock exchange, are called upon today to concern themselves more with the equity capital business, as is the practice in America and England. Only a few banks in this country have accepted this challenge as yet, the Deutsche Bank being a conspicuous exception. If the credit institutions do not more vigorously set themselves this task, there exists the danger that the German market for venture capital could fall into the hands of middlemen who think first of their commissions and secondly of the welfare of the future investors.

There are some rules to be observed in the business of venture capital which might also be valid for Germany. These can be derived from the American market, which has grown to 12 billion dollars and in which around 600 funds are active. In this way, the risk is less for the financiers since the investments are not only well distributed but are conducted on a consortium basis as well. The venture capital business can be lucrative, however, only if for reasons of cost the investments do not fall below a certain minimum.

It is especially important for the success for the investment of venture capital, however, that this business is not judged and conducted solely by the traditional banking criteria. A separation between financier and management is even necessary. Models must be found according to which the holding companies do not become too dependent on the individual credit institutions nor on the industrial financiers. It is also important that the venture financing company is led by managers who are experienced in industry and finance. In this business, it is after all not only a matter of a one-time grant of money. The holding companies must be advised continuously.



Venture financing must not be regarded as a magic word. The economy must be placed in a situation where it can do more for the formation of equity capital on its own. The state should not be active as a venture financier through subsidies, for instance, but should create better general conditions for the economy.

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CS0: 3620/392

## CDU SPOKESMAN URGES CAUTION IN REGIONAL RESTRUCTURING PLANS

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 5 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Norbert Lammert, member of Bundestag Economic Committee and economic policy spokesman for CDU social policy committees: "The Central Significance of the Industrial Sector"]

[Text] HANDELSBLATT, Wednesday, 4 Jul 84. Regional and sectoral economic development in the Federal Republic of Germany is uneven. Regional and sectoral disparities exist in any developing open and dynamic economy, consisting of different levels of activity and differences in the intensity and duration of economic upswings and downswings.

The need for political intervention arises only when such development leads to serious imbalances which time does not correct and which, consequently, have a lasting unfavorable impact on the well-being and lives of the people affected thereby.

#### Industrial Vitality Must Be Maintained

In the past months public discussions about the development of the German economy have increasingly revolved around the supposition of the growing "South-North differential." Experts disagree whether this generalization would hold up under closer scrutiny of the facts. There is, nevertheless, an urgent need for economic policy to resolve the issue to prevent serious economic imbalances.

The productive capacity of our economy remains critically dependent on industrial vitality, notwithstanding the seemingly inexorable trend toward a service-oriented society. This has again been confirmed by the Economic Research Institute in its most recent report on structural developments in the Federal Republic.

Economic policy must, therefore, deal with the important question of whether there really is a "trend toward deindustrialization" in the Federal Republic of Germany and, if so, with its consequences for regional and sectoral economic policy.

Regional disparities in the past have primarily occurred between rural and densely populated industrial areas. Regional support policies have, consequently, been based on the assumption that, given a satisfactory overall economic growth, resources could be channeled into structurally weak--usually rural--areas.

An element of unpredictability has been introduced in the meantime by the fact that aside from predominantly rural regions, some industrial regions must also cope with serious problems. In this context there is a need to determine whether the prevalent public differentiation between so-called "old" and "new" industrial regions is correct and appropriate.

There is the danger that only ill-advised activism will result from the hectic attempts to counteract economic imbalances, since we do not know enough about the economic growth requirements of the different economic areas nor about the varying effects caused by the general basic requirements of official support programs.

The establishment of criteria by which regional economic disparities can be assessed is urgently needed, as is the determination of factors causing regional differences which may be growth-inhibiting; these relate to demographic evolution, cultural conditions, business structures, wage trends, and the potential for research and development. Since 1969 the federal government and the states have jointly pursued the common task of "improving the regional economic structure" which includes assessment of the suitability of subsections of the Federal Republic, subdivided into 179 labor market regions, for receiving support in accordance with a rigid list of indicators (including: gross domestic product at market prices per resident population, wage and salary levels per employee, unemployment rate, reserve labor coefficient, complex indicator of infrastructure).

It has become apparent now that there are serious problems in structurally weak regions which are not at all or not adequately covered by these standardized evaluation criteria.

Public discussions generally overestimate the significance and structural problems of the coal and steel industry when assessing current difficulties of certain older industrial regions to the same degree that they underestimate the importance of the so-called "strategic production"--such as microprocessors, data processing, telecommunications, etc.--and its contribution to total production and total employment, as well as its ability to absorb surplus labor from structurally weak regions and sectors.

The euphoria generated by the generous support for new sites for business and industry, expected to compensate for regional structural deficiencies, abated in view of its real importance. The potential number of enterprises to occupy new sites is, on a yearly average, about 200 in the entire Federal Republic; each employs an average of 50 people and there are no less than 179 competing labor market regions.

With this in mind, the maintenance and growth potential of existing businesses and industries must again become the first priority of local and regional support programs.

#### Industrial Policy With Undefined Content

There is an inverse relationship between the popularity of the demand for a self-contained "industrial policy" and its highly undetermined content. The revitalization of our economy requires--prior to budgeting funds for regional and sectoral economic subsidies--the careful investigation of highly complex relationships and of the causes and effect relationship between subsidy programs and actual economic development which, in most cases, is not understood.

What is urgently needed--and not only for reasons of economy dictated by the budget--is a re-examination and the further development of existing regional political instruments on the state and federal level and their synchronization with sectoral subsidy programs. In the process it is also necessary to take stock of the role and effectiveness of "technology agencies," also supported by public funds, which have increased enormously in recent months.

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CSO: 3620/396

## STRATEGIES FOR SAVING HEAVY ENGINEERING MARKETS

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 23 Jul 84 p 48-49

[Article by R. de V.]

[Text] The contracts of the century have disappeared. What is there left for French engineering, the third largest in the world? Think smaller and reconsider its methods.

French engineering, third largest in the world, is having some lean days. The times are hard for companies specializing in the study, design, and coordination of large projects. Orders are dropping (-7 percent in one year) at the major companies--20,000 employees, 56 billion revenues in exports--which are sharing most of the market. Some are even in the red: 224 million of losses for Technip last year, almost as much for Sodeteg, Thomson subsidiary, and about 50 million for Creusot-Loire enterprises (CLE).

Jobs are disappearing: 270 of CLE's 900 workers have been sent away. Technip itself, which is currently trying to limit the damages, is also hurt by layoffs. The picture is not much brighter abroad. California's Bechtel (44,000 employees) is finding that its orders are also weaker. In Germany, Lurgi, Metallgesellschaft subsidiary, placed 1000 employees on technical leave last summer.

The source of this situation is the crisis and austerity that is striking everywhere, limiting the inception of large projects. In addition, France is experiencing fewer building starts, which is a large area of jobs for engineering.

For the past five years, contracts in petrochemistry, metallurgy, and so on, have become more modest as the overall volume of industrial investments has crumbled. "Contracts of the century" such as the Upper Zakum oil platform built by Serete at Abou Dhabi, are now an exception. The euphoria of growth, the "overheating" in the equipment industries, has been replaced by a "reorientation" of existing industrial units.

This is a field in which the competition of Brazilian, Yugoslav, Indian, or Korean engineering, changes the rules by grabbing small and medium-size contracts at a discount.

Also involved is the integration of their own engineering systems by such large groups as Bouygues or Spie-Batignolles, and the concentration of sales in geographical areas in which the customers are unfortunately insolvent, whenever the deals are not lost for political reasons. This phenomenon has been particularly clear in the Soviet Union; the orders received by Speichim for instance, which works essentially with the eastern countries, have been lower than its total 1981-1983 revenues. Its management expects a deficit in 1984.

A price war is raging under these circumstances. One example is the construction in Russia of the Tengiz gas installation in Kazakhstan, a \$200 million deal in which Technip stands to be left at the gate by the American Litwin and the German Lurgi. We will undoubtedly know the results in November.

Faced with this situation, which for the time being appears irreversible, the large groups are changing their objectives or restructuring; no more sneering at small \$5 million projects. Lafarge Coppee for instance, decided in December 1983 to turn over the management of its engineering division (950 employees) to the Canadian Lavalin. In an attempt at synergy and to create an impression of size, Heurtey and Sofresid had joined their fates one year earlier. And while there is a recurring story that a subsidiary is about to be created from the French side of the American Lummus Crest (200 employees) and Sofresid, GTM-Entrepose acquired 35 percent of the capital of Inter G, a medium-size enterprise (400 employees, 380 million francs in revenues) which has withstood the crisis perhaps better than the big boys.

#### Breath of Fresh Air

But does union necessarily mean strength? Technip (4.2 billion in sales and 2700 employees), a hydrocarbon processing specialist, got bigger by acquiring CLE's market of cement, cellulose, and glass, as well as its denser geographic presence in Latin America. But it still has to combine two fragile companies into a profitable whole. The infusion of 130 million in capital that Technip has obtained from its shareholders, the upcoming study contract with China--and maybe with Iraq--will bring a breath of fresh air. But afterwards? "Mobility, adaptation, diversity," are the key words from Technip's president, Jacques Celerier. To implement them, the company develops its "industries" sector; everything that is not refining or nuclear, and which represented 13 percent of sales between 1976 and 1980, will become 20 percent by 1986.

"But," the head office says, "we also have to improve our sales efficiency." Which means a change in orientation for a better position on small contracts, following the example of the Saint-Nazaire company, which once essentially specialized in the nuclear field, and now offers its services to small and medium-sized enterprises and to the region's collectivities.

"We also have to improve the productivity of our resources," says Philippe Kessler, president of Serete. His company (560 million in revenues) is doing just that by diversifying into computer assisted design, where it holds 80 percent of the Assigraph company, and into industrial design, through Enfi Design, 51 percent of which it owns.

These are techniques which it offers to its customers, but which it also uses for its own needs. It can thus immediately change the design of a project in real time, of monitor costs with respect to initial forecasts. It is an efficient way to protect itself against an Egyptian analyst-programmer who is paid 3000 francs per month (namely four or five times less than his French counterpart), and to offer a quality "comprehensive" service. Will the customers respond in an era when discounts are the norm? "The cost of grey matter is not compressible," states Mr Kessler. "There is no magic, the customer gets what it pays for."

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CSO: 3519/456

## AEROSPATIALE PRESIDENT OPTIMISTIC DESPITE 1983 LOSSES

Paris LES ECHOS in French 28 Jun 84 p 4

[Article by Arnaud Rodier]

[Text] It's true, Aerospatiale is in the red. In 1983, for the first time in five years it had a net loss of 357.5 million francs (it had achieved a net profit of 96.3 million francs in 1982). But Henri Martre does not want to become disheartened, nor does he want to succumb to the crisis psychosis.

"There are favorable elements from the past, and unfavorable elements from the market," quips the boss of this nationalized company, star of the French aeronautics industry. But the quip is only apparent.

With revenues (24.025 billion francs) higher by 12.15 percent, but with orders in free fall (12.8 billion francs at the end of 1983 against 15.6 million at the end of 1982), Aerospatiale is in a "complex and contrasting" situation.

Complex, because it is not doing what it wants. Its activities, assessed by Mr Martre during a press conference yesterday evening, are "very high risk" undertakings.

The uncertainties in perfecting new technologies, the repercussions of the 1979 oil crisis, the drop in military budgets, the doldrums of airline companies, and the length of production cycles (8-10 years for a military system, five years for a plane), are all unpredictable factors.

Contrasting, because one does not sell a plane as one does a helicopter or a rocket. Including cancelled orders, the company did not sell a single Airbus last year. But things have been picking up since January: Ariane is taking advantage of its faultless launchings and of the mishaps of the American shuttle. But what about tomorrow? Civilian helicopters are suffering from the slowdown in offshore activities, but military ones are finding foreign customers. Ultimately, only the missiles have a definitely low profile [1].

[1] Last year, planes represented 33.7 percent of its activity, tactical weapons 31.7 percent, helicopters 19.6 percent, and ballistic systems 15 percent.



## Heavy Debt

Under these conditions it is difficult to establish a solid long range program. On one hand, the company is forced to face the drop in orders by taking various measures (37 hours, partial layoffs, personnel reduction of 1000 workers last year), and on the other it must continue to invest to finance its new projects.

Its research and development expenses reached 5.9 billion francs (4.4 billion in state contracts, 1.5 billion from its own resources), or 20 percent of its turnover. But it also went more heavily into debt: 6.7 billion francs in 1983 against 2.9 billion in 1982.

The result is that its financial costs are soaring from 1.5 percent to 3.5 percent of revenues (837.6 million francs). "It is a handicap compared to the charges of our foreign competitors," acknowledges Mr Martre. But there is no way around it.

That is in fact one of the reasons why it had to create huge reserves during last year (6.5 billion francs against 4.6 billion), which have tilted its net results, and which will still lower them this year despite Mr Martre's serious hopes for recovery.

## The End of the Tunnel

"We are beginning to see the end of the tunnel. The recovery which we did not expect before 1985, will occur sooner," assures Aerospatiale's president, who is relying on an improvement in the situation since last January. For the first five months of the year, the company's orders reached 8.6 billion francs (+54 percent) and should total 24 billion in 1984, for revenues of 25 billion.

A surprising turnabout, to say the least. But Aerospatiale's chief believes that the worst is behind him, and that, while Airbus sales should pick up and while Ariane's success will continue, several helicopter contracts will be signed, among which the one with China, which could be finalized at the end of July.

This does not include the many projects in the works, which are likely to bolster the enterprise: development of the Super-Puma, Dauphin, and Ecureuil families, the launching of the French-German helicopter, third generation anti-tank missiles, anti-ship weapons (ANS) to succeed Exocet, new air-to-ground missiles to replace Roland for the military, Ariane V in space, and so on.

Aerospatiale is certainly not entirely out of the ditch. Especially since after the 100 million of capital endowment it received this year, it does not know how much the state will allocate next year (it would need 500 million francs!), and since the gradual movement of its activities toward foreign areas (61 percent of its revenues in 1983 compared to 55 percent in 1982, and 51 percent in 1981) is not without great risks.

But Mr Martra clearly does not want to fall into the habit of complaining. "The situation is difficult but under control. And we have placed our bets on recovery." The national company is definitely still in a turbulent atmosphere, but not in free fall.

## RETURNED GUEST WORKERS FACE LABOR MARKET, SOCIAL REJECTION

## Reintegration Painful, Jobs Few

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[DER SPIEGEL report on the return of Turkish guest workers from the FRG: "We had to Flee Germany"]

[Text] Frightened by the hostility to foreigners, seduced by the returnee bonuses, tens of thousands of Turkish workers returned to Turkey, the place where, in the opinion of many Germans they belong. Their savings are soon squandered, in most cases their training does not help them in any way, they lose themselves in the gigantic army of unemployed. And the Turkish model of the "employee companies" has failed.

"Everything still German," Mrs Ulku Cizar, 42, says as she pulls the Softis bag from the Eduscho apron pocket and blows her nose.

She used to serve coffee with Eduscho's Soegestrasse branch in Bremen and, of course, the brew that she serves in flower-pattern German porcelain cups is "still German."

German are the rosewood wall-to-wall cupboard, the striped seating furniture, the marble couch table, the Persian-type floral woven rug. German are the pegs which the father, Ramazan, 48, puts into the walls, German the metal from which he fashioned the "Town Band of Bremen" as wrought iron work, "still German" is the license plate of the Ford and also the sticker on the rear window ("Aha, der neue GEHA").

Jeans and T-shirts of daughter Hulya, 19, and son Ismail, 15, come from Germany just as their records, their books, the cosmetics bottle in the bathroom, the giant box of Persil detergent and the latest craze on the detergent market, "Top Job," the white little miracle cloth that allegedly removes the most stubborn "ring around the collar."

All this is no longer in Bremen, Helsingborger Strasse 79, as it was a week ago, but over 2,000 km away in Uskudar, in the Asiatic part of Istanbul, at Yeni Sokak Street. The "No. 40" has been painted in a makeshift manner onto the

two-story flat-roof house with a view of the Princess Islands and the Marmara Sea: reward for 20 years of work in Germany.

In 1964 Ramazan Cizar "out of curiosity" had traveled from Istanbul to Bremen and during the boom had found work with the AG Weser as E welder. A year later, he brought his wife, too, the children were born, went to kindergarten, to elementary school, to the gymnasium. With the comfortably round "ou" pronunciation (instead of au) of the Bremen citizens, daughter Hulya says they are "sounormale Nordlichter" (damn normal North Germans).

In good times, their father earned DM 3000 net including overtime, Ulku a few hundred. Their dwelling and clothing were like those of the Germans, only their food was Turkish. All savings are invested in the house and land in Uskudar, but they also made some "nice trips" to Hungary, Romania, and Austria, to Italy, Switzerland and of course sometimes also to Turkey.

But last year the AG Weser--"use Akschen," as the welder, too, calls the shipyard--collapsed; he participated in strikes, the sitdown in the shipyard terrain, all in vain; he was unemployed on 1 January 1984.

The Bremen Vulkan-Werft (shipyard) was looking for welders. Ramazan Cizar went there and found out that Turks should not delude themselves that they would get the jobs. Germans have priority and there are enough who are strongly interested in getting the jobs, he was told.

Cizar thought it over whether he should hold out for another year with the unemployment insurance, then his daughter would have "her university qualification in her pocket." But after three months of snide remarks at the foreigners agency, at the labor office, at the tax office, from unemployed German colleagues, the family was worn down. They heard the same thing everywhere: "Why don't you get out at long last, they are just about flinging money after you."

Thanks to the "Law on Promoting Willingness to Return Home," the sum of DM 10,500, DM 1,500 for every child under 18 years of age entitled to support is "flung after" Turks, Yugoslavs, Koreans, Moroccans, and Tunesians willing to return home.

A condition is that the recipient has been affected by unemployment or constant short working hours after 31 October 1983. And he gets the money only if his minor children leave the once promised land Almanyia within 4 weeks after making his application, guaranteeing in writing that he will never be seen again as an employee. Last date for the application: last Monday.

The German government enacted the law especially for the Turks whose 20 percent unemployment is far above the German average. Nevertheless only few Turks would take advantage of the "paid kicking out" (according to the Turkish newspaper MILLIYET) were it not for additional financial inducements: allegedly they now can have their capitalized employee shares paid out to them from the pension insurance "without any waiting period" instead of having to wait for 2 years.

But the employer shares remain in the FRG: "A farewell present from us to Germany," says the embittered welder from the Weser firm, in excess of one billion DM according to initial estimates.

When there is in addition severance pay, a capitalized plant pension or the payment of bonus-advantaged savings deposits and all that adds up to DM 50,000, sometimes also to DM 100,000, Turkish family fathers "weaken in great numbers," according to the former employees council member Mahler of Mannesmann in Duisburg. A short time ago, 4,000 Turks in a mass exodus left for home, leaving behind half-empty rows of houses and half-empty school rooms.

But it was not the money alone that quickened the willingness to return home. The Mannesmann firm had held language courses and had made it clear that whoever does not pass the course would be dismissed later on, without severance pay. Only few Turks passed the test.

In view of such departures, the parliamentary state secretary with the federal labor minister, Wolfgang Vogt, gloated in May that the law on Promoting the Willingness to Return Home was "anything but a complete waste of time."

About 82,000 foreigners, over 90 percent Turks, by mid-June had asked for payment of their pension shares. But only about 15,000 foreigners, most of them again Turks, had applied for the returnee bonus. Most of the returnees went without that bonus.

It is possible that many of those willing to return home were not properly informed that they were entitled to the DM 10,500 incentive. On the other hand, others wanted the bonus even though they were not entitled to it. For example, the authorities had to explain to the skilled worker Ali Cavdar, who had been in Germany since 1965, that the detergent firm of Lever in Mannheim, where he had worked for 14 years, was neither in bankruptcy nor did it have short working hours and that he himself had given notice that he was quitting his job. "Then give me at least 5000 and I disappear," Cavdar suggested. "You quit, you haggle at home, nothing in Germany," he said he was told.

It is a fact that the returnee bonus by itself did not provide the incentive that Bonn had expected even though the expulsion climate that had arisen with the growing unemployment was aggravated by this law.

Over half of the Turks mention homesickness for Turkey and the family as first motivation for returning but almost every second of them also states that the Germans' hostility to foreigners triggered his intention to return home.

"You don't stand for it forever," Ramazan Cizar says, "that salesgirls of Hertie, Herten, Karstadt are nice to Germans. But as soon as you show up, their faces turn to stone and they treat you like a pile of dirt."

After 15 years Mohammed Bugaz, 44, has given up his work, the care of public parks, for: "In the past I used to have much fun with the colleagues, but for two years they say, Mohammed, get out, get out."

In May he returned to his hometown of Salpazari high in the mountains above the eastern Black Sea coast, as did Mehmet Karakaya, 52, whom young neo-Nazis had attacked with broken beer bottles in the Hamburg rapid transit system. "The police were standing on the platform but did not act," Mehmet said, and he came to the conclusion: "Now the time has come."

In 1982 for the first time the number of returnees was greater than those joining their family in Germany. And in 1984 the statistics will show a fantastic jump: Counting families, about 300,000 of the 1.52 million Turks (as of 1983) are likely to have moved away by September owing to the "sponsored" return.

"Our welfare service accompanies the returnees," Federal Labor Minister Bluem unctuously stated on 10 November 1983 before the Bundestag. But the magnanimity with which the Germans would like to repatriate the originally so much liked guest workers from the traditionally pro-German Turkey, at a closer look helps only a few. The gift of the Federal Government will promote some livelihoods, but the mass of the returnees faces a completely uncertain future.

This chapter of the guest worker migration in the postwar period is perhaps the saddest: For those who came, there is no real hope for integration in the countries for whose economic miracles they were indispensable since the early sixties; there is also little hope for a better life in the new homeland for the next generation, as the emigrants from Germany to the United States and those from Poland to the Ruhr territory were able to hope for.

For the overpopulated West European industrial states fighting for the scarce commodity of work are no "immigration countries." They reflect on how they can slow down the import of unemployment from the developing countries in their regions or how they can get rid of the immigrants altogether: the British their Asiatics, the French their North Africans, and the Germans their Turks.

Importing this manpower cost little and paid off because most guest workers are--to quote former Ministerialrat Christoph Rosenmoeller of the labor ministry--"with us only in their productive age. Thus the high training costs for the youths and in addition part of the old-age costs are absent."

In one respect Turkey cannot complain: it obtained foreign exchange amounting to billions from the guest workers who emigrated to Germany. With this foreign exchange, Turkey was able to cover about half of its trade deficit.

And the Turkish citizens in some respect had a better life than at home. They found work, were very well paid measured by Turkish conditions and they participated in the blessings of the German social laws.

Many a Turk who has now left Germany, who has intelligently invested his earnings, has a positive partial balance sheet, for example, Yasar Kalayci, 49, in Trabzon on the Black Sea, who spent the money he earned over two decades with the Federal Railways in Hamburg, on the education and dowry of his 9 children.

Two sons have graduated from the university and are earning money on their own, three daughters are married, and four children are still attending school.

"They should not become workers the way I am," Yasar says in the German manner. And then he still has a modest little house, a rattly taxi, the "jitney," and a few hazelnut trees. But that will not be enough for life at old age; in the good Turkish way, the children will have to help--as is the case for most returnees.

Since the beginning of the worker migration, a total of perhaps one million Turks have returned to where they belong in the opinion of most Germans--to Turkey. Nobody knows exactly how many there were and what has become of them. Only one thing everyone of the returnees knows, namely that in the Turkey of martial law he cannot speak up too much, that he must not mention the word "strike."

At customs, when crossing the Turkish border, the returning Turks are registered, then their fates are lost--the sociologist Bianka Ralle in a study calls it "disorganized" remigration. (Bianka Ralle: "Modernization and Migration by the Example of Turkey." Verlag Breitenbach Publishers, Saarbruecken, Fort Lauderdale 1981, 175 pages, DM 19.50).

German-Turkish cooperation had initiated a perhaps unique model of returnee organization: the so-called employee-owned companies.

The idea, born exactly 20 years ago in the Turkish workers club in Cologne, was fascinating: Guest workers finance and build their own factories, small and medium-sized enterprises on a stock corporation basis in their homeland regions, thus providing a contribution to development and ensure a job for themselves after their return home.

A model of qualified codetermination was supposed to be developed of which the "FRG labor unionists did not even dare dream," as one of the then pioneers dreamt, "a praiseworthy alternative to capitalism."

Enthusiastically the Turks started to recruit persons interested in the venture who were supposed to make payments to the companies among the Turkish guest workers in the large industrial centers of the FRG, The Netherlands, Denmark or Belgium. It started with 8 stockholders in Cologne, today there are 345,000, just short of 155,000 of them abroad, who invested roughly DM 2.7 billion from their savings.

It took years before Bonn and Ankara were ready to promote this audacious self-help model of the Turkish labor emigrants. The aid consists of technical and business advice--subsidized by the German side--with which at first the Saarbruecken consulting firm Isoplan was entrusted, since the end of 1980 the Frankfurt "Centrum fuer Internationale Migration und Entwicklung" (CIM) (Center for International Migration and Development). Moreover, Bonn together with Ankara fed money into a German-Turkish credit fund in which both have thus far paid in DM 54 million in equal shares; another DM 58 million has been promised.

As first--and to this date it is one of the successful employee-owned companies--the Turksan firm was founded in Cologne in 1966 with a nominal capital of DM 10 million.



It started in Istanbul in 1968 with the production of exercise books, then produced wallpaper. For years the firm was unable to pay dividends. The guest workers among the stockholders did not understand that the profit had to be reinvested: "Everybody wanted to get his money back, many left," says General Director Lutfi Renda, onetime interpreter and social worker with the workers welfare organization in Cologne, who was elected at one of the stockholders meetings.

The Turksan managers spread the risk: In 1972 they founded a tourism enterprise for flights home by guest workers and opened several duty-free shops at Turkish border stations. Later on participations in a shock absorber factory and in a housing cooperative which built 250 apartments for returnees near Istanbul were added. The firm distributed a 12-percent dividend in 1982, too little considering the 27-percent inflation prevailing at that time.

Nevertheless Turksan became the model for many other newly established businesses. In 1972 there were 28 companies, in 1975 twice as many, by the end of 1981 there were already 240, a year later over 300 were registered in the Turkish register of firm names.

But the figures are deceiving, the ideal did not meet reality: According to a German expert, there are "many that are merely names in the files": enterprises that never got beyond the planning stage. Nobody knows how many guest workers lost their money in this manner.

Only a little over 100 firms succeeded in starting production of screws or furniture, plastics or canned goods. Turksan director Renda: "And among them only 10 percent are in good shape."

Many firms failed from the start because of the fact that the founders had no idea of the prevailing conditions. Example: A group of Turkish workers adopted the plan to establish a chicken farm near Sivas, a distinctly cold area. It was the advisors who called the attention of the investors to the fact that the chickens would not lay eggs unless the farm were airconditioned.

The eggs were to be sold to the local barracks personnel but nobody had thought of the fact that the number of potential customers was too small to buy the egg production. In Turkey only career officers are entitled to eggs, conscripts do not receive any. The project had to be stopped; valuable capital was wasted for planning.

Some firms had to change their location when it became clear to the stockholders that long distances required for bringing in needed raw materials, poor infrastructure, and distant sales markets made their goods hopelessly inferior to those of the private-industry competition.

Frequently the inability of worker stockholders combined with blind confidence in the German experts was disastrous, such as in the case of the feed factory in Cepni near Sivas, which was founded in 1973 by 450 villagers working in Germany. The chairman of the board was a retired teacher, respected men of the village administration joined the firm management, what could go wrong?

German advisers then induced the feed manufacturers to purchase too expensive German machines. The firm, in operation only since 1981, is unable to produce at a break-even point. In addition to the 130 million pound investment capital, the firm had to take up a credit in the amount of 103 million pounds. According to the ex-teacher, the enterprise has been unable to submit a balance sheet "because of lack of personnel" and "we have been duped by the advisers."

Far-reaching hopes based on the employee-owned companies were not fulfilled: The development of backward areas did not take place; the companies that are still operating--only a dozen of them pay dividends--are located in developed areas.

The hope for a job at home has also been virtually shattered: About 12,000 jobs were created, in other words only one out of 25 stockholders can count on a job.

However, thus far not even 700 former guest workers are working in their firms. The wage is too low for them.

Above all, in most cases the firms are no longer "small-scale stockholders companies," as they are frequently called euphemistically in Turkey. The original founders and stockholders, the guest workers, have hardly any more influence on enterprise policy and measures of the business management.

In the capital increases which were frequently necessary, their stock share was reduced; many guest workers were no longer willing to invest more money. Their place was taken by private parties, businessmen, tradesmen, and industrialists, private banks converted obligations of the firms into stocks and thus gained control. Other companies in default came under state bank trusteeship, thus were indirectly nationalized. No later than at this point was "the idea of the factory of and for the worker abandoned," according to the Hamburg political scientist Harun Gumrukcu.

Meanwhile the Turkish government is considering how to get a hold of the guest worker foreign exchange in the future: Thus it wants to persuade the Turks abroad to participate in planned state prestige projects, such as the Ataturk dam near Malatya or the Istanbul subway. Government chief Ozal even wants to sell the Bosphorus bridge, which links Europe with Asia, to the returnees share by share. The price is said to be around DM 40.

This year once again the Bonn government promised credit to save the last employee-owned enterprises regarded as deserving support but beyond that it puts its money on financial support for returning minicapitalists.

All hope rests on them now. They are to prove that their decision is worthwhile also for their homeland. For often enough the economic bosses and politicians have emphasized the benefits of emigration but also the return of the guest workers: First of all, emigration results in a beneficial investment push as a result of the money that is sent home just as development aid would; later on the valuable experiences of the returning skilled workers are added. Labor minister Norbert Blum: "The return of qualified compatriots with industry experience constitutes a profit for the own economy."



All that proved to be an illusion.

Of the Turkish skilled workers from Germany, the domestic economy can use "two, at best three percent," the remainder is much too specialized, according to Sevket Yilmaz, chief of the Turk-Is labor union, the only one authorized in Turkey aside from one rightist-extremist and an Islamic workers organization.

The government in Ankara recently made known that shipbuilders are welcome. Suleyman Yazici, 29, also a victim of the Weser failure, then also went to the Bosphorus in high spirit: "I am still young and strong." In the meantime he has scoured all Istanbul shipbuilding enterprises, all in vain.

And the "development aid" through the money going to the homeland? According to the Ralle study limited to three Anatolian areas, 79 percent of the returnees had invested their money in houses, agricultural land, and plots of land, as well as small bank accounts. All that is said to have contributed at best to the overexpansion of the construction and service field, to the explosion of the land prices but not to the development of Turkey.

Seventy-six percent of the returning Turkish workers say they want to be self-employed in their homeland. Most of them dream of a car repair shop, a grocery store, their own taxi. And all the more disillusioning is the number of those who actually settle down in this manner: 6 percent. Namely even a trained skilled worker is in no way prepared to become suddenly an entrepreneur.

The independent small careers now being supported by Bonn frequently drag along for years, for example in Turkey's state supported small-scale industry complex at the edge of the city of Trabzon, where over 200 motor vehicle mechanics and spareparts dealers are fighting for customers.

Huseyn Naz had worked in Cologne for the Ford-Werke AG before he bought a share here. "If I had only one child, I would be well off," he says. But he has 7, 5 sons, 2 daughters. Four of his sons work with him in the enterprise; business is "so-so." And the competition? Naz: "I am best off among all of them."

The road to the FRG labor market has been blocked for the Turks since the recruitment stop in 1973. Over 150,000 were temporarily able to go to Arab countries where they are mostly working in construction gangs.

"No returnee can seriously believe he can find anything here," labor union chief Yilmaz says, "here, in a country, where job offers read as follows: 'Worker wanted, height 1.75 m, born not before 1962, military service completed.'"

In addition the meager wages and comparatively miserable working conditions--it's no surprise that returnees first want anything but that.

Their children, of course, share the sad prospects. E-welder Ramazan Cizar knew that when the family decided to return: "Aren't the young people in Germany complaining about poor opportunities? It is logical that the children of guest workers have even worse prospects."

The children of the "Almancilar," the "German Turks," have become very German, the parents probably a little bit so. The way they found and understood the host nation, that is the way it has rubbed off on them.

The furnishings of the returnees are of the kind which a nice German would like: thick upholstery, the sofa cushion adjustable by a karate chop, the synthetic gathered curtains, the Panorama wallpaper with the German Alps and the mountain lake, which is in strange contrast to the view out the window: Here lies the Black Sea, here the muezzin calls the faithful to prayer from the minaret.

Even the stand-up toilet is about to give way to the European toilet as the brightly painted toilet covers offered for sale in the bazaars indicate.

The German prejudice about the "dirty and primitive Turk" has rubbed off on the abused themselves and has induced the Turkish returnees to regard highly cleanliness, methodicalness and discipline of the Germans--they also wanted to acquire these characteristics.

The Turks who stayed at home are bugged by the frequently nouveau-riche and know-all behavior of the returnees, the Almancilar, who believe they have acquired culture and more knowledge abroad. The conservative newspaper HURRIYET in a fighting commentary made it recently clear that they are simply not welcome with this self-assessment.

Who the Almancilar are need not be said. Now they are gradually returning home. And they are bringing Germany along. If in their household goods they only brought along cars, refrigerators, washing machines, dishwashers or videos, that would not be too alarming. But they are bringing along from Germany something quite different, namely everything that they have become accustomed to and that is the bad part. Internally completely upside down, these renegades behave impudently. They are looking here for the things they saw in Germany. Every sentence starts with "in Germany." We are going to have to endure a great deal from these Almancilar. And they from us. At the end one of us will have to give in. Let's see who it will be.

"The people here do not believe anything anymore, my own stepmother does not believe that I leased my car and did not buy it for cash," Hasan Ozen complains after 11 years with the Beiersdorf AG in Hamburg. The reason: "They consider all Almancilar as kings."

But it is quite rare for someone to be in a royal position. Ali Cavdar perhaps with his seven-story house. He, himself, worked in Germany for 19 years, his wife for 14 years, his three eldest sons continue to work in Mannheim. Three apartments, at DM 150 each, can be rented out, four of them have already been assigned: for the parents and the 3 sons who will marry this summer and will soon return home.

Mr. Cavdar counts on DM 40,000 capital from the pension refund which "Germany" must transfer within the next few weeks, otherwise the money situation will be

tight. The marriage of the three, at which hundreds of people must be entertained for days, will cost a great deal of money. Each bride alone receives golden bracelets for DM 10,000 each, including the two German daughters-in-law. "That is the way it must be," Mr. Cavdar thinks.

Nurettin Akozbek in Istanbul, a king? He worked for 13 years as an electrician in Wedel near Hamburg, now he does business with "luks camasir," no luxury but everyday middle-class ladies and men's underwear.

There is not yet much to be noted of success; the "big breakthrough" is supposed to be achieved when the brother now returns from Germany and brings along a knitting machine, "so that we can produce the material ourselves."

Trabzon at the Black Sea--here sits another king from Germany: Yakup Karadirek, a mechanic for almost 14 years with the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG in Hamburg. Notice of dismissal effective 30 December 1983. He left Hamburg in a hurry. By mid-May he had not seen a penny of the returnee incentive sum, of the pension capital. Condition for payment is the return home; now the bureaucracy is obviously delaying the money payment.

His hands tremble when he speaks of his guest worker years. "Pain is marked" in his face, that is the way the Turkish poet Aras Oren would describe the man's expression, who now blurts out: "We had to flee Germany."

Yakup owns a house higher up on the mountain where he lives with his wife and children. According to his own confession, he "lost authority" over his children; his wife brought them up, he was in Germany by himself: and now he has a completely new grocery store. He has bought that because he is not needed as a mechanic in Trabzon.

The prices of soap and socks, of flour and olives rise every day with the 50-percent inflation. And since Yakup is not fully familiar with the new occupation, he does not know whether he should be happy if some of the piled-up goods remain unsold.

It is too early to say what will become of the returnees stimulated by Bonn. Kaya Sehrali, 43, at any rate is sorry about his decision.

The "Turks get out" signs on factory walls, the not very remunerative short work-week at the Bremen Vulkan-Werft--"savings were no longer possible, I had to send the family home"--had discouraged him. In 1960 he had gone from the east Anatolian Kars first to Istanbul and then to Bremen; in 1984 he quit his job at his own initiative.

Everything that he had saved in the 24 years in Germany has gone into his house in Istanbul. He has been waiting for months for his pension capital, his situation is gradually becoming critical, his savings are dwindling, eight family members must be fed.

But he does not have the courage to go to a bank and get a loan. "Everybody thinks that whoever comes from Germany is a capitalist. They laugh at me if I ask for a loan."

He went to his old employer of the past, the Istanbul shipyard, which was his first station as an itinerant worker. He considered it as humiliating: the boss told him that he was "too old, done for." And now he wants to work on his own. To do what? Kaya Sehrali has not yet made any firm plans for his future--it almost looks like he got stuck in his German past.

The welder of the Bremen Weser-Werft, Cizar, at any rate knows what he wants: Not to look at iron anymore and he wants to enjoy his homeland city of Istanbul "for a month." He goes for walks with his wife and children to the vegetable bazaar, carries the bags ("I have become a gentleman in Germany") and is happy that he can touch tomatoes, can bite into pea pods without having a German salesperson rap his knuckles.

Daughter Hulya, who everyone here thinks is a German with her naked arms, the stylish knee britches and the bright-red ballerina shoes, notes that she can hardly communicate with the onion seller. She would like to study languages: "I'd really like to do that. I know German, English and French." But not really Turkish.

Her brother Ismail hopes to be accepted at the Istanbul German school but the chances for that are not very great.

Father Ramazan Cizar with DM 25,000 will buy his way into the Turkish pension system; he will then be entitled to receive a pension within 5 years. At present a Turkish pensioner receives DM 300 a month, not really lavish when measured against the cost for foodstuffs alone for a four-member family, which is about DM 400.

For having worked at AG Weser for 20 years, he received severance pay of DM 10,000; three times DM 1,500 were deducted from his returnee bonus because he delayed his departure by three months.

After he gets all of the German money--he figures on DM 46,000--he will open his own business together with another AG Weser colleague: a welder and a heating fitter, returned from Germany, will open up a snackbar in Istanbul.

#### School Age Returnees Frustrated

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[DER SPIEGEL editor Mareike Spiess-Hohnholz on the returned children of the Turkish guest workers: "My German Teachers Liked Me"]

[Text] In official usage they are called "Turks of the second generation"--the children of workers from Anatolia born and raised in Germany.

Mustafa Goz, roofer by occupation and now an independent small entrepreneur, says about his children: "They are neither Germans nor Turks."

If you will, they are emigrants from Germany, immigrants to Turkey. Their difficulties in adapting in the country which they know for the most part only from

vacation stays are far greater than those of their parents, especially if they move to conservative rural regions.

Their first shock is the experience that they have only inadequate command of their mother tongue, a fact for which the children have to suffer in school quickly and painfully.

Only in Izmir and Istanbul are there secondary school at which German is spoken and written. In 1967 the German school in Istanbul with secondary stage I and II introduced special classes, "Turkish for returnees". Heinz Anstock, the long-time director of the renowned institute who died in the meantime, regarded it "in some respect as a paradox."

The institutes in Izmir and Istanbul in the first place are elite schools for the children of the resident citizens. Children of guest workers have hardly any chance to be accepted.

As holder of a scholarship of the Volkswagenwerk Foundation, the pedagogue Horst Widmann conducted research concerning the returnees and found that "remigrants, generally speaking, are largely loners" who fade away "in the vastness of the Turkish space," in other words the province.

The schools in the province, as do those of the cities, demand "that when a young Turk enters a school here even though he may have grown up abroad is to master the same curriculum as do those who have always attended the schools here."

That must now be accomplished by immigrant Zulkuf Caydar, 13, who attended the seventh grade of the secondary school and was first downgraded to the sixth grade in Vakfibeikir at the Black Sea.

He had thought he knew Turkish. But it probably was nothing more than the kitchen Turkish of the mother, the playing Turkish of the friends and brothers and whatever he needed in his dealings with his father.

In the "entire breadth of all subjects" the language used in instruction is "permeated with neologisms which members of the older generation also do not understand" that is the problem faced by the children returning to the Turkish Secondary School, according to educational expert Anstock.

Zulkuf, the person affected: "I can read, I can write but I understand virtually nothing."

He is frustrated, his performance in Germany was good, in Turkey he looks bad. "My German teachers liked me," he emphasizes time and again. So that it will be the same here, too, he tries excessive conformity.

He sits in his classroom straight as a ramrod, in the first row, the first on the right side among all the black-uniformed girls and the boys wearing ties in their men's suits either looking too big or too small. "Here I must simply be well dressed," the 13-year-old says, "and I also am always quiet."

In Germany Zulkuf was an entirely different child, happy, rascally, with long hair, as can be seen from a commemorative photo of a class. Allegedly it did not bother him that his head was completely shorn here, as is customary at the schools.

At the end of the school day, in pouring rain in the school yard, he fervently sings the Turkish national anthem, which he learned after he arrived in Turkey.

The following day all of Turkey celebrates the festival of youth. He marches in the last rank of the student marching platoon, drilled in military fashion, does not even stop in front of the Ataturk memorial until a class comrade nudges him in the ribs.

He has practised marching "at home in the corridor." His slogan seems to be: don't be conspicuous.

Here in Vakfikebir he abstains from his former favorite occupation: bicycling. "It is not done here," he says, and conceals the fact that in Vakfibeikir he is the only boy who possesses a bicycle.

"If you were a tear in our eyes, we would never cry so as not to lose you," a class comrade, Nicole Kniffke, had written in his farewell booklet. And the teacher: "Please write us soon how you are."

But Zulkuf "is unable to do so," he allegedly "has forgotten the name of the school." But the addresses of his former fellow-students are under the farewell words.

Fatma Erken, 19, also wants to leave Germany behind, wants to forget. For her and her brother Mehmet, 16, there was a single tremendous trigger, "to leave before it is too late." That was the film "E.T.," the "going home of the little earth alien."

Father Erken had warned that they would be unable to master the school problem, but for the eldest of the Erken children the E.T. experience was so overwhelming that the mother with Fatma, Mehmet and three other small sons left Cologne and moved to Vakfibeikir.

Fatma and Mehmet, good students in Cologne, are now at the bottom of their classes. Worse than the school frustration appears to be the discovery of having come from one strange star to another.

"I know everything about Charlemagne," Mehmet complains, "but I know nothing about Suleyman the Magnificent. I know all rivers in America but I know virtually nothing on Turkish geography."

And Fatma: "We do not know our own culture. We do not know politics, we are standing stupidly at the edge and cannot participate when our fellow students have discussions.

In Cologne, in the Turkish lessons they "jabbered away how beautiful it is in Turkey."

How would it have been possible for them to understand why thousands upon thousands of Turkish youths here are brought to trial, why they are said to have planned the "coup," and how and why they were shooting at one another in schools, universities, teahouses.

"The aim is biculturally educated children, children who can move in two cultural and language areas, the pedagogue Widmann writes, "while reality frequently only shows 'illiterates in two languages,' uprooted, alienated children and youths who cannot achieve an acceptable identity."

Finding an identity may become agony but not as Turkish newspapers like to report these days in sensational feature articles, because the Turkish children in from Germany "are missing the discos" in Turkey.

"They are wrestling with themselves a great deal," a Turkish teacher says, "but we must consider many of them as lost for us and our country. They will strive to go abroad again if they can.

"Sad for us, for they are among the best."

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